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ABSTRACT 
 
The present report identifies six problems concerning the determinacy of mental content 
which confront naturalistic accounts of such content. In the light of these six problems, an 
evaluation of representative exemplars of four alternative types of naturalistic account 
(namely basic causal, informational, producer-based teleological and consumer-based 
teleological) is provided. It is argued that whilst each type of account makes important 
contributions none satisfactorily addresses all six difficulties. The results of this evaluation 
are used to propose an alternative naturalistic account of mental content which promises to 
meet this challenge in a more satisfactory way. The proposed strategy can be seen as a blend 
of a consumer-based teleosemantics with an information-based condition. Hence, the account 
is broadly teleological and appeals: (i) both to the proper functions of representation 
producers and to the proper functions of representation consumers; (ii) both to the relations 
between an internal state and its external conditions and to the relations between internal 
states. 
 
In section II the first five of the six determinacy problems are presented against the backdrop 
of the shortcomings of simple causal accounts of mental content. The problems which are 
presented here are: The horizontal problem (HP); the vertical problem (VP); the problem of 
inscrutability of reference (PIR); the problem of necessarily co-referring/co-extensional 
representations (PNC); the problem of empty representations (PER). The disjunction 
problem (DP) is presented as a special case of (VP). 
 
Section III turns the attention to more complex causal accounts with a focus on the 
informational semantic theories of Dretske (1981) and Fodor (1987, 1990b). In section 3.1., a 
detailed exposition of three distinct notions of information is provided so as to: (i) establish 
the foundation for the critical discussion of the theories which follows; (ii) establish the basis 
for the notion of information which I develop as a part of my blended theory in section VI. 
Section 3.2.1. then presents a generic information-based account and section 3.2.1.1. 
examines Dretske‟s development of this approach in attempting to deal with the first five 
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indeterminacy problems. It is suggested that though the solutions proffered are intuitively 
attractive, his account is ultimately unsuccessful in this task.  
 
In terms of HP a line of argument is developed which will recur, in adapted forms, until the 
end of section 4.1.: Although information-based accounts give us more discriminative 
machinery in addressing the horizontal problem they face crucial difficulties in excluding 
disjunctions of proximal features from the mental contents ascribed. It will be suggested that 
the only way in which an advocate of a purely informational semantics could successfully 
deal with this problem is if he could show that such proximal disjunctions are open, and, 
hence, not projectable. However, it will be shown that the arguments for this conclusion are 
wanting. The line of argument which this section establishes, therefore, is crucial to 
motivating the adoption of a consumer-based teleosemantic background theory on which to 
graft an informational content condition. 
 
In terms of VP, I will attempt to show that Dretske‟s (1981) account is a sophisticated 
relative of a Type 1 theory of content. I will proceed to show that it succumbs to the standard 
line of criticism of Type 1 theories (i.e. that they are either false of circular) despite this 
sophistication. This discussion will, therefore, establish a line of criticism which will recur in 
section 4.1. and will help to justify the abandonment of any Type 1 theory in favour of a 
consumer-based teleosemantics based on the theory presented in section 4.2. 
 
In terms of PNC, PIR, and PER, I will consider and reject one of the two most plausible 
ways in which a pure informational semantics can attempt to deal with these problems, 
namely by appeal to the distinction between complex and simple concepts. In part this will be 
achieved by implicitly suggesting that how a representation is acquired and the relations 
which it bears to other representations are central elements of which to take note in 
developing an adequate solution to PNC and PIR. This theme will be continued in the 
discussion of Dretske‟s approach to PER. In particular, it will be suggested that the 
complex/simple distinction cannot account for empty would-be natural kind terms, the 
meaning of which may depend (in a suitable sense) on, whilst not being identical to the 
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content of other representational structures. Hence, the rejection of this line of response to 
PNC, PIR and PER will contribute to the motivation for accepting the response to these 
three problems which is defended in section 4.2. 
 
The discussion of Fodor will attempt to show that his asymmetric dependence theory can 
neither adequately resolve the problem of proximal disjunctive contents nor adequately 
resolve DP. The central line of argument will be that in order for Fodor‟s proposal to work he 
must illegitimately prioritise non-disjunctive over disjunctive potential contents. Thus his 
account is either false or circular. This then completes the discussion of the approach of pure 
informational accounts to HP and VP and sets the stage for the adoption of a teleological 
element in part VI.  
 
Fodor‟s (1994) approach to PIR is reviewed. It is suggested that its focus on the internal 
relations which a representation bears to other representations within a system is very 
valuable, even though the particular form in which Fodor presents it is ultimately untenable. 
The three deficits which the account displays are used to motivate a consumer-based 
teleological approach to the problem in section IV. 
 
Section IV introduces and examines two teleological accounts of content (a producer-based 
and a consumer-based account). In section 4.1. it is argued that an appeal to teleology shows 
early promise in resolving the problems of proximal disjunctive contents and DP. However, 
with respect to HP this promise is undermined by a specific version of the sixth determinacy 
problem, namely the problem of complex causal roles (PCR). The rejection of Dretske‟s 
solution to this problem completes the demonstration, begun in section 3.2. that no appeal to 
the process of learning can salvage an informational semantics (so long as the focus remains 
with the representation producer, that is). With respect to VP the promise of a producer-based 
teleosemantics is undermined by the general problem of PCR.  
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It is furthermore argued that producer-based teleological accounts developed on the basis of 
an informational semantics face the fundamental problem that information is not necessary 
for representation within an evolutionary perspective. In section VI the blame is placed partly 
on the producer focus of such accounts and partly on the kind of conception of information 
which they adopt. 
 
In section 4.2. a representative consumer-based teleological account is introduced, based on 
Millikan (1984). It is argued that such an account shows distinct promise of being able to 
develop the central value of an appeal to teleology in dealing with the problems of disjunctive 
proximal contents and VP/DP. However, with respect to HP, in order for this promise to be 
realised such an account must adequately deal with the problem that the contents generated 
on this account may not fall on the horizontal axis at all, resulting in unintuitive contents 
being attributed. With respect to VP, the realisation of the account‟s promise is also 
contingent on it being able to resolve the problem generated by the possible existence of 
multiple consumers.  
 
The overwhelming strength of Millikan‟s account is in its application to PNC, PIR and PER. 
The details of this application are developed so as to argue, against the backdrop of the 
failings and the reasons for those failings, of the prior theories surveyed, that this sort of 
account can potentially, in principle, offer a satisfactory solution to all three of these 
problems. It is suggested that a crucial piece in the puzzle is Millikan‟s isomorphism 
requirement. 
 
Section V introduces the sixth of the six determinacy problems, PCR, as a problem which 
potentially infects all teleological accounts. Four distinct types of response to PCR (those of 
Agar, Neander, Millikan and Papineau) are surveyed and it is suggested that though each 
makes valuable contributions to the adequate solution of the problem, none is ultimately 
satisfactory. This completes the explication of the virtues and vices of the particular accounts 
surveyed and sets the agenda for the account to be presented in section VI.       
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In this final section, the notion of information and information-based semantics is revisited, 
so as to develop an information-based condition which is compatible with a consumer-based 
teleosemantics. Ultimately it is argued that through an adapted application of Neander‟s 
proposed response to PCR to Millikan‟s consumer-based teleosemantics, combined with 
Papineau‟s focus on more complex systems we can generate a more satisfactory solution to 
the problem of complex causal roles. The addition of a broadly causal/informational 
condition to this version of teleosemantics is coherent, well motivated and promises to deal 
satisfactorily with the remaining problems of HP, VP, DP, the problem of multiple 
consumers and the problem of counterintuitive contents.           
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INTRODUCTION 
In thinking about our own minds and those of others, in explaining behaviour and in 
reasoning about the world, we attribute a range of mental states which have a certain mental 
content. That is, our commonsense view of the mind credits a large class of mental states or 
events with the property of representing (or being able to represent) parts of the world in 
which that mind exists, and to represent those parts of the world as being a certain way. One 
central question for a theory of mental content, then, is: In virtue of what do mental states 
have this property of representing the world, of being about the world? This question arises in 
a particularly perspicuous form under three philosophical assumptions: (i) The Assumption of 
Content Realism (CR): That representational properties are objective features of a certain 
class of states (i.e. mental states) (see e.g. Lloyd, 1987); (ii) The Assumption of Content 
Externalism (CE): That the content of (at least some) representational states is determined, at 
least in part, by the relations (past or present) which such states bear to their external 
environment (see also Horgan & Kriegel, 2008); (iii) The Assumption of Psychological 
Naturalism (PN): That our best account of mental states and their representational properties 
should not posit or make appeal to entities or relations which are incompatible with (our most 
plausible version of) natural science (see also Field, 1978). In the light of the conjunction of 
these three assumptions our question, then, is: In virtue of what sort of external, naturalistic 
relation does an internal, physical state come to either have or to realise a representational 
property? This, hereafter, will be referred to as “The Central Question” (CQ). 
 
Accounts of mental content which have attempted to address this question have 
characteristically found themselves confronted with a cluster of six problems concerning the 
determinacy of such content, i.e. the characteristic of mental representations to represent only 
a determinate subset of those objects to which they are related, and to represent those objects 
as having a determinate set of the properties (Lloyd, 1987). Successfully negotiating this 
cluster of problems consequently provides a crucial constraint on theory construction, and a 
crucial benchmark for theory evaluation. The present paper will critically examine 
representative exemplars of four alternative types of naturalistic account (namely basic 
causal, information theoretic, producer-based and consumer-based teleological accounts) in 
terms of their success in negotiating this cluster of determinacy problems. It will be argued 
9 
 
that whilst each type of account makes important contributions none satisfactorily addresses 
all six difficulties. The results of this evaluation are used to suggest a framework of principles 
within which an alternative naturalistic strategy could be developed in order to meet this 
challenge in a more satisfactory way. The paper ends with the construction and consideration 
of a naturalistic account of mental content constructed along these lines. The proposed 
account can be construed as a blend of a consumer-based teleosemantics and an information-
based causal account. As such the account is broadly teleological and appeals: (i) both to the 
proper functions of representation producers and to the proper functions of representation 
consumers; (ii) both to the relations between an internal state and its external conditions and 
to the relations between internal states. 
 
The project of providing a naturalistic account of mental content or mental representation is 
one of central importance in providing a materialistic theory of the mind (Field, 1978), 
compatible with a scientific outlook. A successful account of such content, therefore, would 
have importance for cognitive science and for any branch of philosophy which subscribes to a 
naturalistic outlook and requires a “theory of thought” (Godfrey-Smith, 2004). Progress in the 
attempt to resolve the difficulties revolving around the determinate nature of mental content 
which have troubled such accounts would, therefore, be a significant advance in the overall 
project. The present paper attempts to lay the foundations for the development of one way in 
which such progress may be achieved. 
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I 
PRELIMINARIES 
 
1.1. The Representation Relation and its Relata 
Fodor (1984) suggests that a theory of representation (in general) should, at least, deliver us 
necessary and sufficient conditions, C, to complete the following formula:  
(R) R represents S iff C. 
In the context of CQ I take „R‟ to range over mental states specified in a topic neutral (see 
Armstrong, 1980) fashion, i.e. to range over the set of internal states/states of affairs.  
 
1.1.1. Delimiting the Scope of ‘S’ 
The domain of „S‟ includes states of affairs, represented by formulae of the form „the x is F‟ 
(where x ranges over particulars and F over properties or structured sets of properties) (e.g. 
Dretske, 1981, 1986; Stampe, 1977). With this as the domain of S, articulating conditions C 
would provide an analysis which could serve as the basis for a naturalistic reduction of the 
content of simple, perceptual beliefs with „x‟ serving as an indexical expression (e.g. the 
belief that that is a horse) (cf. Dretske, 1981). Under certain further assumptions, however, at 
times we may wish „S‟ to range over particulars or properties. The most prominent of these 
assumptions are that a satisfactory theory of content will: (a) include a combinatorial 
semantics, and (b) account for more simple representational abilities (e.g. the representational 
abilities of animals which are cognitively more simple than humans).  
 
Accounts of mental representation, therefore, can differ in terms of whether they adopt either 
of these assumptions, and, therefore, whether they take the fundamental unit of analysis (i.e. 
the domain of S) to be entire propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires), or whether they 
take this unit of analysis to be the set of semantic elements out of which such attitudes are 
composed. 
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In the present paper I will proceed, for the most part, on the basis of the assumption that there 
are mental representational states which express only properties and that there are such states 
which refer only to individuals (hereafter ACA). I will proceed in this way for three reasons. 
The first is that assumptions (a) and (b), above seem to me to be prima facie defensible, as 
does the claim that (a) and (b) together support the idea that the domain of S should include 
not only states of affairs but properties, individuals and relations as well. This, of course, 
requires that we accept a version of Realism about Universals, and this latter view is one 
which should, to my mind, admit of defence independent of considerations concerning mental 
or linguistic representation. Hence, the assumption adopted here is contingent upon the 
possibility of such a defence.  
 
Since (a) and (b) and ACA will implicitly inform the conclusions presented in the present 
paper I should note the main reasons for my acceptance of them. The reason for my 
acceptance of (a) is the standard consideration that the existence of a combinatorial semantics 
of mental representations accounts best for the productivity and systematicity of certain sorts 
of representational states (like beliefs) (see, e.g., Fodor (1987) and Fodor and Pylshyn 
(1988)). The former refers to the property of the class of belief states which are in principle 
possible (under appropriate idealising assumptions which abstract away from certain sources 
of limitation on human powers of computation, e.g. limited resources) to be indefinitely large 
(Fodor & Pylshyn, 1988). The latter refers to the property of there being an intrinsic, but 
contingent, link between the ability to think certain thoughts and the ability to think certain 
others, at least for suitably demarcated sets of thoughts (Fodor, 1987; Fodor & Pylshyn, 
1988) (e.g. the ability to believe that the dog bit the man and the ability to believe that the 
man bit the dog).  
 
The reason for my acceptance of (b) is that it is intuitively plausible to attribute 
representational capacities to organisms which are simpler than humans, particularly given 
the assumption that mental representation is a natural phenomenon (cf. Godfrey-Smith, 
2002). However, first it is doubtful whether such organisms have the ability to possess 
complex representations with subject-predicate structure, or whether such types of 
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representations are required in order to explain the behaviour of such organisms. Second, it is 
plausible to think that levels of natural complexity tend to occupy a continuum, „shading off‟ 
at the edges (Godfrey-Smith, 2002). It therefore seems equally plausible to think that levels 
of cognitive complexity, including the complexity of mental representations, also admit of 
some variation in degree. This suggests, though doesn‟t show decisively, that we would (i) 
allow for the sort of complexity of mental content evident in complex cognitive systems such 
as human beings; (ii) allow for the lesser complexity of representations of simple states of 
affairs; (iii) allow for the simpler representation of properties and particulars on their own. 
 
The second and third reasons for adopting ACA are methodological. First, this treatment 
accords well with the fact that the six determinacy problems to be discussed in the present 
paper are most clearly articulated as concerning those features of representational states 
which are predicate structures. Second, this treatment seems to be fair to the primary 
exemplars of naturalistic theories which will occupy the focus of the first five chapters of the 
present paper. This is more or less explicit in both Fodor (1987, 1990a, 1990b) and Dretske 
(1981, 1988) Millikan (1984) takes her theory to be an attempt at accounting for all mental 
representation. Nevertheless, as her discussion of various examples in the literature attests, in 
making the dialectic between her approach and that of, e.g., Fodor or Dretske perspicuous her 
account can certainly be taken as an account of those aspects of representational states which 
express properties (i.e. the predicate-like features of such states).
1
 
 
It must be emphasized that one needn‟t adopt the assumption that mental representations 
admit of a combinatorial semantics in order to accept the idea that a complete naturalistic 
semantics should account for representational states which express only properties. One 
might, for example, think that whilst representational capacities such as beliefs are non-
compositional, such capacities exist only in higher mammals, even though simpler 
representational abilities can be found elsewhere in the natural world. It should also be 
emphasized that whilst the aforementioned assumptions are adopted in the background for the 
purposes of the present paper, no criticism will be made of theories on their basis. In the case 
                                                   
1 See, for example, her (1989) discussion of Dretske‟s (1986) magnetosome example. 
13 
 
of non-combinatorial accounts of propositional attitudes (e.g. that proposed by Papineau 
(1993) (see section 6)), criticism will be made of the non-combinatorial nature of the theory 
only insofar as this hinders either the successful achievement of the goals of such an account 
or the successful resolution of the problems of the determinacy of mental representation.  
 
In what follows, unless matters turn on the distinction, I will simply use boldface capital 
letters to range over types (including properties and types of states of affairs) and capital 
regular-face letters to refer to tokens of those types (including particular individuals and 
particular states of affairs).      
 
 
1.1.2. Two Aspects of the Relation ‘…represents…’ 
A complete theory of mental representation (and a complete answer to CQ) would be 
required to specify not only the conditions on a representational state having a certain 
content, but also the conditions on an item qualifying for representational status (see 
Neander, 2004). The present paper will focus on the question of the determinants of the 
content of a representational state, rather than on the determinants of the status of a state as 
representational. As such I will not be concerned with whether the theories to be considered 
below adequately differentiate the class of representational states from the class of non-
representational states. Furthermore, I do not intend my own positive proposals in the final 
section of the paper to be taken as aimed at this task. On this approach, therefore, a successful 
naturalistic theory of mental content would not be a complete naturalization of the class of 
contentful representational states. It would, however, be an adequate naturalization of the 
property of intentionality possessed by such states.  
 
In order for this approach to be justifiable it must be shown that we can legitimately separate 
the question of representational status from that of representational content, at least in the 
sense that we needn‟t evaluate an answer to the latter question in terms of whether it 
adequately differentiates the representational from the non-representational.  
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This approach has been questioned, sometimes on the basis that unless we provide an account 
which determines both the status of a physical state as a representation and the 
representational content of that state at once, we will be confronted with the unpalatable 
consequence of having a state which qualifies as a representation, without being a 
representation of anything (Millikan, 1989).  
 
However, this seems to me to place us in a false dilemma. Accounting for both aspects of 
representation in terms of a single set of determinants would be sufficient for avoiding the 
aforementioned unpalatable consequence. However, it does not seem to be necessary. First, 
one might maintain that the adequate set of content determining conditions is a proper subset 
of the adequate set of representational status determining conditions (see also Neander, 
2004). In this way, one secures the result that a physical state cannot qualify as a 
representation without qualifying as a representation of something in particular.  
 
It is, of course, apparently analytic that if a physical state qualifies as a representation of p 
(for some value p) then that state must qualify as a representation. However, as long as we 
are willing to forego the aim of providing a complete naturalistic account of representation 
for the more modest (though very important) aim of providing a complete naturalistic account 
of one aspect of representation (i.e. the property of intentionality), this needn‟t worry us. For, 
the more modest project does not aim to specify conditions on a physical state having a 
specific representational content. Rather, it aims to provide conditions C* so as to satisfy the 
following formula: 
(R*) Representational state, R, represents S iff C*.
2
 
 
Second, one might hold that although the adequate set of content determining conditions are 
logically independent of the adequate set of representational status determining conditions, 
                                                   
2 The more modest project‟s aspirations to comprising part of a complete naturalistic account of representation 
depend, therefore, on the promise of a naturalistic reduction of representational status.  
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given the nature of each set of conditions, there is a metaphysical or nomological necessity 
which precludes the possibility of a state qualifying as a representation though not of 
anything in particular. I will not explore this possibility in detail here. However, one can see 
at least the outlines of how such an argument might go.
3
  
 
1.2. Aims of a Naturalistic Theory of Content 
It was claimed in the previous section that a complete theory of content should provide 
necessary and sufficient conditions, C, to complete formula (R). This aim was then delimited 
to that of providing necessary and sufficient conditions, C*, to complete formula (R*). 
However, at least some of the theories discussed below (e.g. that of Fodor (1987, 1990b)), 
aim only to provide sufficient conditions for a representational state to have a certain content 
(rather than another). In the case of other theories (e.g. teleosemantic theories) it is far less 
clear how they are intended to, and how they should, be construed (see, e.g. Braddon-
Mitchell & Jackson, 1997; cf. Papineau, 2001). 
 
In addressing this issue, we must distinguish two aims which one might have in tackling the 
problem of developing a naturalistic theory of mental content: (i) to show how it is possible 
for a wholly physical system to have representational properties; (ii) to discover the 
naturalistic basis of representation in some pre-identified representational system (e.g. in 
human beings). It is the first of these projects which I take to be the purely philosophical one; 
the second, is to a significant degree an empirical one.  
 
There may be many ways in which states of a natural system can come to represent their 
world. In order to achieve aim (i), we need only to provide one of these ways; in order to 
achieve aim (ii) we need to provide that way which is not only possible within the framework 
                                                   
3
 For instance, depending on the details of the respective causal relations, holding a causal/functional role 
account of representational status, and a causal/informational account of representational content together may 
entail that no internal state which qualifies for representational status can fail to qualify as having some 
representational content or other (though whether this will be the intuitively correct content or not is another 
matter). 
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of a naturalistic metaphysics but which is also possible and actual given the nature of a 
specific natural system.   
 
Of course for those that take the task of developing a naturalistic account of mental 
representation to be that of providing a theoretical reduction of intentional properties to 
properties recognized within a naturalistic metaphysics, aims (i) and (ii) collapse into one.
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Presumably offering theoretical reductions is a respectable philosophical enterprise. Hence, 
simply claiming that the purely philosophical project of the naturalization of mental content 
is limited to aim (i), does not decide between whether philosophical theories of such content 
should be framed as providing both necessary and sufficient conditions or as providing only 
the latter.  
 
For the purposes of this section, I will confine myself to a few general remarks which will be 
important to keep in mind in what follows. 
 
Both the option of claiming to provide only sufficient conditions and the option of claiming 
to provide necessary and sufficient conditions bring with them distinct potential advantages 
as well as distinct theoretical burdens. Taking the first option apparently has the advantage 
that the burden of proof placed on the naturalistic theorist is lighter: Apparently, she needn‟t 
concern herself with demonstrating that paradigmatic cases of systems which possess 
representational capacities (e.g. humans) satisfy the conditions which she proposes, or that 
they do so in as general a way as our intuitive attribution of such states to these systems 
seems to require. Depending on the specifics of the externalist/naturalistic account of content 
which is provided, this option may also help to ease certain intuitive difficulties which 
apparently confront such accounts, such as the Swampman (Davidson, 1987) problem.
5
 This 
                                                   
4 See Kripke (1980) on the modal force of theoretical reductions. 
5 Swampman is a creature synchronically, qualitatively, identical to Davidson; that is, qualitatively, at the time 
of his coming into existence (say time t), identical to Davidson in every physical respect. However, by a freak of 
nature Swampman has his origins in a random materialisation of elements and organic matter found in a swamp. 
Hence, Swampman has no evolutionary or selectional history and when he first materialises he has had no 
causal interaction with the world in which he emerges. The difficulty is that, given that Swampman at t is 
physically identical to Davidson at t, and assuming, as we have done, a physicalistic ontology, surely his brain 
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is so, since such a theorist has, it seems, left the possibility open that Swampman has 
contentful states in virtue of satisfying some distinct set of sufficient conditions for content.   
 
However, these two advantages are mitigated by consideration of the following two points. 
First, it seems difficult to see how such a theorist‟s claim that the proposed conditions are 
sufficient for meaning/content can be assessed independently of paradigmatic examples of 
contentful states. Second, so long as one claims that one‟s conditions are merely sufficient for 
a state to have a specific content, allowing that there may be distinct sets of such sufficient 
conditions, one leaves open the possibility that the very same system can independently 
satisfy more than one set of sufficient conditions. Unless, therefore, such conditions can be 
shown always to agree in the content attributed, the proponent of this strategy must forego 
claims to having decisively resolved the problem of indeterminacy of mental content 
(Boghossian, 1991). This is particularly pressing, if such a proponent wishes to depend upon 
the possibility of alternate sufficient conditions in dealing with problems such as Swampman.    
 
On the other hand, the theorist who claims to be providing both necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a representational state having a specific content must commit himself to the 
claim that either paradigmatic representational systems satisfy his proposed conditions or else 
that such systems are not really representational systems at all. Presumably, this second 
alternative would be a highly undesirable one to take up on. However the first alternative 
commits the theorist to a substantial empirical claim, and this does not, prima facie, sit well 
with the purely philosophical methodology demanded by the theoretical question of how 
naturalistic mental representation is possible. More pressingly taking this alternative requires 
that the naturalistically inclined theorist must either provide a set of conditions for mental 
representation which accommodates the intuitions apparently marshalled by cases such as 
Swampman, or else must attempt to diffuse their force. Either way there is a substantial 
theoretical burden which such a theorist must face.  
                                                                                                                                                              
states and, in virtue of this, his mental states at t are identical to Davidson‟s at t? Yet the natural relations which 
Swampman bears to his external world seem to be completely different to those which Davidson bears to his. If 
content is fixed by certain such relations, then it seems that Swampman cannot have the same representational 
states as Davidson.   
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For the purposes of the present paper, I will, for the purposes of analysis, criticism and 
discussion, for the most part construe the various accounts considered as attempting to 
provide sufficient conditions only. Furthermore, this is how I intend my positive proposals in 
the final section to be construed. However, I adopt this line tentatively and in the full 
knowledge that the responsibilities entailed by the abovementioned theoretical burdens are 
ones that I cannot discharge in the present paper. To this end there is one important possible 
source of content indeterminacy which this paper cannot adequately resolve. 
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II 
Basic Causal Accounts, Misrepresentation and the Determinacy of Mental Content 
 
The most straightforward answer to CQ is that an internal state/state type represents some 
aspect of the world in virtue of the present or historical occurrence of actual causal 
interaction between that state/state type and that aspect of the world. One source from which 
such accounts may gain support is the consideration of the conjunction of: (a) the frequent 
differentiation between mental state content in linguistic terms (e.g. through the attribution of 
a propositional content to a belief/desire state), and (b) the popularity of causal accounts of 
the referential meaning of certain classes of linguistic items such as proper names (e.g. 
Kripke, 1980). Another source from which support may be gained is in the consideration of 
the arguments marshalled by, e.g., Putnam (1981) in support of CE (and, indeed those 
marshalled by Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979, 1986) in support of semantic externalism).  
 
Even in this skeletal form, basic causal accounts highlight the first five of the six determinacy 
problems with which I will be concerned. Following Godfrey-Smith (1989) and Lloyd (1987) 
we can conceptualise the first two of these problems as comprising the horizontal and vertical 
axes of two-dimensional Cartesian space.  
 
The so-called „horizontal problem‟ (Godfrey-Smith, 1989, p.536) (hereafter HP) arises from 
the fact that what is represented in a mental state only features as one part in the causal chain 
which eventually leads to the tokening of an internal state type. In the case of perceptual 
beliefs, for instance, the perceived object reflects light in a certain way, causing a projection 
onto the retina, causing various electromagnetic impulses to eventually trigger an internal 
state in the subject‟s central nervous system. This chain of causes extends beyond the proper 
object of the representation, since this object has a particular causal history which accounts 
for its presence in the perceiver‟s environment. In virtue of what, then, is the object of an 
internal state one of these (more proximal/more distal) causes and not another? Actual causal 
histories (of the production of states) do not seem to provide enough discriminative 
machinery (Sterelny, 1990) to answer this question satisfactorily. 
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The, so-called, „vertical problem‟ (Godfrey-Smith, 1989, p.536) (hereafter VP) arises from 
the need to differentiate the set of objects to which a mental state refers from, on the one 
hand, larger sets of which this set is a subset, and, on the other hand, smaller sets forming a 
subset of this set. The problem has different forms, but usually concerns the question of 
which aspect of an object the mental state represents. For example, if the content of the state 
is to be rabbit (and, hence, the state is to refer to the set of rabbits), this content needs to be 
differentiated from the content leporida
6
 or mammal, on the one hand, and rabbits with which 
one has had contact or this rabbit on the other. We certainly want to allow for the extension 
of a mental representation to generalize beyond the set of objects with which one has had 
causal contact, and to generalize to a specific larger set, but simple causal accounts, in 
themselves, do not seem to provide a principled basis for this.
7
  
 
 
Figure 1 
We can extend the Godfrey-Smith (1989)/Lloyd (1987) analogy by conceiving of the third 
type of indeterminacy problem as comprising a third Cartesian axis in three-dimensional 
                                                   
6 Leporidae is the family to which rabbits belong. 
7 See figure 1 below, for a graphical representation of HP and VP. 
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space.
8
 Basic causal accounts can be seen to be confronted by Quine‟s (1959) problem of the 
inscrutability of reference (hereafter PIR): The content rabbit refers to something of a certain 
ontological class, namely a unified object; the content does not refer to a temporal rabbit 
stage or to an undetached rabbit part. As causal contexts are extensional (see Davidson, 
1967), however, and as these properties (hereafter „Quine-type properties‟) are necessarily 
co-instantiated, every instance of a rabbit cause is an instance of a temporal-rabbit-stage 
cause is an instance of an undetached-rabbit-part cause. Any adequate account of mental 
content must account for the intensionality of contexts involving reference to certain types of 
representational mental states and, thus, for the fine-grained (Loewer, 2002) nature of 
content. Since causal contexts are extensional basic causal accounts on their own would seem 
be insufficient in this regard (cf. Shani, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
These three problems are really three manifestations of a general problem that all adequate 
accounts of mental representation must address, namely that of the possibility of 
misrepresentation (see, e.g., McGinn, 1982). That is, such accounts must show how it is 
possible for: (i) A state to represent an object, x, as F, when the object is not in fact F; (ii) a 
                                                   
8 See figure 2 for a graphical representation of PIR. The lines demarcating the concentric ovals are perforated to 
emphasize that the classes of items demarcated are not proper subsets of one another. 
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state to represent the presence of a Y when no Y is present (Neander, 2004). An adequate 
solution to the three axes of the problem of determinacy, therefore, is intimately connected to 
an adequate solution to the problem of misrepresentation.  
 
Adequately accounting for misrepresentation requires solving Fodor‟s (1984) problem 
referred to variously as the problem of disjunction, disjunctivism or (in lighter moments) 
disjunctivitis (hereafter DP). Basic causal accounts must accommodate cases of 
misrepresentation by making a distinction between types of internal states, X, and tokens of 
those types, X (Neander, 2004). Content is fixed for X due to causal interactions occurring 
between Xs and Ys for some property or type of state of affairs, Y. Nevertheless, on 
occasion, a token of some Z (Z≠Y) may cause a tokening of X, whence misrepresentation. 
However, consider the union of the extensions of Y and Z; call elements in this union YorZs. 
Since all Ys and all Zs are YorZs, if there is an adequate mass of causal interactions between 
tokens of Y and tokens of X then there is an adequate mass of causal interactions between 
tokens of YorZ and tokens of X. Hence, in virtue of what do Xs represent Ys rather than 
YorZs? Of course if Xs do represent YorZs then since a Z, and hence a YorZ, caused a 
tokening of X, such a case is a case of accurate representation rather than misrepresentation, 
contradicting our original assumption. It will be noted that this is a special case of the vertical 
problem (Godfrey-Smith, 1989).
9
 
                                                   
9 In this presentation of the disjunction problem I have used capitalized boldface letters to refer to elements in 
the union set of the extensions of Y and Z. However, the convention which has been adopted for the purposes of 
the present paper is to treat capitalized, boldface letters as ranging over types (i.e. properties and state of affairs 
types). Are we then to take „YorZ‟ as expressing a property?  
In answer to this, it is important to note that there are at least two general ways in which the disjunction problem 
is presented in the literature. On the one hand, it is presented as a problem concerning the extensions of mental 
representational states (cf. Gates, 1996); on the other hand it is presented as a problem concerning the property 
expressed by a mental representation (cf. Fodor, 1990a, 1990b). Although it is uncontroversial that there are 
disjunctive predicates, it is substantially more controversial whether there are disjunctive properties. Assuming 
that there are no such properties, the disjunction problem is essentially the problem that it is indeterminate 
which of two (or three, etc.) properties a mental representation expresses, where at least one of these properties 
is picked out in English by a disjunctive predicate. On this reading, given that the property expressed by a 
predicate determines the extension of the predicate, the property expressed by „YorZ‟ will determine an 
extension which is disjunctive in the sense that it is the union of the extensions picked out by the two predicates 
used to form the disjunctive predicate „Y or Z‟. One apparent problem for viewing the disjunction problem in 
these terms is that it seems to license the view that the property which is expressed by „YorZ‟ is a property 
which is shared by Ys and Zs. However, it is not clear that for any two representationally relevant properties 
(that is properties which can feature in a naturalistic theory of content), there is always a representationally 
relevant property shared by every object which has either of the first two properties. The assumption which must 
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It has been alluded to above that mental representations are determinate not just in the sense 
of having a specific object (class of objects) but in representing the object in a specific way. 
The fourth and fifth determinacy problems concern this second aspect of determinacy. The 
fourth problem concerns the possibility of representational contents which are distinct yet 
necessarily co-refer (hereafter, PNC). For example, the belief that water is cool seems to be 
distinct from the belief that H2O is cool. Yet, since H2O is water (and necessarily so (Kripke, 
1980)), every water causing is an H2O causing and so it seems that on a basic causal account, 
the content of these two beliefs must be the same. 
 
The fifth problem is that of empty representations (PER). Basic causal accounts face 
difficulties in: (i) Accounting for states which apparently have content but do not have a 
referent, for on such theories world-brain actual causal interactions determine both referent 
and content; (ii) accounting for how such referentially empty representations could differ 
from one another in terms of content, since on such accounts all such representations are, 
presumably, contentless (see also Greenberg & Harman, 2005).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
be made, therefore, is that since both Ys and Zs cause tokenings of Xs, they must share some property in virtue 
of which they do this. But it is far from clear that this is true.  
It may be better, therefore, to construe the disjunction problem as being concerned simply with the extensions of 
mental terms: That is the problem of disjunctivism is the problem that it is indeterminate as to what the 
extension of a mental representations is.  
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III 
More Complex Causal Accounts, Indication and Information 
 
Basic causal accounts attempt to fix content by appeal to actual causal relations and falter on 
the first five problems of determinacy. Increased discriminative machinery (Sterelny, 1990) 
would be supplied by appeal to relevant counterfactual cases as well. This is the central 
motivation behind complex causal accounts, including the informational/indicator semantics 
of Dretske (1981) and Fodor (1987) (Sterelny, 1984; Godfrey-Smith, 1989). The present 
section will discuss these accounts and their contributions to solving the first five 
indeterminacy problems. Section 3.1. presents three distinct versions of the notion of 
„carrying information‟ which can be extracted from the work of Dretske (1981, 1986, 1988) 
and Fodor (1987, 1990a). Sections 3.2. then discusses the distinctive information-based 
accounts of mental representation which Dretske (1981) and Fodor (1987, 1990a, 1990b), 
respectively, develop and their contributions to the resolution of the problems of 
indeterminacy.  
  
3.1. Indication, Information and Reliable Co-variation 
 
3.1.1. The Accounts 
Dretske (1981, 1984) attempts to develop a naturalistic theory of mental representation 
founded on a semantic account of information, informed by Shannon‟s (1948) mathematical 
theory of communication. On this account of mental representation the fundamental condition 
on a state‟s representing some aspect of the world is that that state carry information about 
that aspect of the world. I take the two central features of Dretske‟s account of information to 
be that: 
(i) The information relation is determined by the relation of reliable indication. 
(ii) The relation of reliable indication can be explicated in terms of conditional probability 
and natural law. 
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The indication relation, in turn, is best taken to obtain between types of states of affairs 
(Godfrey-Smith, 1992) (although Dretske (1986) restricts it to tokens) such that:  
(I) X indicates Y iff if an X occurs then a Y occurs (Neander, 2004). 
 
The successive developments of Dretske‟s account of information can be seen as different 
ways of interpreting the given conditional. Dretske‟s (1981) account of information requires 
that r‟s being X‟ (hereafter X(r), following Loewer (1987)) carries the information that Y(s) 
iff (i) the conditional probability of Y(s) on X(r) is 1, and (ii) this correlation is underwritten 
by natural law. In particular Dretske (1981, p.245, n.1) requires that there be a 
“nomic…regularity between these event types…which nomically precludes [X(r) when it is 
not the case that Y(s)]”.  
 
In order to avoid scepticism about the existence of information and to adequately handle his 
own paradigmatic examples of the information relation, Dretske (1981) suggests that the 
nomic regularities which underwrite the relation of carrying information should be 
understood as relativised to certain specifiable standing conditions. It is relative to these 
„channel conditions‟ (i.e. that set of physical items, parts and processes which mediate the 
transmission of information (cf. Millikan, 2000)) that the relevant conditional probability is 1.  
 
These channel conditions are meant to reveal rather than eclipse the dependency which 
obtains between the relevant event types. The occurrence of an X must, therefore, do some 
work over and above the standing conditions in precluding the possibility of s not being Y. 
Hence, letting the set of channel conditions be denoted by {Ci}iε[1,n], we can formulate 
Dretske‟s (1981) account of information as follows (cf. Loewer, 1987): 
(DI1) X(r) carries the information that Y(s) if and only if there exist some strict 
law of the form „□((...&CC)→...)‟ (where „CC‟ is a complete description of the 
elements of {Ci}iε[1,n], under the relevant types) which is true for the substitution 
of X in the first open position and Y in the second, and there exists no law of the 
form „□(CC→...)‟ which is true for the substitution of Y in the second position. 
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Dretske (1986, 1988) weakens this account by allowing that the relevant conditional 
probability may be less than one (though sufficiently close to it), and allowing that the 
correlation need not be underwritten by a causal or nomic relation. There must however be a 
contextually relevant condition which explains the existence/persistence of the correlation, 
thereby eliminating the possibility that it is a merely accidental/chance correlation (1988, 
p.57). 
 
Given this interpretation of Dretske (1981), we must construe his (1986, 1988) versions of the 
notion of information as being based on the idea that there are cases in which one would 
intuitively allow that X(r) carries the information that Y(s), and yet for no set of conditions 
{Ci}iε[1,n], is there a description CC such that □((X&CC)→Y) is true. In such cases, Dretske 
allows that as long as there is some condition which explains the correlation between X and 
Y, instances of the former can carry information about instances of the latter.
10
  
 
The central notion tying all of these presentations together, therefore, is that the relation of 
„carrying information that‟ is underwritten by a genuine, rather than accidental, correlation 
and dependence between the events related thereby. This dependence holds, moreover, only 
when certain counterfactuals of the form „X(r) would not be the case unless Y(s) were the 
case‟ are true (Dretske, 1986; McLaughlin, 1991). With this in mind, we can construe 
Dretske‟s (1986, 1988) presentation of information as depending on the idea that the presence 
of a condition which explains a correlation between two events can support counterfactual 
generalizations of the aforementioned form, even if this support is to a more limited degree 
than if such events were linked by a strict law relativised to channel conditions.
11
  
 
                                                   
10 In what follows I will refer to this account of information as DI2. 
11
 It should be noted that the conditions which obtain in the case of a non-accidental correlation between two 
events which are not linked by a strict law, and which are captured in an appropriate explanation of the 
correlation, differ significantly from the channel conditions. The latter are, whilst the former are not, such that it 
is possible for some description of them, „C‟, to be substituted for „CC‟ in „□((X&CC)→Y)‟ to yield a true 
statement. 
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A somewhat different account of information is given by Fodor (1990a, 1990b). According to 
this account: 
(FI) Xs carry information about Ys (under that description) if and only if there is 
a nomic connection between the property of being a Y and the property of being a 
cause of Xs. That is, the generalization “Ys cause Xs” is a law (1990a, p.57).  
 
This shares with Dretske‟s (1981) analysis the feature that the relation of „carrying 
information that‟ is underwritten by natural law in the very strict sense that there must be a 
natural law connecting Xs and Ys (under those descriptions) if Xs are to carry information 
about Ys (under those descriptions). However, it differs from Dretske‟s analysis in two 
(perhaps three) important ways. First, the direction of the dependence differs: FI allows, 
whilst DI1 does not that X(r) can carry the information that Y(s) even if X(r) can occur when 
it is not the case that Y(s), since an event type can have more than one cause.
12
 Second on FI, 
though not necessarily on DI1 or DI2 the relation of „carrying information that‟ is 
underwritten by a causal relation. Third whereas Dretske (1981) seems to require that the 
channel conditions be specifiable and that the relevant law once amended with these channel 
conditions be strict, Fodor allows that the laws in question may be ceteris paribus laws 
(Fodor, 1990a, 1990b; Boghossian, 1991).
13
       
 
Hence, to summarise, there are a number of different positions one can take up in providing a 
naturalistic account of the information relation. These positions can be conceptualized on the 
basis of the following three questions: 
(i) What is the direction of the dependence required? 
(ii) Need this dependence be lawful? 
(iii) Need this dependence be underwritten by the causal relation? 
                                                   
12
  Assuming that we can represent the lawful generalisation „Ys cause Xs‟ as „□(Y→X)‟ (as Fodor (1987, 
1990a, 1990b, 1991) seems to imply), we can see the difference between the two proposals immediately.  
13 Whether one takes this to be a genuine difference or not depends, however, both on Dretske‟s account of 
channel conditions as well as whether one thinks that the ceteris paribus condition can always in principle be 
filled out. 
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Different answers (and their permutations) to these three questions will determine a range of 
accounts of information. As we will see, utilizing these different accounts of information as 
the foundation for an account of mental representation will confront one with different 
problems. 
 
3.2. Proposed Solutions to the Problems of Determinacy 
The aim of the present section will be to examine the way in which information-based 
accounts of mental content attempt to deal with the first five problems of indeterminacy 
which were outlined in section II. The focus of the section will be the distinct proposals of 
Dretske (1981) and Fodor (1987, 1990b). 
  
3.2.1. Informational Semantics 
The generic idea lying behind information-based accounts of mental representation can be 
stated as follows: 
(IS) X represents Y only if Xs carry information about Ys (at least, under certain 
circumstances).  
Specific accounts in this family differ, however, in terms of which further conditions they 
stipulate as required for mental content. 
 
3.2.1.1. Dretske (1981) 
 
3.2.1.1.1. The Account 
Dretske notes that on his account of information informational content will often not be 
unique. Given that X(r) carries the information that Y(s), X(r) will also carry all of the 
information carried by (or „nested‟ in (Dretske, 1981)) Y(s). This is a significant prima facie 
drawback for using this theory of information as a basis for a theory of mental content which 
is able to cope with accommodating the determinate nature of such content. Dretske attempts 
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to address this problem first by utilizing the basis notion of informational content so as to 
generate an account of a semantic-like content which is determinate.  
 
He proceeds via the following definitions. If X(r) carries the information that Y(s) only in 
virtue of Y(s) being nested in the further information about s, Z(s), then X(r) carries the 
information that Y(s) in analog form. If X(r) carries the information that Y(s) without 
carrying any further information about s, Z(s), in which Y(s) is nested then X(r) carries the 
information that Y(s) in digital form. If X(r) carries the information that Y(s) without 
carrying any further information about any t (t not necessarily equal to s), Z(t), in which Y(s) 
is nested then X(r) carries the information that Y(s) in completely digitalised form. Hence, to 
carry Y(s) in digital form is to carry Y(s) as the most specific piece of information about s 
(Dretske, 1981, p.177). Any information which X carries in completely digitalised form is the 
most specific information carried by X. Since every item of information is nested in itself, 
this definition implies that if X(r) carries the information that Y(s) in completely digitalised 
form, then it carries it in digital form. However, the converse does not hold (Dretske, 1981, 
p.185).
14
  
 
Figure 3 
                                                   
14 See figure 3 for a graphical representation of the notions of information and analog, digital and completely 
digital forms of coding of that information. (cf. Dretske, 1981, p.177)  
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The notion of complete digitalization forms the basis for Dretske‟s notion of semantic 
content: 
(SC) For all r, s, for all X, Y, X(r) has Y(s) as its semantic content iffdef X(r) 
carries the information that Y(s) in completely digitalized form. (cf. Dretske, 
1981, p.185)  
 
Now, X(r) has Y(s) as its semantic content only if X(r) carries the information that Y(s), and 
hence, only if s is Y. So identifying mental content with semantic content would leave no 
room for error or misrepresentation. In order to address this problem Dretske (1981, ch.8) 
distinguishes between two contexts in which X can be tokened: The learning and post-
learning contexts. For any representational state, X, the content of the inner state type is that 
information which is completely digitalised by X within the learning context. Tokens 
occurring outside of this context, however, needn‟t carry this information, and when they do 
not misrepresentation occurs. Hence, the tokens of the type gain their representational content 
from the representational content of the type of which they are tokens, and the type gains its 
representational content from the information born by its tokens within a specific context.  
 
Hence, the final account of mental content which Dretske (1981) gives is as follows: 
(MCD1) For any X, Y, X(…) carries the information that Y(…)
15
 iffdef during the 
learning period, L, instantiations of X(…) came to have Y(…) as their semantic 
content.   
                                                   
15 My understanding of Dretske‟s (1981, ch.9) account of concepts is that they are abstract meaningful structures 
which can be instantiated relative to objects indexically specified (i.e. the „s‟s, „t‟s, etc. of the preceding 
discussion) to yield de re beliefs. It is the concepts which provide the meaning specified by predicate clauses of 
the form „…is F‟. The object of discussion here has changed from the representation of specific states of affairs 
indexically specified, to the abstract concepts which express that meaning which can be expressed in English 
through open sentences of the form „…is F‟. Formulae of the form Y(…) are meant to convey this meaning. 
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The mechanism which Dretske envisions for the complete digitalization of the information 
that Y(…) involves a process of such information being used during L to shape the 
discriminatory and classificatory behaviour of the subject of the state tokens of X, assisted by 
training or feedback mechanisms. The role of learning and feedback in Dretske (1981) is 
simply that it is a mechanism for assisting in the development of a structure which carries a 
certain piece of information in completely digitalized form. It is the fact that this structure 
comes to have this piece of information as its semantic content which is determinative of 
content not any function rendered by the process of learning. This differentiates Dretske‟s 
(1981) account from his (1986, 1988) account.    
 
3.2.1.1.2. The Proposed Solutions 
 
HP 
Such an account attempts to solve HP by: (i) Appealing to differences across nomologically 
possible worlds in the degree of correlation between more proximal and more distal features 
appearing in the causal production of a state; (ii) taking the proper object of representation to 
be that item, closest on the horizontal axis to the state, about which that state carries 
information (Dretske, 1981; Godfrey-Smith, 1989; Lloyd, 1987). (i) renders that set of 
properties which appear on the horizontal axis such that their occurrence is entailed (given 
suitable channel conditions) by the tokening of an X. (ii) renders that property, information 
about which has been completely digitalized by X.    
 
This strategy is an intuitively attractive one. However, it is not clear that it is ultimately 
successful. The attempted solution rests on the idea that given the appropriate channel 
conditions, at certain points on the horizontal access there can be considerable variation in the 
properties which can be instantiated even though X is instantiated regardless. As such the 
conditional probability that any one of these properties is instantiated on the instantiation of 
X is less than 1. However, it seems to be plausible that the possibilities for variation in 
proximal intermediaries decreases as one moves toward the immediate causes of an internal 
state, so that at a suitably proximal distance from X on the horizontal axis, there will be no 
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room for variation of properties given the channel conditions. If this is so, then tokens of X 
will represent this proximal condition (since that is the piece of information which they carry 
in completely digitalized form). Hence, it becomes unclear how Dretske‟s (1981) account can 
yield distal contents (see Leon, 1987).  
 
Arguably, the key assumption in the above argument is an empirical one. However, there is a 
more theoretical argument against this attempted solution of HP as well. Suppose that there is 
room for suitable variation at each point on the horizontal axis prior to but not including that 
point at which the property which is the intuitively correct object of representation, say Y, 
occurs. Suppose that for each point, i, between X and Y, the set of possible properties which 
can be instantiated without affecting the tokening of an X is {Pj}
(i)
jε[1,n(i)]. But then Xs will 
carry the information that P
(i)
1(…) occurred or P
(i)
2(…) occurred or…or P
(i)
n(…) occurred. In 
virtue of what is it the case that Xs represent Ys rather than P
(i)
1VP
(i)
2V…VP
(i)
n? Given that 
the disjunctive predicate exhausts all of the possibilities, the conditional probability of the 
state of affairs type characterised by this disjunctive predicate on X is 1, and since it appears 
closer on the horizontal axis to X than does Y, it is a more viable contender for the 
information carried in completely digitalized form by X. That is, it is unclear why we cannot 
take the disjunction of possible proximate causes between the purported represented item and 
the internal state to be what is represented, rather than the purported represented item (Lloyd, 
1987).
16
 
 
                                                   
16 See figure 4 for a graphical representation of this point. In the figure the i-th position is conceived of as 
corresponding to the retinal projections of the rabbit, and the (in this model, finite) number of P(i)s are conceived 
as the various ways that the light reflected from a rabbit can strike the retina whilst still causing a tokening of an 
X.  
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Figure 4 
 
Two possible replies to this argument should be considered. First, it might be suggested that 
the requirement that there be a law which underwrites the relevant conditional probability 
might help one to avoid the difficulty. For, not every predicate is projectable, even if it is 
constituted entirely out of projectable predicates. However, this reply seems to be of no help 
to Dretske, since it depends upon there being available a theory of projectability which makes 
no appeal to any intentional or semantic notion, and some prime candidates for the title of 
„correct theory of projectability‟ (e.g. Goodman‟s) would not meet that standard (Gates, 
1996). But moreover, we have seen that the really fundamental notion in Dretske‟s theory of, 
the notion which the nomological condition is meant to capture, is that the relevant 
dependencies be counterfactual-supporting, and, hence, non-accidental. However, in these 
sorts of cases, given that the disjunctive predicates exhaust all of the relevant possibilities, it 
does seem that the relation between Xs and the state of affairs type picked out by such a 
predicate is counterfactual-supporting. For, were an X to occur, such a state of affairs type 
would have to occur, since it is only by its occurrence that an X can occur.   
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The second reply is that the assumption that there are only finitely many possibilities for each 
i is unwarranted. After all, we are concerned with counterfactual possibilities here and there 
may be infinitely many for each i. It may be suggested that once we remove this assumption, 
the problem disappears because infinite disjunctions are not projectable (cf. Fodor, 1990b).  
 
Well, surely the burden of proof here must fall on the shoulders of the proponent of (MCD1), 
since it is he who is attempting to show that a satisfactory, wholly naturalistic account of 
mental representation is possible. Dretske (1986) and Fodor (1990b) have each offered 
arguments which attempt to discharge this burden. However, it seems to me that neither 
argument is successful. 
 
Consider first the argument in Dretske (1986) presented in a somewhat different context. 
Dretske argues that in the case of more complex organisms, through the process of 
associative learning a number of different stimuli can come to trigger a single internal state. 
Dretske holds that in principle there is no upper bound on the number of different stimuli 
which can possibly come to fill this intermediary role. His explicit conclusion is that there is 
no time-invariant disjunction of state types which can be held to be the content of X. For 
present purposes, I will take Dretske‟s idea to be that although the class of proximal stimuli 
which actually will come to trigger tokens of the internal state type through associative 
learning is finite, the class of possible proximal stimuli which can come to trigger an internal 
state through associative learning varies over time and is infinitely large at all times.
17
 
  
If this move is to do the work that Dretske requires of it then the every member of the set of 
possible proximal stimuli which can become triggers of X through associative learning must 
be such that it carries the information that Y(…). For otherwise, X(...) would not carry the 
information that Y(...). However, it is a substantial empirical assumption that this class is 
unbounded in size, one which is not supported by the fact that in the theory of classical 
conditioning the class of unconditioned stimuli can consist entirely of arbitrary members. For 
                                                   
17 It may seem that this is not the most natural way to read Dretske (1986). However, it does seem to me to be 
the strongest way of reading his proposal which is in accord with the word of his (1986). 
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in standard cases of such associative learning the conditioned stimulus need not carry any 
information about the unconditioned stimulus.  
 
More importantly, since content is fixed in the learning context (L), the relevant times, t, for 
which we need to consider the class of possible proximal stimuli which can become triggers 
of X through associative learning {psi}iε[1,∞]
(t)
, are just those within L. The idea being that 
though the channel conditions which obtain in L nomically preclude the occurrence of any 
non-Y at the same point on the horizontal axis as is occupied by Y, they do not preclude any 
of the members of {psi}iε[1,∞]
(t)
 from occurring. Hence, it would seem that mechanisms which 
underpin the processes involved in associative learning are all admissible within the learning 
context. 
 
However, if the class {psi}iε[1,∞]
(t)(j)
 is specified as the class of all elements which can appear 
at point j on the horizontal axis, at time t, where this class is infinitely large due to the 
admissibility of the mechanisms of associative learning in L, then it seems that there would 
be nothing to preclude {psi}iε[1,∞]
(t)(j)
 from including secondarily conditioned stimuli.
18
 
Moreover, these secondarily conditioned stimuli needn‟t carry the information that F(…), 
since their status as triggers of X does not depend on their presentation in the presence of Ys. 
However, if {psi}iε[1,∞]
(t)(j)
 does include such stimuli, then X(…) does not carry the semantic 
content that Y(…) since it is possible within L for an X to be tokened in the absence of a Y, 
since an X will be tokened in response to a secondarily conditioned stimulus. 
 
Hence, this first line of argument for the conclusion that there are only finitely many possible 
alternative causes at each i on the horizontal axis is unsuccessful.   
 
The second line of argument for this conclusion (given in Fodor (1990b)) suggests that, at 
least in the case of medium sized perceptual objects such as cows, the class of proximal 
                                                   
18 A secondarily conditioned stimulus is a conditioned stimulus which comes to elicit the target response due to 
its association with another conditioned stimulus. 
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stimuli is infinite, since belief fixation has a holistic character (Boghossian, 1991): What 
proximal stimuli you believe to be associated with cows (smells, sounds, images, etc.) will 
help to determine what proximal stimuli can cause a token of a mental symbol representing 
cows. Since, any proximal stimulus can become a trigger of the relevant internal state token 
given a suitable set of background beliefs, the class of possible proximal stimuli is infinitely 
large. 
 
However, I think that this argument is a non-starter in the present context. For, though we 
might claim that the apparent circularity of the appeal to background beliefs can be avoided 
by focussing on the underlying physical dispositions required to implement that set of beliefs, 
the same sort of physical complexity can be attributed at any point on the horizontal axis. 
That is, if it is true that theory can mediate which proximal stimuli come to trigger an internal 
representational state, then it is equally true that theory can mediate which distal stimuli can 
come to trigger the same internal state type. To suppose otherwise would be the beg the 
question by illicitly assuming that one distal state of affairs is the proper representational 
object rather than another. However, why then can we not eliminate the distal state of affairs 
which is intuitively represented by the internal state from the status of representational 
object?
19
 Hence, Fodor‟s appeal is either circular or unhelpful. 
 
Hence, it seems that Dretske‟s (1981) account does not adequately resolve HP. 
 
VP 
The proposal for addressing the problem of VP appeals to similar resources as those utilized 
in HP. Appeal is made to differences across nomologically possible worlds in the degree of 
correlation between an internal state type, X, and the properties which define the possible 
supersets and subsets into which the possible represented, Y, falls.  Hence, a state type, X, 
has the content rabbit, rather that leporida, mammal, rabbits with which one has had causal 
                                                   
19 See also Boghossian (1991). 
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contact, or this rabbit because the nomic dependence obtains between Xs and rabbits rather 
than mammals, etc. (cf. Fodor, 1990b).  
 
However, the problem of disjunction is more tricky and highlights a more general difficulty 
concerning the notion of information/indication. If that X represents Y requires that X(…) 
has Y(…) as its semantic content (and hence carries the information that Y(...) according to 
DI1) then error would seem to be excluded. Suppose then that X represents Y can allow for 
P(Y,X)<1 (i.e. suppose we weaken DI1 to DI2). Then for any purported Z (≠Y), occurrences 
of which can cause occurrences of X, X correlates strictly better with YorZ than with Y.
20
 X 
therefore has a disjunctive content, and extending this argument renders error impossible. On 
either conception of information, therefore, error seems to be impossible. 
 
It has already been noted above that Dretske (1981) attempts to deal with this problem and 
allow for error by distinguishing between the learning and post-learning environments. 
Hence, Dretske‟s account seems to be a Type 1 theory (Fodor, 1990a), since it apparently 
attempts to fix content by specifying a context in which only one sort of information can be 
carried by X. The standard line of criticism against Type 1 theories is that they either do not 
solve the problems which they are meant to or that they do so in a circular way. In the 
discussion that follows I will show that: (i) Dretske‟s (1981) account is a very sophisticated 
Type 1 theory; (ii) it succumbs to the standard line of criticism regardless.  
 
Fodor (1984) has objected to Dretske‟s account that even if the learning context/post-learning 
context can be adequately drawn it will not succeed in solving the problem of DP (Fodor, 
1984). (MCD1) attempts to allow for error by fixing the content of a representation, X, 
according to the information, Y, which it carries within (L), and then allowing that it needn‟t 
carry the information that Y outside of (L). Hence outside of (L) X can be tokened in 
response to both Ys and Zs (where Z≠Y). But if this is true, then if a Z were to occur during 
the learning period then it would have caused a tokening of X. However, it is the 
                                                   
20 That is, P(Y,X)<P(YorZ,X)≤1. 
38 
 
counterfactual dependence between Xs and states in the world which determines the 
informational content which X carries. Hence, it is not true that X carries the information that 
Y in (L), since it is not true that an X would not occur unless a Y were to occur: An X would 
occur without a Y, namely in the presence of a Z. Rather if X carries any information in (L) 
then it must carry the information that YorZ. Hence, X has the content YorZ outside of (L) 
and, hence, tokens of X caused by Zs are accurate representations not misrepresentations. 
 
A second objection to (MCD1) questions whether the distinction between the learning and 
post-learning environments can be drawn in a naturalistic way (Loewer, 1987; Fodor, 1987), 
and can be drawn sharply enough to support the distinction between truth and falsity (or 
accurate and inaccurate representation) (Fodor, 1984, 1987, 1990a).  
 
There seem to be at least two concerns here. First (see, e.g., Fodor (1987)), there is the 
concern that there is no principled distinction between the period of time during which a 
representation is undergoing the shaping of its content, prior to its application being evaluable 
as true and false (or correct and incorrect), and the period of time during which the content 
has been shaped and the representation is only being applied.
21
 The distinction between truth 
and falsity, correct or incorrect application, is an all or nothing affair; however, the 
distinction between the learning and post-learning environment is a matter of degree. Hence 
the latter distinction cannot be the basis for the former. Second (see, e.g. Loewer (1987)), 
there is the concern that it seems plausible to think that different concepts will have different 
learning periods and, hence, what counts as the learning period for one concept can only be 
specified with reference to the content of the concept. Hence, the learning/post-learning 
distinction threatens to be question-begging as far as the project of developing a naturalistic 
account of mental content is concerned. 
 
                                                   
21 This worry is highlighted by the fact that it seems intuitive that we should allow it to be possible for a mental 
representation to change its content over time. This, moreover, presumably occurs during the time when a 
representation, the content of which has already been shaped, is now being applied in a way that can be 
evaluated as true or false (or correct and incorrect). 
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However, it seems to me that there is a way for Dretske to respond to these objections. 
Dretske is not explicit about what constitutes the learning period; however, his comments are 
suggestive. Based on his primary and central presentation of his proposed solution to the 
problem of misrepresentation (1981, p.193) I suggest that we can frame the following 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a period of time to count as a learning period which 
are in accord with the spirit of his account: 
(LP) A period of time [t1, tn] constitutes a learning period for a mental 
representation, X(r) iff there exists some state of affairs F(s) such that: 
(a) At t1 X(r) codes in analog form the information that F(s), relative to channel 
conditions CC; 
(b) At tn X(r) codes, for the first time, in completely digitalised form the information 
that F(s), relative to channel conditions CC. 
 
Notice that neither the analysandum nor the analysans of (LP) individuates the mental 
representation which is a candidate to have a learning period with reference to its content. 
Hence, it is now open to us to identify (as Dretske does) the content of the representational 
state as that piece of information the development in coding of which defines [t1, tn] as a 
learning period for X.   
 
Three points are notable about (LP) the first is that the demarcation between the learning 
period and the post-learning period is sharp: As soon as X digitalises any piece of 
information which it has carried in analog form in the past, the learning period ends and the 
content of X is that information which it has digitalized, whatever that may be.  Second, it is 
also possible that X carries information other than F(s); if any of this information is carried at 
a later point in completely digitalized form then that piece of information becomes the 
content of X. Hence, in order that X has a determinate content, we must stipulate that the 
content of X is that informational content that has been completely digitalized in the most 
recent learning period. Third, it is not a requirement of (LP) that the channel conditions 
relative to which X carries the completely digitalized information which it does at the end of 
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(LP) would have to obtain throughout the period [t1,tn].
22
 Rather, the channel conditions 
which obtain at t1 and tn and relative to which X(r) carries F(s) in analog form at t1 and in 
digital form at tn can change and, hence, fail to obtain at other times tj, jε(1,n). 
23
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
                                                   
22 (LP) has been constructed to secure this result, since there must be some mechanism which mediates this 
development of the ability to digitalise information. As Dretske himself implies, the most plausible mechanisms 
to fill this role involve the presentation of items from a contrast class which could easily elicit a token of the 
representational state concerned. 
23 See figure 5, below for a graphical representation of this construal of the learning period, (L). In the figure, 
F(s) might be an object‟s being a bird. This information is carried in analog form, since the object is a specific 
type of bird (e.g. a canary); this is represented by „E(s)‟. This piece of information is also carried in analog form 
since its relationship with X is mediated by some more proximal stimulus such as light striking the retina in a 
certain way. F(s) also carries further information, say that s is a mammal (this is denoted by G(s)). Over the 
course of time from t1 to tn the subject of S becomes able to „generalize‟ over a large variety of particular ways 
in which birds reflect light, and to „generalise, over a large variety of different specific kinds of bird. This may 
happen by the presentation at tj of various non-canary birds (e.g. yellow budgies) and perhaps certain non-birds 
which are easily confused with birds. This latter possibility is represented by H(t) (notice that this information is 
also carried in analog form, since there must be a particular kind of non-bird presented, which may cause the 
same pattern of light to be projected onto the retina of the subject. Finally notice that X does not express Z, 
since there is no progression from analog to completely digitalized form.    
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Hence, (LP) is a naturalistic definition of the learning period which can support Dretske‟s 
project and which allows for: (i) a sharp enough distinction between learning and post-
learning contexts; (ii) the change in meaning of a concept. It also demonstrates how we can 
allow that different concepts can have different learning periods, without our needing to 
specify the learning period with reference to the content of the concept.
24
 Finally, it avoids 
Fodor‟s objection since so long as there is no pair of times (ta,tb) such that a,b ε [1,n], a≠1, 
b≠n, and X carries the information that YorZ in analog form at ta and X carries the 
information that YorZ in completely digitalised form at tb, then X has the content Y rather 
than YorZ.  
 
It seems to me that IF the notion of channel conditions can be adequately articulated, there is 
nothing incoherent with attempting to salvage MCD1 by appeal to LP. However, the „if‟ in 
the opening line of this paragraph is a big „if‟ (literally and metaphorically), since it requires 
an account of channel conditions which are not only naturalistically specifiable and non 
question-begging but also non ad hoc (Neander, 2011). I don‟t have a knock-down argument 
that such a specification is not available; however, it is not at all clear that it is. Certainly if it 
is Dretske hasn‟t told us enough about channel conditions to see that it is. More likely, it 
seems that the problem of giving a naturalistic account of mental representation just recurs at 
the level of giving a naturalistic account of channel conditions. This is the fundamental 
problem which I see in the current proposed solution to VP, the problem of error and the 
problem of DP.  
 
The threat of circularity is a problem which MCD1 shares, I would suggest, with Type 1 
theories in general. In constructing a theory of content we want to isolate, as the proper 
relatum of the state, one of the many items to which a mental representation is related. 
However, since the representation is related to all of these items, it seems that if we can 
specify conditions under which the representation is related to one item only, then there are 
specifiable conditions for every other item to which it is actually related. Which of these 
                                                   
24 Rather the specification proceeds in the opposite direction.  
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conditions are the content determining ones will depend, therefore, on which item is the 
desired or actual content of the state, rather than vice versa.       
 
PNC and PIR 
PIR and PNC receive a single treatment, by appealing to the distinction between complex 
and simple concepts. In terms of PNC, since the properties of „being water‟ and „being H2O‟ 
are identical, any state which has water as its semantics content has H2O as its semantic 
content (Dretske, 1981, p.217). However, water beliefs can differ from H2O beliefs by 
instantiating distinct concepts (Dretske, 1981; Gates, 1996) where in this case the concepts 
are differentiated in terms of degree of complexity: Whereas „H2O‟ is a complex concept 
(comprised of the concepts „Hydrogen‟, „two‟ and „Oxygen‟) „water‟ is a simple concept 
(Dretske, 1981, p.217; Gates, 1996):
25
 Whereas one can token WATER without tokening 
Hydrogen, one cannot token H2O without tokening Hydrogen, since H2O is (or instantiates) 
a complex concept (Dretske, 1981, p.264, n.2).  
 
However, it seems to me that this attempted solution is ultimately unsuccessful.
26
 One 
significant consequence of Dretske‟s attempted solution to PNC is that simple 
representational states which are equivalent in terms of semantic content must be identical 
(Dretske, 1981, p.217). However, we can generate cases in which two syntactically and 
semantically
27
 simple representations have a felt difference in content.   
                                                   
25 It is important to note that there really are two threads which come together in Dretske (1981). The one is that 
concepts which are equivalent in semantic content can be different in terms of their complexity. The other is that 
this difference in complexity results in a difference in function of the semantic structure. There are times at 
which Dretske seems to suggest that the difference in function is the constitutive difference between the relevant 
structures. In this section I‟ll deal with the first of these threads. The role of internal function in attempting to 
deal with these problems will be revisited in subsequent sections. 
26 The argument given below shows that the attempted solution does not work for predicate structures. Notice 
also, however, that even if it did it would have the theoretical disadvantage of precluding a unified response to 
the analogous problem to PNC which arises for name-like structures (a point noted by Fodor (1994), since these 
structures are in general syntactically simple. 
27 A semantically simple representation is one which is not equivalent to some description by which it is 
introduced. Semantically complex structures operate somewhat as placeholders for their equivalent descriptions. 
Hence, Dretske‟s type of solution can accommodate such cases since the underlying descriptions are composed 
of semantically different simples combined in ways which yield semantically identical complexes. 
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Consider Sam. Sam lives on the planet Zoot, which is very much like Earth in terms of 
certain of its atmospheric conditions. The inhabitants of Zoot, the Zootians, look very much 
like humans. The only difference is that the people in Sam‟s world fuel their bodies with a 
red viscous liquid, Raso, which takes the place in their lives of the items which we eat and 
drink on Earth. There is no water on Zoot and hydrogen and oxygen are very rare, so rare, in 
fact, that the existence of these elements is not known.
28
 The Zootians‟ bodies can, however, 
absorb and process water just like our bodies (as they can digest the items which we eat on 
Earth, though they do not eat these items on Zoot).  
 
Sam is a scientist on Zoot. One day, through a freak occurrence, a very small amount of water 
molecules forms on the electron microscope which Sam and his scientist friends use in their 
lab.
29
 The sample is too small a quantity for Sam (or anybody else) to be able to see that the 
substance is clear or a liquid, or that it can satisfy any of the role descriptions which it does 
on Earth. Nevertheless Sam and a group of his scientist friends are able to experiment on the 
water molecules, noting characteristic effects and using ostension or the description of such 
effects to fix the reference of a term „retaw‟.30 Over time a completely different group of 
Sam‟s scientist friends are able to separate the hydrogen and oxygen atoms in the water 
samples and investigate their properties. Again, through description or ostension they fix the 
reference of two terms „Hydrogen‟ and „Oxygen‟ respectively. Sam and all his friends get 
together for coffee to discuss their results and realize that retaw is H2O. 
 
Having worked so hard, Sam decides to take a well deserved vacation. The Zootians are 
scientifically a very advanced culture and have developed the requisite vehicles for high-
speed space travel. Despite this no Zootian has ever visited Earth. Sam decides to hop in his 
spaceship and go where the Milky Way takes him. It so happens that Sam arrives on Earth. 
                                                   
28 To make this plausible, we might suppose that there are atoms very similar to these which can perform a very 
similar role to that performed by hydrogen and oxygen on Earth. 
29 I‟m not really sure whether one can „see‟ a water molecule by using an electron microscope. The scientific 
details should be changed here if one can‟t. 
30 The term is taken from McGinn (1982), though is being use here somewhat differently. 
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Sam likes our planet and decides to stay. Since Sam is on vacation he avoids all contact with 
any scientifically literate Earthians. Over time, due to his interaction with members of 
communities of individuals who lack the concepts of Hydrogen and Oxygen Sam develops an 
intrinsically distinct internal structure which expresses the concept of water.
31
 Sam, of course, 
never realizes that water is H20 or that it is retaw. After some time Sam begins to get bored 
and so decides to explore the state of Earthian science. During this process Sam realizes that 
there is plenty of Hydrogen and Oxygen on Earth. One day whilst conversing with one of his 
newly made Earthian scientist friends he comes to realize that water is H20, and hence that 
water is retaw. Sam regards these as substantial discoveries, very different to the discovery of 
the identity „A is A‟. 
 
All of this has been framed in terms expressions in a natural language. However, the above 
seems to me to carry over mutatis mutandis to mental representation, given, that is, a suitable 
account of the mental representation of natural kind terms. However, such an account is 
presumably presupposed by the framing of the problem of PNC, and seems to be plausibly in 
the offing.
32
 Hence, we have a case which I would suggest is intuitively correctly described 
as a case in which Sam‟s RETAW beliefs and Sam‟s WATER beliefs are different from one 
another. Yet, by the lights of informational semantics, each representation has the same 
semantic content. Moreover, there seems to be no difference in conceptual complexity 
between RETAW and WATER: Both seem to be conceptually simple. Hence, the 
complex/simple distinction on its own cannot provide informational semantics with a 
satisfactory response to (PNC).          
 
Dretske‟s response to PIR seems to be as follows. Rabbit beliefs (or mental representations), 
undetached rabbit part beliefs and temporal rabbit stage beliefs all have the same semantic 
content. However, these structures can differ from one another in terms of the complexity of 
the concepts involved, such that, e.g., it is not possible to have the second and third sorts of 
belief without also having concepts with the content part or stage (i.e. the concept involved is 
                                                   
31 Hence, this acquisition is based on ostension or characteristic functional roles occupied by water on Earth.  
32 See the discussion of Fodor‟s asymmetric dependence theory below. 
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complex) whereas this is possible in the first case (i.e. the concept involved is simple) (1981, 
p.264, n.2; Gates 1996).
33
  
 
As such, PIR is lumped together with PNC. Notice first, however, that the problem of PIR 
unlike that of PNC is a problem involving properties which, though they are necessarily co-
instantiated, are non-identical and have distinct extensions (Gates, 1996). However, Dretske 
renders the semantic content of (and property expressed by) all representational states 
involved in PIR as the same (i.e. that property picked out by the disjunction (perhaps better, 
conjunction (see Dretske, 1984)) of every possible Quine-type predicate). Since the semantic 
content of these states is the same, by parity of reasoning with examples such as the water-
H20 case, it seems that we would be correct in believing that rabbits are undetached rabbit 
parts, that undetached rabbit parts are temporal rabbit stages and that temporal rabbit stages 
are rabbits (Gates, 1996, p.337). However, all of these thoughts seem to be patently false, 
though Dretske‟s account of semantic content and his attempted solution to PIR must, it 
seems, render them true. 
 
There is an even more punishing problem for Dretske‟s proposal. A concept or cognitive 
structure will be complex if and only if the structure is composed in a certain way of discrete 
cognitive substructures (Dretske, 1981), such that the content of the complex is generated by 
the content of its parts and the manner in which those parts are combined (cf. Dretske, 1981, 
p.230). Simple cognitive structures are, according to Dretske, individuated only in terms of 
their semantic content. What, then, are the simple parts which combine (in the case of the 
complex representations appealed to in the solution to PIR) to express the property 
rabbit&undetached-rabbit-part&temporal-rabbit-stage?  
 
                                                   
33 I must emphasise here that Dretske‟s treatment of Quine‟s examples is very brief, occupying only a single 
footnote of length one paragraph (1981, p.264, n.2). His treatment there purports to explain why “believing that 
s is a rabbit and believing that t (some part of s) is an undetached part of rabbit or the belief that u (some 
temporal cross section of s) is a temporal rabbit stage”. Hence, Dretske takes it for granted that there is a 
naturalistic account to be had which can respect the distinction between referring to an object, some part of that 
object and some temporal cross-section of that object (though de re not de dicto).    
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Dretske gives two of them, namely a cognitive structure expressing the property part and a 
cognitive structure expressing the property stage. Hence, presumably the other constituents 
are cognitive structures expressing undetached (or perhaps just detached), temporal and ... 
rabbit! Hence, this proposed solution must assume that there is a cognitive structure with the 
determinate content rabbit. However, the problem of PIR is precisely in virtue of what there 
could be such a structure. Dretske‟s proposed solution, therefore, must, if it is to work, 
assume that the problem of PIR has already been solved. Hence, his proposed solution is 
really no solution at all.  
 
PER                             
MCD1 entails that X has the representational content Y only if at the end of L X had the 
semantic content Y. However, if this is true, then at the end of L X carried the information 
that Y, and, hence, since the information relation is factive, at the end of L Y must exist.
34
 
However, empty representations are representations of non-existents. Hence, it seems that 
MCD1 cannot deal with PER. 
 
Dretske seems to accept the above argument but limits its force to primitive representational 
states (i.e. those that are syntactically and semantically simple). Primitive representations 
cannot have empty contents (1981, p.229); however, complex representations can. Empty 
representations, such as representations which have the content which „unicorn‟ does in 
English are, therefore, necessarily complex, built up out of simpler representational states 
which have non-empty extensions. 
 
This seems to me to be the only response which Dretske can make to PER given his account 
of the information relation and the role of information in mental representation. It also seems 
to me to be highly intuitive to think that representations with empty extensions are complex 
                                                   
34 Even on weaker notions of information than DI2, it must be true that there is an (explicable) correlation 
between X and Y. 
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constructions out of simpler representations with non-empty extensions.
35
 However, not all 
empty representations seem to satisfy the model which Dretske proposes for dealing with 
PER. One category of empty representations which I think do not satisfy this model are 
concepts of would-be natural kinds which are empty through a failure of extension fixation 
according to the standard model of natural kind semantics (i.e. that of Kripke (1981) and 
Putnam (1981)). 
 
Lynn Rudder Baker (1991) perhaps has this in mind when she suggests, in a different context, 
that the view that all uninstantiated properties must be represented, if at all, then by complex 
representations is implausible. Consider the example of phlogiston, mentioned, without the 
explicit development which it will be given here, by Baker (1991, p.22). The standard 
Kripke-Putnam story about the semantics of natural kinds holds that natural kinds apply 
correctly to a set of items sharing some naturally occurring explanatory property 
(Boghossian, 1991, p.74). Just what this underlying unificatory property is is determined by a 
process of extension fixation in relation to local samples (Kripke, 1981, p.122).
36
 Although 
such samples may be identified, and hence the extension of the concept may be fixed, by 
qualitative descriptions (Kripke, 1981) a natural kind concept is not semantically equivalent 
to (and does not express) such a qualitative description. Indeed the samples can be identified 
equally well by ostension (Putnam, 1981). For example, the extension of a natural kind term 
such as „water‟ (i.e. the property which it expresses) can be fixed by a definite description 
such as „the X such that X is a colourless potable liquid, which fills the lakes and streams on 
Earth‟.  
 
The process of fixing the extension of a natural kind term is mediated by the intentions of the 
speakers of the language to use the term to pick out a kind of the sort defined above. 
However, terms which are intended as natural kind terms (i.e. purported natural kind terms) 
                                                   
35 For example, this seems to account well for our concepts of fictional and mythical entities, since these entities 
seem to be introduced precisely through this sort of fabrication from other representations (through descriptions, 
etc.). Concepts of fictional entities and mythical entities, moreover, constitute an important class of empty 
representations. 
36 That is, the natural kind is that kind exemplified by most of the members occurring in specified local samples 
(Boghossian, 1991). 
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can have empty extensions if it turns out that there is no underlying naturally occurring 
explanatory property exemplified by most of the members in local samples (Boghossian, 
1991). This can occur because there is no property or collection of properties which satisfies 
the description used to fix the extension, or because a large and disparate class satisfies this 
description. Phlogiston is an example of the former kind: There is no X such that for stuff to 
burn is for it to give off X (Fodor, 1991). 
 
To return to the objection suggested by Baker. Dretske considers the concept of water (and 
one may assume other natural kind concepts) to be primitive, since it is syntactically simple 
and is not semantically equivalent to any description. This follows from the Kripke-Putnam 
account of the semantics of natural kind concepts.
37
 But then the same considerations should 
surely show that phlogiston is also a primitive concept.
38
 It is surely implausible to suppose 
that as things actually are the concept of phlogiston is semantically equivalent to a 
description, though if phlogiston had existed, then it would not be. Just as water never was 
equivalent to its reference fixing descriptions, so too phlogiston never was and is not now 
equivalent to its purported reference-fixing descriptions. And, yet, the concept of phlogiston 
does seem to have content. 
 
Hence, the stipulation that all empty representations must be complex representations will not 
account for cases of purported natural kind concepts which turn out to have empty 
extensions.      
                                                   
37 I am assuming here that this account of natural kind terms in natural language is compatible with a naturalistic 
account of the semantics of natural kind concepts and thus can be applied (with appropriate alterations) to the 
latter representations. There seems to be an apparent difficulty with doing this since the standard story about the 
semantics of natural kind terms makes reference to the intentions of speakers, and the concept of an intention is 
a semantic notion. However, as Fodor (1990b) notes, we needn‟t make use of the notion of intention in giving 
an account of natural kind concepts: What matters is the dispositions which subjects of such concepts have, not 
the mechanisms by which they come to have such dispositions. Hence, so long as the possessor of a candidate 
natural kind concept displays the disposition to apply that concept only to members of the kind in question in all 
such worlds in which such members are distinguishable to the subject from qualitative doppelgangers, then he 
satisfies the generalization of the condition referring to speaker intention in the case of natural kind terms.  
38 If it is thought to be problematic that phlogiston may be nomologically or metaphysically impossible, and, 
hence, have no possible world in which it is distinguishable from its qualitative doppelgangers, then we can 
reframe the example with a purported natural kind which, though actually non-existent, is nomologically 
possible.  
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3.2.1.2. Fodor 
 
3.2.1.2.1. The Account 
Given Fodor‟s account of information (FI) and the possibility that tokens of a representation 
type X can be caused by not only tokens of some type Y, but equally tokens of some type Z, 
with Z≠Y, some tokens of X will carry information about Y and some tokens of X will carry 
information about Z. However, the content of a representation is common to all tokens of the 
representation type (Fodor, 1990b). The central question for Fodor, therefore, is „In virtue of 
what do Xs represent Y rather than YorZ, and hence misrepresent when caused by a Z?‟. 
 
Fodor‟s answer to this question is that Xs represent Y rather than Z or YorZ in virtue of there 
being an asymmetric dependence between Y-caused tokens of X and Z-caused tokens of X. 
Hence, Fodor frames the following sufficient (though not necessary) conditions on Xs 
expressing the property Y (meaning Y): 
(AD) For any representational state type, X, for any property, Y, tokens of X 
express (represent) Y if: 
(i) There is a nomic dependence between the property of being a Y and the property of 
being a cause of Xs, such that the generalisation „Ys cause Xs‟ is lawlike. 
(ii) For any property Z, if Z≠Y and there is a nomic dependence between the property of 
being a Z and the property of being a cause of Xs then the law that Zs cause Xs is 
asymmetrically dependent on the law that Ys cause Xs. 
Fodor presents the notion of „asymmetric dependence‟ variously. However, the central 
underlying idea which condition (ii), above, is intended to capture is that that Xs carry 
information about Ys is the fundamental informational relation amongst all of the 
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informational relations which  Xs bear to the world (Fodor, 1990b, p.91). Letting „Y→X‟ 
represent „Ys cause Xs‟39 we can express this more formally as follows (cf. Fodor, 1990b): 
(AC) For any properties X, Y, Z, if Z≠Y and „Y→X‟ is a law and „Z→X‟ is a law, 
then the nomic dependence between Z and X asymmetrically depends on the nomic 
dependence between Y and X if and only if: 
(i) If „Y→X‟ were to be broken, then „Z→X‟ would be broken; 
(ii) If „Z→X‟ were to be broken then „Y→X‟ would still hold. 
  
Fodor prefers to work with the asymmetric dependence condition as framed in terms of 
nomic dependencies rather than in terms of the interpretation which such nomic dependencies 
receive in the language of possible world semantics (Fodor, 1990b). Nevertheless he (1990b, 
p.113) does give a possible worlds gloss on the asymmetric dependence condition. Since, the 
gloss which he gives does not, to my mind, capture what Fodor intends it to, for present 
purposes I will work with the following revision of it, based not only on the account which 
Fodor gives, but equally the use he makes of that account and the amendments he makes to it 
in response to various objections: 
(ACP) For any properties X, Y, Z, if Z≠Y and „Y→X‟ is a law and „Z→X‟ is a 
law, then the nomic dependence between Z and X asymmetrically depends on the 
nomic dependence between Y and X if and only if: 
(i) There exists some possible world, W, such that in W „Ys cause Xs‟ is a law but „Zs 
cause Xs‟ is not; 
(ii) For every world, W*, if in W* „Zs cause Xs‟ is a law but „Ys cause Xs‟ is not, then W 
is closer to @ than is W*.   
 
 
                                                   
39 This notation is merely a convenience, and should not be interpreted as implying that „Ys cause Xs‟ entails 
that Ys are nomologically sufficient for Xs, or that there are non-question-begging conditions which can be 
specified in which Ys are sufficient for Xs. 
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3.2.1.2.2. Proposed Solutions to the Problems  
 
HP 
On the face of it (AD) looks like it will be able to handle HP (cf. Fodor, 1990b, p.109). Even 
though some distal feature, Y, on the horizontal axis which causes the tokening of a 
representational state X depends (in some sense) on some more proximal feature, Z, causing 
the tokening of X, nevertheless this is not the kind of dependence required for X to represent 
Y. For there are a number of distinct proximal routes by which the occurrence of a Y can 
cause the tokening of an X in which Z tokenings don‟t feature.40 Hence, if the Z→X 
connection were to be broken the Y→X connection would be left intact. Hence, the latter 
connection doesn‟t asymmetrically depend upon the former, and hence X means Y rather 
than Z.  
 
However, this only shows that in the nearest world in which the Z→X connection is broken, 
the Y→X connection is left intact; it doesn‟t show that this world is nearer to @ than any in 
which the Y→X connection is broken but the Z→X connection is left intact. Why should we 
believe this stronger claim? This question is particularly pressing since it is far from clear that 
the counterfactual which it is meant to translate, namely „all else being equal, if the Y→X 
connection were to be broken then the Z→X connection would be broken as well‟ (Fodor, 
1990b, p.112), is true. Indeed this counterfactual looks false. Presumably, the reasoning 
behind this claim is that to get to a world in which the Z→X connection is broken but the 
Y→X connection holds, one need only break the Z→X connection. However, to get to a 
world in which the Z→X connection holds but the Y→X is broken, it would need to be the 
case that for each distinct proximal „route‟ between Y and X one would need to either break 
the connection between Y and the proximal cause of X associated with that route, or one 
would need to break the connection between the proximal cause of X associated with the 
route and X.
41
 This, it might be held, would require a greater alteration of the actual world.
42
 
                                                   
40 This is the familiar starting point which was highlighted in the above discussion of Dretske. 
41 In the present case, considering the route from Y to X which runs through Z one only has the option of 
breaking the Y→Z connection, of course. 
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Figure 6 
 
I am not convinced that this move works. However, even if we grant that (AD) can eliminate 
any one particular proximal stimulus as the content of X, it seems that it cannot eliminate the 
disjunction of all possible proximal stimuli, by which Ys cause tokens of X, from the content 
of Xs. For there are no worlds in which the Y→X connection holds but the connection 
between the disjunction and X does not, since it is only by causing the occurrence of one of 
these stimuli that Ys cause Xs. On the other hand, there are worlds in which the connection 
between the disjunction and X holds and yet in which the Y→X connection does not (i.e. 
those worlds in which the connection between Ys and each of these proximal stimuli types 
does not hold). Hence it seems that the nomic connection between Y and X is asymmetrically 
dependent on the nomic connection between this disjunction of proximal stimuli and X. 
 
Fodor notes this objection (1990b, pp.109-110) but claims that it is not a problem for (AD). 
There are at least two lines of argument for this conclusion which can be constructed from his 
                                                                                                                                                              
42 See figure 6 for a graphical representation of Fodor‟s response to HP as well as the argument in this 
paragraph. The idea is that world 2 is further away than world one because more nomic connections which hold 
in the actual world need to be broken to get to world 2. In the diagram a directed line which has been crossed 
represents a broken nomic connection. The perforated lines represent possibilities of breaking nomic 
connections: The choice, for each possible causal route between Y and X, in world 2 is between breaking the 
vertical line or the diagonal line. 
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work. The first is one which we have already seen above: The disjunction of proximal stimuli 
is open owing to the holistic character of belief/content fixation. However, first, there are 
surely closed disjunctions either more proximal or more distal from the one which Fodor 
thinks is open; why doesn‟t X express those disjunctions? More importantly, as has already 
been discussed above, in principle, this line of argument will do Fodor no good.  
 
The second line of argument is not given directly in response to the present problem but 
rather in a discussion of causal chains (pp. 117-118). Nevertheless it is directly applicable to 
the case at hand. Fodor‟s response to the problem of causal chains is to appeal to a further 
condition on Xs representing Y‟s, namely that Xs be robust with respect to Ys, in the sense 
that it must be possible for non-Ys to cause Xs (so that an X occurs without a Y). Hence, 
Fodor might attempt to exclude the disjunction of proximal stimuli as what is expressed by X, 
on the basis that X cannot be robust with respect to the disjunction and hence cannot be 
represented by X. Hence, Xs must express Y rather than this disjunction. 
 
However, prima facie, we can use the same argument to get to the conclusion that X does not 
represent anything at the same point at which Y occurs on the horizontal axis. For since Xs 
are robust with respect to Ys, there are non-Ys which can cause Xs. But, then, consider the 
disjunction of all these possible non-Ys and Y. By the above reasoning, X is not robust with 
respect to this disjunction, and, hence, Xs must represent some still more distal feature than 
Y.
43
  
 
In the light of this objection, the line Fodor would have to take in dealing with HP is that Xs 
represent Y rather than the disjunction of all of the proximal stimuli associated with Ys, 
because X is not robust with respect to this disjunction and there is no proper subset, 
{Pj}jε[1,m], of the set of the proximal stimuli, {Pi}iε[1,n], which is such that all other nomic 
connections between elements of {{Pi}iε[1,n]-{Pj}jε[1,m]} and X are asymmetrically dependent 
                                                   
43 Notice that we can iterate this argument for each co-ordinate point on the horizontal axis, to yield the 
conclusion that X has no content at all. In what follows I‟ll refer to the disjunction of Y and all the non-Ys 
featuring at the same point as Y on the horizontal axis as „the disjunction associated with Y‟.  
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on the disjunction of elements of {Pj}jε[1,m]. In particular this is not the case when 
{Pj}jε[1,m]={Z} (where Z as above).  
 
However, on the basis of the reasoning which was put forward in favour of Fodor‟s being 
able to avoid the consequence that X represents Y rather than the specific proximal stimulus 
Z it looks like the closest world in which the nomic relation between the disjunction of 
elements in {{Pi}iε[1,n]-{Z}} and X holds but the Z→X connection fails is closer than any 
world in which the Z→X connection holds but the nomic relation between the disjunction of 
elements in {{Pi}iε[1,n]-{Z}} and X fails. This is because the former world is one in which the 
nomic relations between each of the elements of {{Pi}iε[1,n]-{Z}} and X holds but the Z→X 
connection fails, but the latter world is one in which each of the nomic relations between the 
elements of {{Pi}iε[1,n]-{Z}} and X fails but the Z→X connection holds. Hence we have to 
change substantially more about the actual world to get to the latter world than we do to get 
to the former world. Consequently, since {{Pi}iε[1,n]-{Z}} is a proper subset of {Pi}iε[1,n], let 
{Pj}jε[1,m] be the singleton constituted by the disjunction of all of the elements in      
{{Pi}iε[1,n]-{Z}}. Then this is a proper subset of the set of the proximal stimuli which is such 
that all other nomic connections between the remaining proximal stimuli and X are 
asymmetrically dependent on the disjunction of elements in this subset. Hence, this 
disjunction cannot be excluded from being a contender for constituting the content of X. 
 
Of course, as I noted above, I don‟t find the reasoning which was put forward in favour of 
Fodor‟s being able to avoid the consequence that X represents Y rather than the specific 
proximal stimulus Z entirely convincing. However, the present point is just that if that line of 
reasoning is cogent then Fodor can avoid the consequence that X represents some specific 
proximal stimulus Z, but he can‟t avoid the consequence that X represents some disjunction 
of such possible stimuli. On the other hand if the line of reasoning is faulty then it looks like 
Fodor can avoid the consequence that X represents some disjunction of such possible stimuli, 
but he can‟t avoid the consequence that X represents some specific proximal stimulus Z. 
Either way there‟s trouble for Fodor. 
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Hence, I conclude that (AD) doesn‟t adequately solve HP.  
 
VP 
(AD) also does not adequately solve VP. Since DP is a special case of VP, and since (AD) is 
designed primarily to deal with DP (Fodor, 1987, 1990b) its ability to adequately address VP 
is really the litmus test of the proposal.  
 
In terms of one aspect of VP Fodor‟s response is the same as Dretske‟s: A representational 
state X has as its extension Ys rather than some subset of Ys or some superset into which all 
Ys fall because the nomic connection is between the property of being a Y and the property 
of being a cause of Xs rather than the property which defines the sub-/super-sets of the 
extension of Y and X. 
 
As has been gestured toward in the previous subsection the problem of DP is addressed by 
Fodor (1990b) as follows. In any case in which Y→X is a law and Z→X is a law, it is also 
true that YorZ→X is a law. However: 
(i) Xs will express Y if the nomic connection „Z→X‟ depends asymmetrically on the 
nomic connection „Y→X‟; 
(ii)   Xs will express YorZ if the nomic connections „Z→X‟ and „Y→X‟ depend 
symmetrically on one another; 
(iii) Xs will express an ambiguous meaning between Y and Z if the nomic connection 
„Z→X‟ is independent of the nomic connection „Y→X‟.  
 
(AD) is forwarded as providing sufficient conditions for representational content, as are 
conditions (i), (ii) and (iii), above. Hence, Fodor claims that were the nomic dependencies as 
described in (i), then X would have a non-disjunctive content. Moreover, he claims that since 
he is only offering sufficient conditions the analysis can be undermined only by developing 
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cases in which the purportedly sufficient conditions obtain and yet in which the content of the 
state is not as the theory claims. Hence, Fodor seems to regard as irrelevant arguments to the 
effect that (AD) and its purported solution to DP are incorrect on the basis that it seems 
implausible to think that in the case of our paradigmatic examples of mental content Fodor‟s 
conditions are satisfied (cf. Fodor, 1990b). 
 
Now I should note at the outset that I doubt that Fodor is right in adopting this line, for much 
the same reasons as were mentioned in section I, above. It seems to me that the primary 
(only?) way of assessing whether a theory which purports to give sufficient conditions for 
meaning is really giving an account of that phenomenon is to test such conditions against our 
paradigmatic examples of meaning/content. When we do that however, it seems that (AD) is 
a non-starter. To see this consider a characteristic example of error (taken from Fodor 
(1987)): The mistaking of a slim cow seen at a distance for a horse. Presumably in this case 
the error is explainable by the fact that the cow looked, at that distance, like a horse, that it 
cast the same pattern of light onto the retina as a horse would have in those circumstances 
etc.. But then it seems that if these are the sorts of cases which establish the cow→HORSE 
nomic connection, then the easiest way in which this connection could be broken is to sever 
the causal connection between these sorts of retinal projections and tokens of HORSE.
44
 This 
is presumably easier than severing the connection between slim cows seen from a distance 
and those retinal projections, since in this case reasonably large changes in bovine genetics or 
terrestrial optics would be required.
45
 Given this, however, it looks like the nearest worlds in 
which the cow→HORSE connection is broken are one and the same as the nearest worlds in 
which the horse→HORSE connection is broken. Hence, there really is no asymmetric 
dependence here. 
 
                                                   
44 It should be emphasised that „HORSE‟ is being individuated intrinsically. Hence, all that is required to sever 
the retinal projection→HORSE connection is for the causal „wiring‟ mediating the connection to be slightly 
different. 
45 It should be emphasized that we can‟t sever the nomic connection between cows and HORSEs by simply 
ensuring that there are no slim cows seen from a distance. For in this case it is still true that were a slim cow to 
be seen from a distance then it would cause a tokening of HORSE, and, as Fodor says, it‟s the counterfactuals 
that count in semantics. 
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Of course it is likely to be objected to this that this description of the breaking of the 
cow→HORSE connection, does not entail that were this connection to be broken then so 
would the horse→HORSE connection, since one can identify a horse through more than one 
sense modality. However, though it is surely possible to do this, it is equally possible that 
someone who is unable to do this can nevertheless represent horses and would not be 
confined to merely disjunctive content with respect to these animals. It seems to me that this 
sort of example generalises, and, hence, casts doubt upon the idea that we have any good 
reason to think that (AD) really is an account of meaning and hence that it really does solve 
DP. 
 
Nevertheless, I will not rest my case on this line of argument. It is far less obvious that cases 
of natural kind terms can be included in the generalisation gestured toward in the previous 
paragraph, and it will be more satisfying if we can undermine (AD) on its own terms. I will 
therefore forward two lines of argument in what follows, both of which take (AD) as its 
maker intended. 
 
The first argument is a development of one given by Godfrey-Smith (1989, pp.538-540). He 
argues that the lesson of DP is that it is the nomic link between the disjunctive kind YorZ 
and X which is the fundamental one. Hence, the nomic connections between Y and X and 
between Z and X are two instances of this fundamental connection. As such, it would seem 
that, in this case, the question of asymmetric dependence just simply does not arise unless 
one, question-beggingly, assumes that the representational content of X cannot be YorZ.  
 
I think that Godfrey-Smith‟s argument is a good one. However, one might question whether 
there is only one nomic connection here. Fodor is a realist about properties and nomological 
relations (1990b), and hence would take there to be a fact of the matter about whether there 
are three nomic relations here or just one. Although Godfrey-Smith is right that Fodor cannot 
simply assume that there are three distinct connections, by the same token we cannot simply 
assume that there is only one.  
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However, suppose that there really are three independent nomic connections in the case at 
hand.
46
 On this assumption „YorZ‟ expresses a distinct property from either „Y‟ or „Z‟. 
Hence, we need to decide which nomic connection (i.e. that involving Z, Y or YorZ) is the 
asymmetric base.
47
 But now it seems clear that this base must be the YorZ→X connection, 
since it is true that if YorZs ceased to cause Xs, then so would Ys and Zs, though not vice 
versa.
 48
 Hence, Xs must have a disjunctive content.
 
 
 
Hence, on the first line of argument there is only one nomic dependence which obtains 
between YorZs and Xs, and hence Xs cannot represent Ys but can only represent the 
disjunctive content YorZ. On the second line of argument, though Xs can express Y, Z, or 
YorZ, by (AD) they must express the last of these, and hence Xs have a disjunctive content. 
Either way, therefore, DP has not been solved. 
     
In general, Fodor‟s defence of the claim that it is possible for his conditions for content to be 
met depends on the premise that ceteris paribus the more things one has to change to 
transform the actual world into a distinct possible world, the harder it is to get to the latter 
world (1991, p.277).
49
 Moreover, demonstrating the possibility of a naturalistic semantics 
does require such a defence, even if one is only offering sufficient conditions. However, 
given this principle, it is always possible to construct a deflationary disjunction which will 
have equal claim on (AD) as some non-disjunctive item for the title of „proper content‟ of 
some representational state.  
 
                                                   
46 I am assuming here, what is generally assumed by all parties in the debate, that „YorZs cause Xs‟ is 
counterfactual supporting. 
47 I borrow this term from Boghossian (1991) to refer to that nomic connection on which all others 
asymmetrically depend. 
48 DP gets off the ground only by assuming that for every case in which there are laws „Y→X‟ and „Z→X‟, 
there is a property YorZ, such that „YorZ→X‟ is a law and if a causal interaction is covered by the law Y→X, 
then it is covered by the law YorZ→X, and if the causal interaction is covered by the law Z→X, then it is 
covered by YorZ→X. Whence the truth of the statement in the text. 
49 See, e.g. his (1990b) discussion of the water/XYZ case. 
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To see this, let Y→X be a law and the purported asymmetric dependence base. Suppose 
further that the set of possible non-Ys which can cause Xs is {{Z}U{Qi}iε[1,n]}. Now, 
consider the disjunction of all of the members of the set {{Y}U{Qi}iε[1,n]}. The nearest Y→X 
world in which Z→X fails, W1, is a world where YorQ1or...Qn→X holds but Z→X fails 
(since „Y‟ is in the disjunction). It is, moreover, the nearest such world, since Qi→X must 
hold in W1 for all iε[1,n], in order for W1 to be as close a Y→X world to @ as possible. 
However, the nearest Z→X world in which Y→X fails, W2, would be a world in which 
Qi→X holds for all iε[1,n]. Hence, W2 is also a YorQ1or...Qn→X world. But then the 
nearest world in which YorQ1or...Qn→X fails but Z→X holds must be further away from @ 
than W2, and de facto further away from @ than W1.
50
 So, YorQ1or...Qn is the asymmetric 
dependence base. Moreover, X is robust with respect to it.     
 
Hence, if Fodor‟s line of reasoning in demonstrating that it is possible for the conditions in 
(AD) to be satisfied, then it turns out that he hasn‟t solved the disjunction problem.51 On the 
other hand if his reasoning is not sound, or if there is something wrong with the distance 
measure which he uses then he has not demonstrated the possibility of the conditions in (AD) 
being satisfied. Either way, and taking the account on its own terms, (AD) is unsuccessful in 
addressing DP. 
 
There is a common intuitive thread tying these previous two arguments together with the 
central argument against Fodor‟s proposed solution to HP. Fodor seems to assume that he 
can articulate conditions for when a representation will count as disjunctive and when it 
won‟t simply in terms of those expressions which pick out the relevant non-disjunctive 
contents. However, once we apply the asymmetric dependence condition directly to the 
properties picked out by well-chosen disjunctive predicates things fall apart. Hence, if (AD) 
is to solve HP, VP and DP, it must prioritise the non-disjunctive predicates over the 
                                                   
50 Note that there is no world between W1 and W2 in which YorQ1or…orQn→X fails but Z→X holds. For if 
there was, this would then be a world in which Y→X fails but Z→X holds which is nearer to @ than W2. But 
W2 is the nearest such world. Contradiction.   
51 The argument requires that there be three or more possible distinct types of item which can cause the tokening 
of a representational state. It seems plausible that this assumption is usually satisfied, however.   
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disjunctive ones. But that is just what a consideration of these problems suggests one cannot 
do.   
 
PNC 
The approach taken by Fodor to PNC is essentially the same as that of Dretske (1981), 
discussed above. Hence, I will give it no further discussion here. 
 
PIR 
There are two distinct approaches taken by Fodor to PIR. The first of these is very similar to 
Dretske (1981).
52
 The second is the, to my mind much more plausible and more promising, 
approach given in Fodor (1994). He argues there that we can differentiate the contents in PIR 
by amendment of a pure informational semantics with an appeal to the inferential role which 
the representations play in the cognitive economy of the subject. He demonstrates this 
approach by using the following example, based on figure 7, below (taken from Gates (1996, 
p.341)).  
 
 
              Figure 7 
 
                                                   
52 One point of difference (which doesn‟t make a difference to the success of the account) is pointed out by 
Gates (1996) who claims that Fodor‟s view differs from that of Dretske in that whilst the latter takes the 
semantic contents of RABBIT, UNDETACHED RABBIT PART and TEMPORAL RABBIT STAGE to be 
the same, Fodor, takes each to be different. That is, only a complex representational state can express 
undetached rabbit part or temporal rabbit stage. I agree with Gates (1996) that this is a mistake. 
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Fodor considers the case in which a subject, S, has two representational terms SQUARE and 
TRIANGLE, which are caused to be tokened by instantiations of square and triangle 
respectively. Since the properties of being a square and being an undetached part of a square 
are necessarily co-instantiated, as are the properties of being a triangle and being an 
undetached part of a triangle, the question arises as to whether SQUARE means square or 
undetached proper part of a square, and similarly for TRIANGLE.  
 
Fodor‟s (1994, pp.64-74) solution to this problem is to consider the following two 
hypotheses: (a) that SQUARE means square and TRIANGLE means triangle; (b) that 
SQUARE means undetached proper part of a square and TRIANGLE means undetached 
proper part of a triangle. If (b) is true then there will be circumstances under which S tokens 
the mentalese sentence „A is a square‟, tokens the sentence „A is a triangle‟, infers from this 
that „A is a square and A is a triangle‟ and infers from this that „A is a square and a 
triangle‟.53 On the other hand, if (a) is true then there would be no circumstances under which 
this pattern of inference will occur. Hence, there are circumstances under which we can 
differentiate these two hypotheses and reject one in favour of the other.  
 
I think that the move to examining the internal relations which representational states bear to 
one another in addressing PIR is a good one. However, I don‟t think that Fodor‟s particular 
treatment of the problem is successful. Why should we accept the premise that (i) if S‟s 
tokens of SQUARE mean square and her tokens of TRIANGLE mean triangle then there 
are no circumstances under which she will accept the above pattern of inference, but (ii) if 
S‟s tokens of SQUARE mean undetached proper part of a square and her tokens of 
TRIANGLE mean undetached proper part of a triangle then there are circumstances under 
which S would accept the inferences? The reason is surely that it is impossible for anything to 
be both a square and a triangle simultaneously whereas it is possible for something to be an 
                                                   
53 This final inference determines that A refers unambiguously. 
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undetached proper part of a triangle and an undetached proper part of a square 
simultaneously. But why should that constrain the inferences that S is prepared to accept?
54
  
 
The point is this: Even when a subject possesses two representational terms expressing X and 
Y, it needn‟t follow that S grasps all of (perhaps any of) the metaphysical necessities which 
obtain between Xs and Ys.
55
 Hence, it is implausible to think that in general one can only 
possess representations which express certain properties if one‟s pattern of inference 
involving those representations reflects the metaphysical necessities which obtain between 
these properties. Fodor would need to give us reasons as to why the PIR case is special in 
this regard, which he doesn‟t.56 
 
There is also a second problem with his strategy, however. In virtue of what would the 
distinct patterns of inference determine the extensions of the terms involved? In virtue of 
what, that is, would patterns of inference determine that the terms involved expressed 
different properties in the world, rather than expressed the same property, thought about in 
two different ways? Plausibly the concepts of water and H2O have different inferential roles 
without it following that the properties expressed by these concepts are one and the same. 
                                                   
54 Remember, although we are picking out the relevant properties by the descriptions „square‟ and „undetached 
proper part of a square‟ it is that which is picked out by the descriptions which is expressed by S‟s 
representational terms, rather than the descriptions themselves. We are also assuming that it is not the case that 
in having a representational primitive which expresses square and another one which expresses triangle S 
grasps some description of the properties of squares and triangles from which it follows that nothing can be a 
square and a triangle simultaneously. At least, if we are assuming this then the example of squares and triangles 
is inappropriate to the case of rabbits and undetached rabbit parts. 
55 Indeed this is one of the lessons we can take from PNC. 
56 Could Fodor claim that this only shows that a representation having an inferential role which mirrors the 
metaphysical necessities of some item about which the representation carries information is not necessary for 
the representation expressing that item, and hence change his claim to one about sufficiency? Not obviously. For 
so long as he allows that a representation‟s inferential role may not reflect the metaphysical necessities which its 
represented bears to other items in the world, it is possible for a state express triangle, whilst having an 
inferential role which: (i) mirrors the necessities which triangle bears to other properties, and, (ii) does not 
mirror the necessities which undetached proper part of a triangle bears to other properties. But if the mirroring 
between inferential role and metaphysically necessary relations which the property bears to other items is not 
necessary for content, then the possibility is not excluded that this representation expresses undetached proper 
part of a triangle as well. Hence, this move does not necessarily solve PIR.   
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Again Fodor would need to give principled reasons for thinking that the PIR case is distinct 
here, which he doesn‟t. 
 
What we need in order to make Fodor‟s suggestion work in the light of these two points is 
some principled reason to think that the external, meaning co-determining relations which the 
representation bears to some item in the world somehow constrain the causal patterns that the 
representation can enter into. However, the relations appealed to in a pure informational 
semantics cannot provide the basis for such a reason.  
 
Finally, Fodor‟s consideration of what inferences a subject would accept threatens to render 
the account of content holistic. This is because which inferences one is prepared to accept 
depends upon which other background beliefs one has (Sterelny, 1990).
57
 Of course not all 
will find this consequence problematic and demonstrating that it is genuinely problematic 
would take us beyond the bounds of the present paper. Hence, I will just note that being 
committed to a holistic theory in the present context is a rather unwelcome consequence, for 
two reasons. First, Fodor explicitly formulates the project of informational approaches to 
semantics as that of providing an atomistic account of representational properties. Second, it 
is intuitively difficult to see how any content could be fixed on a holistic account, since what 
content any one state has depends upon the content of a large portion of one‟s other states, the 
content of any one of which depends in turn on the content of still other states, etc.. Either 
this requires the attribution of infinitely many representational states or it requires that some 
states both have their content determined by, and simultaneously determine, the content of 
other states. Neither option is entirely palatable.         
 
PER 
Prima facie the most promising application of (AD) to the first five problems of determinacy 
of mental content is its application to PER. As it stands (AD) does not require there to be any 
                                                   
57 The degree of holism is not confined since we can construct Quine-type cases for very many distinct 
representational types. 
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actual causal interaction between the property expressed by a representational state and that 
state. So long as the property features in an appropriate nomic relation which satisfies the 
conditions for being the asymmetric dependence base, the property can be represented.  
 
However, this promise is undermined by the following point. Baker (1991) notes that, for any 
empty representation, we can construct a qualitative „doppelganger‟ of the property 
expressed. For example, the property unicorn has the „doppelganger‟ shunicorn58 where 
shunicorns are non-unicorn, white, horse-like, horned creatures.
59
 Since, both unicorns and 
shunicorns are so similar, it seems plausible to think that shunicorns would cause UNICORN 
tokens if unicorns did. Moreover, their similarity also suggests that the nearest world in 
which the unicorn→UNICORN connection held but the shunicorn→UNICORN connection 
failed would be the same distance from the actual world as the nearest world in which the 
shunicorn→UNICORN connection held but the unicorn→UNICORN connection failed. 
Hence, UNICORN would have a disjunctive content. Since we can construct such 
doppelgangers for any empty representation, it seems that Fodor‟s account entails that every 
empty representation will have a disjunctive content, which seems incorrect. 
 
The central point (to which Baker (1991) also alludes) is that Fodor‟s theory is one which 
depends essentially on relations between laws across counterfactual scenarios. However, in 
the case of uninstantiated properties it just isn‟t clear what would be required for them to be 
instantiated. Hence, it just isn‟t clear what the relative distances of worlds from @ are, and, 
consequently, whether it is possible for Fodor‟s conditions to be satisfied in such cases.60 
                                                   
58 The term, though not the description, is due to Baker (1991). 
59 We can assume that shunicorns differ from unicorns in some relevant way (perhaps genetically), or in certain 
qualitative features which are detectible only with some scrutiny. 
60 Fodor (1991) does respond to this argument. However, I find his response unconvincing. He claims that since 
he is only offering sufficient conditions for content, he gets to stipulate which nomic relations hold. The burden 
on the critic‟s shoulders is then to construct cases in which the proffered conditions are satisfied and yet the 
meaning isn‟t as predicted. Baker‟s objection clearly doesn‟t have this form, since it seems to be questioning 
whether the sufficient conditions for content have been satisfied in the unicorn/shunicorn case. Hence, Fodor 
implies that he needn‟t engage with Baker‟s line of argument. 
However, this underestimates the force of Baker‟s objection. The task which Fodor has taken on is that of 
showing how it is possible for there to be representational content in a naturalistic world, and, de facto, how it is 
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Undoubtedly Fodor has got something right in the idea of asymmetric dependence, for the 
relation between a representation and what a representation represents is, in some sense, more 
fundamental that the relation between the representation and anything which it misrepresents. 
Moreover that property which is expressed by a representation is in some sense responsible 
for the representation in a way which properties misrepresented by the token are not. 
However, the above discussion (particularly the discussion of HP, VP, and DP) seems to 
reveal that this asymmetry is a consequence of some other meaning related condition rather 
than the foundation of all such conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
possible for there to be empty representations. In order to do this it won‟t be enough to simply give a set of 
purportedly sufficient, naturalistic conditions and then stipulate that they hold. Rather one must demonstrate that 
it is possible for them to hold. This is what Fodor attempts to do for the water/XYZ case, by attempting to 
demonstrate the existence (and hence possibility) of some mechanism which would mediate the asymmetry of 
the dependence. However, Baker‟s objection highlights: (i) the lack of demonstration on Fodor‟s part that it is 
possible for the conditions of (AD) to be satisfied in the case of empty representations; (ii) the lack of any 
principled basis on which this demonstration might proceed (cf. Baker, 1991, p.20).  
In particular, Fodor‟s specific response to the water/XYZ case cannot work for the unicorn/shunicorn case. 
Since neither unicorns nor shunicorns are instantiated, we cannot apply the standard Kripke/Putnam account of 
natural kind terms to unicorn representations. Hence, it does not seem that there are differential dispositions 
with respect to the tokening of a representational state in the presence of unicorns as opposed to shunicorns. 
 Hence, Baker‟s objection attempts (and succeeds in my view) to give us reason to believe that the conditions in 
(AD) could not be satisfied in the case of empty representations. 
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IV 
Teleological accounts 
 
In order to solve the determinacy problems whilst avoiding the objections raised above we 
need a further source of discrimination between allowable contents (Sterelny, 1990). In 
search of this some philosophers have made an appeal to biological norms governing the 
functioning of the producers or consumers of internal representational states. In what follows 
I will consider one prominent example of each type of approach. 
 
4.1. Teleological Accounts Focusing on the Representation Producer 
Dretske (1986, 1988) amends his informational semantics by introducing a teleological 
element. As has been seen above in his (1986, 1988) account of representational content, 
Dretske adopts the weaker notion of information, DI2; as has also been seen (and as Dretske 
(1988) notes), however, on neither version of information/indication is error possible. Hence 
information/indication cannot be the representation relation. 
 
As such, Dretske (1986) provides the following teleological version of indicator semantics: 
(TIS) An inner state type X represents a type of state of affairs, Y, iff X has the 
function of indicating Y. 
 
4.1.1. Proper functions, selected effects and the selection of/selection for distinction 
Although Dretske (1988) is relatively non-committal about the relevant notion of function in 
(TIS), we can construe this notion as that proposed by Wright (1973, in Neander, 2004): The 
function of an item is an effect of the item which “account[s] for it being there” (Wright 
1973, p. 364, in Godfrey-Smith, 1992). As Dretske (1988) implicitly holds, this notion of 
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function can be realised through learning or natural selection.
61
 In the case of the latter, the 
notion becomes that of biological proper function: For any item, p, the phenotypic expression 
of the genotype, g, p‟s proper function is q iff that p caused q causally contributed to the 
selection by natural selection of g (Neander, 2004).  
 
Hence proper functions are effects that have been selected for. Here, for some phenotypic 
expression, p, of the genotype, g, there is selection for p just in case p causes the selection of 
g by natural selection; there is selection of p just in case p is selected by natural selection 
(Sober, 2010). Hence, the phenotypic property selected for is that property which is causally 
explanatorily relevant to the fact that the genotype responsible for it was selected.  
 
This explanatory relevance is revealed by the consideration of appropriate counterfactuals 
(see Fodor, 2008; cf. Sober, 2010). Roughly, these counterfactuals would be of the form 
„were g not to have had phenotypic expression p, then there would not have been selection of 
g‟ and „were a relevantly similar genotype, g*, to have phenotypic expression p, there would 
be selection of g*‟ (cf. Horgan, 1989).   
     
4.1.2.  Proposed Solutions to the Determinacy Problems 
The central benefit of an appeal to teleology is that it allows the information theorist to grant 
that states can indicate more or less reliably (within bounds) and can indicate more than one 
type of state of affairs, whilst still having the function of indicating one rather than another of 
these types. An internal state X accurately represents when it is caused by states the 
indication of which is selectively responsible for the existence of the state; and it 
misrepresents just in case it is caused by a state of affairs which it is not its function to 
indicate. 
 
                                                   
61 Dretske holds that it is only the former which can do the job required of function ascriptions in the case of 
accounting for belief contents. However, I agree with Godfrey-Smith (1992) that this rests on a mistake. Hence, 
I will ignore this qualification here. 
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HP 
In terms of HP, prima facie an appeal to teleology can provide assistance. Although a state X 
may provide perfectly reliable indication only for proximal causes (or for no causes at all), it 
may still represent distal causes if it is its function to indicate such states of affairs. Although 
there may be more than one „horizontal‟ type of state of affairs which is indicated, a state 
represents only that state which it is its function to indicate. Hence, on the face of it an appeal 
to teleology can avoid the problems of distality which were raised for MCD1.  
 
This face value in addressing HP is a little misleading however, a point Dretske (1986) notes 
via his „anaerobic bacteria‟ example. Certain northern hemisphere anaerobic bacteria have 
tiny magnets called magnetosomes which cause the bacteria to move downwards away from 
the oxygen-rich, and, therefore, toxic, surface water. It would seem that the proper function 
of these magnetosomes is to indicate the location of water with a low concentration of 
oxygen, since this seems to be the feature of these structures which contributed to the survival 
and proliferation of the species. However, if this is the proper function of the magnetosomes 
then when they direct the bacteria into oxygen rich surface water owing to the reversal of the 
direction of local magnetic north (say because a magnet is held above the bacterium) we must 
conclude that the magnetosome is malfunctioning.  
 
Intuitively, however, this seems incorrect. It is possible for the magnetosome to direct the 
bacterium into oxygen depleted water only by indicating the direction of local magnetic north. 
Hence, intuitively, it would seem that it is not the magnetosome which is functioning in a 
biologically abnormal way, but rather the environment which the bacterium finds itself in 
which is biologically abnormal relative to the bacterium. At least it is not clear what basis 
biology gives us for choosing between these two descriptions. 
 
Of course, as Dretske notes, this sort of example can be seen to generalize. The approach to 
HP adopted in an account such as (TIS) is to appeal to biological considerations in order to 
exclude specific proximal stimuli as the content of a state, X, given that it is some distal 
stimulus which is explanatorily relevant to the selection of the state type (or the mechanism 
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which produces it). However, given that Xs can only indicate the distal stimulus by indicating 
some disjunction of more proximal stimuli, in any world in which there is selection of the 
indication of the distal stimulus by X, there must also be selection of the indication of the 
disjunction of proximal stimuli by X. Hence in the actual world if there is selection for the 
indication of the distal stimulus there must be selection for the indication of some appropriate 
disjunction of proximal stimuli. 
62
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In parallel with the discussion in section III, one might require that this disjunction include 
proximal stimuli that cause tokenings of X only in counterfactual scenarios. Hence, one 
might wonder whether such a disjunction would not be infinite and whether this would not 
cause a problem for the notion that the indication of this disjunction is selected for. Indeed 
Dretske‟s (1986) own response is to require that the organism, in order to have determinate 
distal content, must be capable of basic associative learning. By the argument considered in 
section III, Dretske believes that this will solve the problem of distality since it will render 
the class of proximal stimuli as infinitely large.  
 
This line of argument has been considered in detail in the previous subsection, and the same 
points raised there apply in the present context as well. In particular, if this argument is to do 
the work which Dretske requires of it, then he must claim that at the time of selection, 
because there were infinitely many proximal stimuli which, through associative learning, 
could come to trigger tokens of the internal state, X, there could only have been selection for 
the indication of the distal stimulus, Y. As such, in the context of selection, the mechanisms 
of associative learning must be allowed by the background conditions which purportedly 
ensure the non-accidental correlation between X and Y. However, if this is so, then in that 
context it would be possible to generate infinitely many secondary conditioned stimuli (at 
                                                   
62 This problem also poses difficulties for an account of misrepresentation, for it would seem that there would 
always be a deflationary redescription (Dennett, 1987) of the proper function of the representational state which 
renders misrepresentation impossible. 
63 I take this problem to be a special instance of the general problem of complex causal roles. In what follows, I 
will show that Dretske‟s particular solution to it is unsuccessful. In section V the general problem and proposed 
solutions to it will be discussed in detail.         
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least one for each primary conditioned stimulus). Since we can ensure that these secondary 
conditioned stimuli do not indicate Y, it would be possible to ensure that Xs don‟t indicate Y, 
in the context of selection. If one opens the door to allow the mechanisms of associative 
learning in, it is impossible to prevent the indication of the distal stimulus by the 
representational state from slipping out.
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VP 
In terms of VP an appeal to teleology can, prima facie, assist us in solving the disjunction 
problem. The disjunction problem arises from the inference from (i) a state X misrepresents 
by having content Y but being caused by a Z (≠Y), to (ii) X has content YorZ and, thus, 
doesn‟t misrepresent when caused by a Z. But the proponent of TIS needn‟t accept this 
inference. On TIS X represents Y iff the function of X is to indicate Y. Now, so long as in 
the case of a token Z causing a tokening of an X, the correlation between X and Z is not 
causally efficacious in X‟s selection, then that X indicates YorZ adds nothing over and above 
the fact that X indicates Y to the explanation of the selection of X.
65
 Hence, the proper 
function of X is to indicate Y rather than YorZ. Thus, X represents Y rather than YorZ, 
despite being sensitive to/correlated with Zs.  
 
This is a promising move, but offers only a partial solution to DP, since there are cases in 
which (intuitively) a representational state, X, misrepresents by being caused by some Z, the 
indication of which is causally efficacious in the selection of X. These sorts of cases arise in 
the context of the problem of complex causal roles, PCR. Hence, the ultimate success of 
(TIS) in solving VP and DP is contingent upon a satisfactory solution to PCR. In section V 
and section VI, however, it will be argued that the most promising approach to PCR requires 
an abandonment of a producer-based teleosemantics of the form of (TIS). 
                                                   
64 Of course secondary conditioned stimuli are in a sense causally explanatorily irrelevant to the process of 
selection, because the benefit of producing a certain behavior, by hypothesis is secured only by the presence of 
the distal stimulus. The current point, however, is not that a disjunction of proximal stimuli including secondary 
conditioned stimuli would be selected for; it wouldn‟t. The point is rather that if we are allowed to consider 
those proximal stimuli which could come to trigger the internal state through a process of associative learning, it 
can no longer be the indication of the distal stimulus which is selected for.  
65 Alternatively, though not equivalently (see n.9), as long as the fact that Xs indicate YorZ is not causally 
efficacious in X‟s selection, then that X indicates YorZ is not selected for. 
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PIR 
In the case of PIR, the relevant properties are necessarily co-instantiated. Hence, any internal 
state carrying information about the one carries information about the rest. Now in principle 
this latter point is not a problem for TIS since, as has been noted above, the account can 
differentiate between two states of affairs types indicated with the same reliability. However, 
the former point is a problem, because it entails that in any possible world in which X carries 
information about, or indicates, one Quine-type property, it carries information about, or 
indicates, the rest as well. Hence, the indication of one of these properties cannot be selected 
for without the indication of each of the other properties being selected for. Hence, X cannot 
have the function of indicating one Quine-type property rather than another, and hence cannot 
have a content expressing one of these properties rather than another.
66
  
 
PNC and PER 
Finally, with regard to PNC and PER this kind of appeal to teleology, on its own, seems to 
offer no further assistance. Teleological notions are appealed to in order to provide further 
discriminative machinery in determining which out of a range of properties is expressed by a 
mental representation. They promise to do this by appealing to certain aspects of the history 
of the state type. However, the property expressed by each of two necessarily co-extensional 
states is the same property, and that which is expressed by an empty representation never 
played any role in the history of the state type.  
 
This being said I do think that there is some value in an appeal to teleology in responding to 
PNC and PIR. However, I think that this value can only be appreciated once we take into 
consideration properties of the representational system occurring at the level of the system‟s 
internal functioning rather than simply at the level of the informational relations which it 
bears to the world. This point will be explored in the following subsection.  
 
                                                   
66 Even if we could separate out the indication of these properties, we would still have to show that there is a 
selective advantage to indicating the one rather than the other, and it might be doubted whether there is such an 
advantage (see, e.g., Loewer, 2002). 
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Even the partial success of (TIS) is undercut by a fundamental problem with grafting a 
teleological element onto an informational/indicator semantics. Godfrey-Smith (1989, 1992) 
has argued persuasively for the claim that the explanatory role attributed by Dretske to the 
indication relation is misplaced. He suggests that considerations concerning the costs and 
benefits of different kinds of mistakes which organisms can make (particularly those of 
producing false positives and false negatives, respectively) are central to the explanation of 
organism-world relationships. This often displaces the explanatory role of indication without 
thereby displacing our intuitive attributions of representational status. That is indication is not 
necessary for representation. Similar ideas are present in Millikan (1989) and Stich (1990).
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As an example, consider a predator-prey situation of the kind described by Millikan (1989, 
p.288). In a population of beavers, in the presence of danger, one beaver slaps its tail on the 
surface of the water. The consequence of this splashing is to cause all of the other beavers to 
find protective cover in a location corresponding to physical features of the tail splashing. 
Now, supposing that it makes sense to talk about representation in such a context, it would 
seem to be plausible that this splashing system has the function of representing danger to the 
other beavers, such that predatory danger is represented by certain physical features of the 
splashing to be at a certain location relative to the splashing beaver.  
 
However, considerations of costs and benefits to the beavers strongly suggest that, since this 
system functions to cause the beavers to find protective cover, it is entirely possible that 
given the constraints on the resources available to the beavers, the process of natural selection 
would favour the production of false positives (i.e. signalling danger when in fact there is 
none) rather than false negatives. Signalling danger when there is none imposes relatively 
limited costs on the beavers, but not signalling danger when there is such danger imposes the 
ultimate cost on the beavers, i.e. their death.  
 
                                                   
67 This argument runs also against Lloyd‟s (1987) weaker account of information requiring only that the 
conditional probability of the represented condition on the occurrence of the internal state exceed the conditional 
probability of any other relevant alternative condition on that state‟s occurrence (Godfrey-Smith (1992)).   
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Hence a system which tends to produce false positives would, in certain circumstances, be 
favoured by evolutionary selection over a system which produced false negatives. Equally, 
just a few occasions on which such a system signalled danger when in fact there was such, 
may be enough of a contribution to the overall fitness of the beaver species, for that system to 
be selected for such signalling (Millikan, 1989). Still, since we initially took the system to 
produce representations of danger, and since the system may have been selected not for 
indicating danger, but rather for being „overly sensitive‟ to the „evidence‟ for danger, we 
must hold, it seems, that a structure can be a representation yet not indicate, not have 
indicated, and, de facto, not have the function of indicating, that which is represented. 
  
In general, therefore, contexts in which the relative costs (including those relative to the 
resources available) and benefits to a species result in the processes of evolution and natural 
selection favouring systems which produce false positives rather than false negatives will 
generate counterexamples to (TIS). This, so long as we take that account to be offering both 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a representational state to have a certain content 
(Godfrey-Smith, 1992).
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4.2. Teleological Theories Focusing on the Representation Consumer 
One way in which to avoid this last problem is by turning to the representation consumer. For 
Millikan (1984, 1989) both the content of a representation, and the status of an internal state 
as a representation, is dependent upon its relation to the functioning of the representation 
                                                   
68 Might we then simply claim that (TIS) provides sufficient, though not necessary, conditions for 
representation? Not easily. The above line of argument suggests that once we take biological/evolutionary 
considerations into account, we see that representation can get on perfectly well without indication. Hence, the 
burden then falls on the proponent of an account such as (TIS) (construed now as only providing sufficient 
conditions for representation) to provide good reason for thinking that, within a biological framework, in those 
cases in which states do indicate that which is represented, the indication relation plays a non-redundant part in 
a set of sufficient conditions for representational content. However, it is not at all clear that this is true. Once we 
account for the representation relation in those cases in which there is no indication, it seems plausible that the 
combination of such an account with a consideration of the cost-benefit considerations obtaining in cases of 
representation with indication will displace the notion of indication within the explanatory framework offered by 
the account. That is, it seems plausible that indication may turn out to be a by-product of, rather than a 
foundation for, representation.   
74 
 
consumer (i.e. the system which uses the representation), rather than the representation 
producer. For Millikan (1984, p.107; 1989, pp. 286-287): 
(TRP) An inner state X is a representation and a representation of some condition 
Y iff: (a) that X correspond by a certain rule with Y is a necessary condition on 
the performance, in accordance with a Normal explanation, of the proper function 
of the consumers of X; (b) Y admits of variations, within the class of representeds 
into which it falls, which accord, one-to-one, with a set of rule-governed 
transformations of X, within the class of representations into which it falls; (c) the 
rule-governed transformations of X have as a Normal condition of their proper 
function the corresponding variation of Y.  
A Normal explanation relative to a specific proper function is, in turn, defined as an 
explanation of the manner in which that function has historically been performed by the 
organ/system which possesses it (Millikan, 1986, p.52).
69
 A condition which is necessary for 
the performance of a certain function in accordance with a Normal explanation is a Normal 
condition (Millikan, 1989, p.287). Hence representational status and content is determined in 
cases in which a rule-governed mapping between representation and represented is a Normal 
condition for the proper functioning of the representation consumer (Millikan, 1989, p.287).    
 
Conditions (b) and (c) specify what is sometimes referred to as Millikan‟s isomorphism 
requirement (Neander, 2004; Shea, 2010), since the one-to-one correspondence between the 
variations in the represented and the transformations of the representation sets up a 
mathematical isomorphism between the class of representeds into which Y falls and the class 
of representations into which X falls.
70
 Since this requirement will form a central point of 
                                                   
69 As I understand Millikan, Normal explanations, in order to explain, describe certain features under specific 
descriptions, such that these descriptions pick out those properties of objects/events/circumstances, the 
instancing of which was historically causally relevant to the successful performance of a proper function. It is 
the features picked out by the explanations, rather than the features of the explanations which are relevant within 
her account. Hence, appeal to such explanations introduces a potential source of intensionality (with an „s‟) 
without rendering the account circular.   
70 It may, in fact, be better to construe Millikan as imposing a more general homomorphism requirement (see 
Shea (2010) and also n.96, below). Mathematically, a homomorphism differs from an isomorphism only in that 
the former need not be a bijection. Hence, all isomorphisms are homomorphisms, but not vice versa. Imposing 
this more general requirement would allow for two representations to have the same extension (cf. Shea, 2010); 
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focus in discussing PNC, PIR and PER, it would be worthwhile to explicate exactly what is 
meant here. A mathematical isomorphism is an injective and surjective mapping (i.e. a 
bijection), f:G→H,71 which preserves the mathematical structure of the sets mapped. Hence, 
if we have an operation defined on G, say „*‟, and we have an operation defined on H, say 
„.‟, then for any g1, g2εG, for any h1, h2εH, f(g1*g2) = f(g1).f(g2). That is, the operations 
performed on the elements of G correspond exactly to the operations performed on the 
mappings of such elements into H. In the same way, Millikan requires in condition (b), 
above, that the transformations which the representation can undergo correspond exactly to 
the transformations which its represented can undergo (cf. Shea, 2010), each within the class 
of representations and representeds to which they belong, respectively (Millikan, 1984, 
2004). 
 
My understanding of Millikan is that she holds that there are certain objective constraints on 
the variety of isomorphisms which can obtain between classes of representations and classes 
of representeds. However, out of the possible isomorphic mappings, that mapping which 
defines the representational content is determined by the needs of the consumer of the 
representation (Shea, 2010). Both the set of variations of the represented mapped, and which 
correspondence rule maps the representation onto that represented, consequently fall under 
the concept „mapping in accordance with a specific rule‟.     
 
Hence, the system which produces the representation (the representation producer) has as its 
proper function to relate the representation with a certain item in the world and establish an 
exact correspondence between certain transformations of the representation and certain 
                                                                                                                                                              
this weakening of Millikan is, therefore, implicitly assumed in the discussion of PNC, below. Nevertheless, for 
ease of discussion, in what follows I will bracket this qualification.  
It should also be noted that a further weakening of Millikan may be required: In order to accommodate the case 
of ambiguous representations, we may need to allow that the correspondence rule between representation and 
represented is not a function but is simply a relation. Again, this will be implicitly assumed in section VI when I 
discuss how (TRPINF) can accommodate ambiguous representations. However, for ease of discussion this 
qualification will be bracketed as well.  
71 That is for every distinct element yεf(G) there is only one distinct element in xεG, such that f(x)=y, and 
H=f(G). 
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variations of this item, under the direction of the requirements of the proper functioning of 
the representation consumer in accordance with a Normal explanation (cf. Millikan, 1984, 
2000). Proper functions of the representation consumer and representation producer are, 
therefore, intertwined.  
 
4.2.1. Proposed Solutions to the Problems of Determinacy 
The paradigmatic examples in Dretske (1986, 1988) fall out as a very special case of (TRP), 
since they are special in three senses. First, the operations on the set of representations and 
the set of representeds are each the respective identity operations on these sets. Second, the 
correspondence rule between representation and represented is of a distinctive sort 
(indication). Third, the same state which adapts the consumer to the environment is 
responsible for initiating behaviour in accordance with that adaptation.
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Hence, indication is one way in which a type of internal state can correspond to an external 
state type, but it needn‟t define the correspondence rule between representations and 
representeds which partially constitutes that mapping which is a Normal condition relative to 
the consumer‟s function. „Normal‟ here does not correspond to statistically normal, and 
representation and represented may need to co-occur only infrequently to contribute to the 
fitness of the organism for precisely those reasons highlighted in the discussion of producer-
based teleological accounts, above (Millikan, 1989). 
 
HP 
In addressing HP a proponent of (TRP) must rely on the idea that on this account the content 
of a state is not determined by its causes but by the relation between its correspondence to the 
world by a rule and the proper functioning of its consumers (Millikan, 1984). Hence, a 
representational state will represent one rather than another of the items appearing on the 
                                                   
72 See Millikan (1984) for the definition of „adapt‟. 
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horizontal axis just in case that the representation maps onto this item (rather than any other) 
by a certain rule is a Normal condition for the consumer‟s proper function.  
 
It would seem, then, that (TRP) can handle HP in a more satisfactory way than the previous 
accounts which we have considered. However, the actuality of this potential success is 
contingent upon: (i) whether there is a determinate item on the horizontal axis onto which the 
representation must map in order for the representation producer to perform its proper 
function in accordance with a Normal explanation;
73
 (ii) whether the horizontal contents 
generated by this account are intuitively the correct ones.  
 
With regard to (i), (TRP) must adequately address the possibility that there may be more than 
one representation consumer and, hence, prima facie, more than one horizontal item the 
mapping onto which constitutes a Normal mapping.
74
 A difficulty more specific to HP is that 
(TRP) may entail that there is no item on the horizontal axis which is represented by the 
representational state. The horizontal axis is constructed out of the more proximate and more 
distal causes of the occurrence of X. However, (TRP) does not require that the property 
which is Normally mapped by X must be causally relevant to the production of Xs.  
 
This feature of (TRP) can be seen as a virtue, since it allows for the attribution of content 
(like food) which applies to properties which, prima facie, are not themselves causally 
relevant to the production of a representational state. However, it may also be a vice. 
Ultimately, whether this is a problem, and if so just how much of a problem it is, for (TRP) 
will depend upon whether (TRP) also generates highly unintuitive contents, and what the 
prospects are for constructing an alternative account which is able to yield contents like food. 
This issue will be explored further in the discussion of Millikan‟s response to the problem of 
complex causal roles and will be taken up again in the final section. 
                                                   
73 Hereafter, that mapping between a representation and an item which is a Normal condition for the proper 
functioning of the representation consumer will be referred to as the Normal mapping. 
74 This issue will be discussed in more detail below. 
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VP 
In addressing VP the proponent of (TRP) must rely on the idea that the representational state 
will have content P rather than Q or R (where <R> is a subset of <P> which is a subset of 
<Q>) just in case that it maps onto the property expressed by P by a certain rule is a normal 
condition for the proper functioning of the representation‟s consumer. On the other hand for 
those problematic disjunctive properties which can arise for TRP, the solution in the offing is 
that since one of the disjuncts is not causally efficacious in the execution of the proper 
function of the representation consumer, the mapping onto this disjunct needn‟t appear in the 
Normal explanation relative to the consumer‟s function. Hence, it should not appear in the 
content of the representation.      
 
The crucial difficulty for this proposal has already been mentioned in relation to HP: Given 
that there is usually more than one consumer of a representation, will content always be 
suitably determinate? On what basis are we to be assured that the normal explanations 
relative to each of the proper functions intersect, and intersect uniquely relative to the 
mapping conditions which they mention, so as to yield a shared Normal mapping condition, 
thus yielding sufficiently determinate mental content (see also Neander (1994))?  
 
Two of the central contributions of Millikan to naturalistic semantics are the differentiation 
between representation producers and representation consumers and the positing of the 
relation between them as central to content determination: The class of representation 
producing/consuming pairs which are relevant to the determination of representational 
content is the class of cooperative systems, systems which have co-evolved because the 
proliferation of the one depends upon the proliferation of the other (Millikan, 1984, p.97; 
Millikan, 2004, pp.73-74). Hence, we might extend this reasoning to suggest that the success 
of the organism depends upon the co-ordination of the representation consumers as they 
execute their proper functions, in response to the representation produced (cf. Millikan, 
1989). Hence, Millikan might argue that were the Normal mappings relative to each 
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consumer such as to require that the representation simultaneously mapped onto different 
features of the environment, then this would undermine cooperation between the various 
consumer systems and hence would tend not to be favoured by natural selection.
75
 
 
However, there are two central problems with this argument. First, it assumes that the 
existence of different Normal mappings (where the difference in each case is, at least, a 
difference in the object mapped onto) relative to different representation consumers 
necessarily implies an incompatibility between the Normal performance of the consumer 
proper functions
76
 which require these Normal mappings. However, this is a fallacy. Just so 
long as the relevant mappings can be simultaneously instantiated when the Normal proper 
functioning
77
 of the organism requires the simultaneous Normal performance of the proper 
functions of more than one representation consumer, there will be no incompatibility of 
function. It is, moreover, plausible that such simultaneous instantiation is possible: The case 
of properties which are locally co-instantiated in the environment in which the organism 
evolved would provide such a possibility.  
 
Second, even if we were to grant this questionable assumption, an incompatibility of proper 
functions performed simultaneously in accordance with a Normal explanation, does not 
imply that the proper functions cannot be simultaneously performed simpliciter. Millikan 
(1986, p.52) gives the example of certain metabolic processes in the human which, though 
they can be performed in the presence of certain lithium compounds, nevertheless have 
historically been performed in the presence of calcium. Hence, that not all of the proper 
functions of the representation consumers can be simultaneously performed in accordance 
with each one‟s Normal explanation does not imply that the fitness of the organism of which 
the consumers form part is necessarily compromised, nor that the functions cannot be 
performed, nor that they cannot continue to be selected for.
78
 Hence, content can be 
                                                   
75 I am not aware of any published source in which she makes this argument, however. 
76 That is the successful performance of these proper functions in accordance with a Normal explanation. 
77 See n.76. 
78 Notice that this case would not imply that the Normal explanation, and hence the content of the 
representation, would change. So long as the Normal explanations describe Normal mappings which are 
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indeterminate due to the existence of multiple distinct Normal mappings, without thereby 
prejudicing the fitness of the organism/species of which it forms part. Hence, there is no 
simple argument from the need for co-ordination in consumer functions to effect fitness, to 
the conclusion that content must be suitably determinate.  
 
On the face of it Millikan‟s account doesn‟t seem to be able to help with either PNC or PIR. 
Prima facie, correspondence by any rule to water is necessarily correspondence by the same 
rule to H2O. Similarly, in the case of necessarily co-instantiated properties, such as the 
Quine-type properties, it would seem that any naturalistically specified correspondence rule 
obtaining between a representation and one of these properties would be a correspondence 
rule obtaining between a representation and another of these properties. Moreover, even if 
there could be naturalistic correspondence rules which obtained between the representation 
and one, rather than another, of these properties, since natural selection cannot separate 
necessarily co-instantiated properties and, de facto, mappings of such properties, there would 
seem to be no differential selectional advantage to the consumer between these mappings. 
Hence, prima facie (TRP) cannot give a non ad hoc reason why a representation should be 
counted as a water representation rather than an H2O representation. Nor can it give a 
naturalistic reason to differentiate representations of Quine-type properties.  
 
However, this overlooks the value which conditions (b) and (c) bring to the account. Indeed it 
seems to me that the kind of response to PNC and PIR which is available to a proponent of 
(TRP) is the most promising of all of the possible lines of response which we have reviewed 
in the present paper. In order to access the response, however, we must delve a little deeper 
into the theoretical resources which Millikan (1984) develops.  
 
Given the conditions placed on representation in (TRP) Millikan defines two important 
elements involved in meaning and representation: The Fregean sense (or just „sense‟) of a 
                                                                                                                                                              
incompatible, but not every subset of such Normal explanations have this property, then content would be 
indeterminate, whilst each consumer could perform its proper function in accordance with a Normal explanation 
enough of the time to ensure stability in the Normal explanation over time. 
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representation and the referent of a representation. The former is the Normal mapping rule 
(Millikan, 1984). The latter is that onto which the representation Normally maps (Millikan, 
1984). Millikan also introduces one final aspect of meaning which, although not part of the 
definition of a representation in the way in which the two terms just introduced are, 
nevertheless can be accommodated within her account: Explicit and implicit intensions. Both 
of these notions apply to that which governs the tokening of a representation (what Millikan 
(1984) calls its iteration). An explicit intension is the iteration of a representation, X, 
according to specific rules or functions which take as arguments prior representational 
structures which do not contain X.  
 
To give an example (one of Millikan‟s (1984)) suppose a primitive creature has amongst his 
set of representations one (RED) expressing the property of redness, one (ROUND) 
expressing the property of roundness and one (FISISE) expressing the property of being fist-
sized, but no representation expressing the property apple. Apples are in fact highly nutritious 
for the creatures in question, and over time, as the creature evolves, a representation, 
APPLE, develops such that this representation is tokened according to the rule that whenever 
the string RED ROUND FISISE is tokened then so is APPLE and the latter representation 
replaces the former string in all further representations. That APPLE maps onto apples 
according to a certain rule becomes a Normal condition for the performance of the proper 
function of the consumers of APPLE and hence APPLE comes to express apple. APPLEs 
have as their explicit intension RED ROUND FISISE.  
 
Three points which Millikan makes are very important for our purposes. First, both a 
representation and its intension may have senses, yet not have the same sense. Second, the 
referent of an intension and the referent of the representation which has this intension can 
come apart as well. Both of these points are generated by the fact that different mappings 
may be required for (orthographically) distinct representations in order to facilitate the proper 
functioning of the consumers as they respond to those representations. From these first two 
points it is striking that intensions act very much like reference-fixing descriptions (a point 
that Millikan (1984) herself notes), in the sense that they introduce a term into a language 
without being semantically equivalent to that term. Third, two representations may have the 
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same referent but different senses. The Normal proper functioning of the representation 
consumer determines which of the many isomorphisms which obtain between a set of 
representations and a set of representeds determines representational content. Hence, two 
different representations can map Normally onto the same referent in different ways 
(Millikan, 1984), since the role which these representations play in their respective 
consumers‟ (which needn‟t be the same) Normal proper functioning may differ. 
 
Let‟s return then to the two problems with which we are concerned. There are two distinct 
ways in which the proponent of (TRP) may respond to the problem of PNC. The first is to 
point out that it is possible for two representations to have the same referent but different 
senses. It is true that there can be no selectional advantage between corresponding, according 
to a certain rule, to water and corresponding, according to the same rule, to H2O. However, 
there can be a differential selectional advantage between mapping onto the property that is 
water and H2O in one way rather than another (i.e. in having one sense which maps the 
representation onto water/H2O rather than another).   
 
Could the Normal mappings of two (orthographically distinct) representations and water 
differ in the way required? To answer this question fully we would need to know how the 
notion „transformation‟ can be generalised. If it applies only to cases in which syntactic 
structure is kept invariant whilst lexical content is varied (Millikan, 1984), then it would seem 
that two mappings could certainly differ in the way required. For example, if being able to 
manipulate the chemical structure of H2O can yield selective advantage, then the 
representation consumers which are Normally responsible for this can determine such a 
mapping. However, this interpretation of „transformation‟ renders the current response as 
equivalent to the Dretske/Fodor line discussed above. We found there that the difference 
identified by the complex/simple distinction wasn‟t the difference after which we sought.  
 
Nevertheless, the fundamental notion of an isomorphism is suitably abstract enough to allow 
the possibility that „transformation‟ is not limited to this interpretation. Hence, this line of 
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response is not necessarily subject to the same objections which we have raised for the other 
accounts. 
 
Despite this, the objections to the Dretske/Fodor line suggest strongly that the fundamental, 
broadly semantic, fact which underpinned the felt difference between water representations 
and H2O representations was intimately connected to features of how the representation was 
acquired. Indeed, in the case of Sam, whilst we intuitively wish to restrict the content of 
Sam‟s relevant states to the single property expressed by those states, the felt difference 
between them derives from how these representations were introduced into Sam‟s inner 
„language‟. Millikan‟s notion of an intension can capture this nicely.  
 
It also captures two of the central features of the standard Kripke-Putnam story which 
generated problems for the previous accounts in relation to the semantics of natural kind 
terms. First, it captures the notion of reference fixing descriptions, and Millikan‟s notion of 
an implicit intension
79
 promises to capture reference fixation which is not dependent upon 
other representations. Second, it captures the distinction between reference fixation and 
semantic equivalence. Notice that (TRP) has a distinct advantage over informational-based 
semantics here. A representation, X, introduced into the subject‟s „inner language‟ by a 
combination of other representations will potentially represent some item on an informational 
based semantics only if this combination of other representations carries information about 
that item. However, the difficult problem then arises as to how it is possible for X to 
represent this item whereas the combination of other representations does not, i.e. how is it 
possible for X to be semantically distinct from the combination of other representations?  
 
(TRP) is able to cleanly deal with this problem because on this account what determines 
content is the proper function of the consumers of the representation, and there may be 
important differences between the intension and X in this respect. Hence, on (TRP) the 
                                                   
79 This notion refers to the iteration of representations according to rules or functions which take as arguments 
perceptual data (1984, p.148). 
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combination of representations which introduces a distinct representation into a system 
needn‟t be semantically equivalent to X. 
 
Hence (TRP) is able to non-arbitrarily exclude the reference fixing intension from the 
semantic content of the representation the reference of which is fixed. Yet it is able to non-
arbitrarily differentiate between water representations and H2O representations: These two 
representation types differ because either (i) the perceptual abilities involved in their implicit 
intensions differ, or (ii) the descriptions used to fix their references differ. This accords with 
the counterarguments given to the alternative theories above, and with central features of the 
standard story about natural kind semantics.  
 
PER 
It will readily be noted that this approach promises to deal nicely with PER as well. It was 
noted above (in the discussion of informational semantics) that: (i) It is, in many ways, 
plausible that empty representations seem to have content, and, hence, to differ from one 
another, because they are constructed out of other representations which are not empty; (ii) 
that this prima facie plausibility is undermined by the fact that there are empty simple 
representations (e.g. phlogiston). The present approach seems to „thread the needle‟, as it 
were, by allowing, first, that an empty representation can be introduced by a complex 
representation. Two empty representations may, therefore, differ in intension whilst being 
identical in content (that is, because they have no content). This promises to explain the felt 
difference between two empty representations in parallel with the second response to PNC, 
above. However, second, this approach allows that the empty representation, though 
introduced by a complex representation, is, nevertheless, not semantically equivalent to it. 
Hence empty representations may be both syntactically and semantically simple. Since the 
model by which it achieves this result seems to capture certain features of natural kind 
semantics so well, this would explain the phlogiston case very nicely. 
 
Let‟s turn finally to PIR, which has, in many ways, proven to be the most intractable of all 
the problems with which we have dealt. It has been noted above that it would seem that there 
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can be no selectional advantage to having states which express, say, rabbit and states which 
express, say, undetached-rabbit-part. Equally, in parallel with the above discussion of 
Dretske (1981), there are no explicit intensions to which we can appeal in addressing this 
problem. Hence, the work in solving PIR falls on the shoulders of the primary machinery of 
(TRP).  
 
Notice first that it is not clear that it is actually true that there can be no selectional advantage 
in having states which express rabbit and states which express undetached-rabbit-part. 
Consider the example of the bear. Gende, Quinn and Wilson (2001) have documented the 
phenomenon of selective consumption of salmon parts: That is the phenomenon of the bear 
consuming only certain parts of the salmon such as the eggs (in the female) or the brain (in 
the male) and then abandoning the rest of the fish. Gende, Quinn and Wilson (2001) relate 
this sort of behaviour to the level of availability of salmon in the bears‟ habitat during feeding 
periods: Roughly, the greater the density of available salmon, the more selective the bear‟s 
consumption of it. There is a clear survival advantage in this pattern. When the amount of 
available salmon is high, the bear can eat to satiety on the energy rich female salmon eggs 
and male salmon brain. In so doing the bear ingests more energy for one stomach-load of 
food, than it would if it consumed only whole fish. When it comes time to hibernate for the 
winter, the bears which have been consistently filling their stomachs with fish eggs are likely 
to do better than those which have been eating only whole fish. 
 
Just what the representational capacities of bears are is unclear (to me at least). However, if 
bear behaviour could be explained with reference to representational states, then it seems 
highly plausible that the bear which could represent parts of the fish would have a selective 
advantage over the bear which could not.  
 
Now, this doesn‟t show quite what we were trying to, because the problematic contents in 
PIR are not part of a rabbit and rabbit (these are not necessarily co-instantiated), but rather 
undetached part of a rabbit and rabbit (these are necessarily co-instantiated). Hence, to deal 
with this complication, consider the following hypothetical scenario. Suppose that in some 
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world the salmon are such that when the part containing the eggs of the female, or the part 
which is the brain of the male, is attached to the salmon it is such that if consumed from that 
state it is just as nutritious and energy-filled for the bear as it is in the actual world. We 
suppose that this is true because bear saliva can maintain the nutritious state of the part of the 
fish. However, if these parts are first detached from the salmon (say by a tempestuous fish 
eagle) and then consumed by a bear, they are poisonous to it. Supposing that the same story 
applies as before about the advantages of consuming only certain parts of the salmon, it 
would seem that it is advantageous to the bear to consume only certain undetached salmon 
parts. We might also generalise on which parts are particularly nutritious to the bear by 
supposing that just which parts are particularly energy-filled change each year and the bear is 
capable of adapting to these changes. Then it would seem that, intuitively, the bear which 
could represent undetached part of a salmon would be at a distinct advantage to the bear that 
could represent salmon. Furthermore, allowing the density of fish to change over time, it 
seems that the bear which could represent both salmon and undetached part of a salmon, 
would be at an advantage over the bear which could only represent salmon.     
 
So far, so good. We‟ve got to the point where if all of the above is correct we can say that if 
the bear could represent undetached salmon part and salmon this would be advantageous. 
However, perhaps many things which are advantageous are not possible. Given the argument 
with which we began discussion of (TRP)‟s approach to PIR, how could the bear represent 
salmon. 
 
Notice first that the aforementioned argument can now be seen to underestimate the power of 
the mapping conditions in (TRP). For the mapping condition does not (or does not just) 
concern a function which obtains between two elements (a representation and a represented). 
Rather it has three features: (i) an operation on a set of representations, concerning a subset of 
the transformations which they can undergo; (ii) an operation on a set of representeds, 
concerning a subset of the variations of which they admit; (iii) a function between these to 
subsets which is an isomorphism between these two sets under these respective operations. It 
is these three features which define the mapping with which (TRP) is concerned.  
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Hence, if that the pattern of transformations which a representation can undergo corresponds 
in a certain way to the pattern of variations which one (out of a number) of possible 
representeds can undergo is such that the exploiting of this correspondence historically 
facilitated the production of an effect by the representation consumers which was selected 
for, then it is that correspondence rather than some other which determines what the 
representation represents. Hence, it is true that any function (in the sense of element (iii)) 
between a representation, X, and salmon is a function between that representation and 
undetached salmon part. However, some of these functions will preserve a certain 
correspondence between certain transformations which X can undergo and certain variations 
which salmon (or its instantiations qua such instantiations) can undergo. Other functions will 
preserve a certain correspondence between certain transformations which X can undergo and 
certain variations which undetached salmon part (or its instantiations qua such instantiations) 
can undergo.  
 
Thus, we can frame two sufficient conditions for a representation to express undetached 
salmon part rather than salmon: 
(RS) A representation X expresses undetached salmon part rather than salmon if:  
(i) there exists a function which preserves a correspondence between certain 
transformations on X and a set of variations which instantiations of undetached 
salmon parts (qua such instantiations) can undergo, but which instantiations of 
salmon (qua such instantiations) cannot;  
(ii)  this correspondence is such that the successful performance of the proper functions of 
the representation consumers as they responded to the representation historically 
depended on it.       
It will be readily noted that we can generalise over „salmon‟ and „undetached salmon part‟ to 
the set of all Quine-type properties. 
 
Let‟s recap. Fodor‟s (1994) central insight was that the metaphysical properties which an 
item possesses, in particular the relations which that item, insofar as it instantiates the 
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property, can bear to others, is central to separating out fine-grained contents in PIR. In 
particular, the mirroring of these relations in the inferential relations which a representation 
can enter into was claimed by him to be central to this task. However, Fodor‟s suggestion fell 
short because, first, it could give no account of why certain metaphysically necessary truths 
about the relations which the relevant properties could and could not enter into should 
constrain the set of inferences which a possessor of the representation could and could not 
make. Second, it could give no account of why certain inferential relations which the 
representation could and could not enter into should determine that the representation 
referred
80
 to one thing in the world instead of another, rather than simply determining that 
one thing was thought about in two different ways. Third, it fell short because it could place 
no non ad hoc bounds on the network of inferences which were relevant to the determination 
of this content. 
 
The present suggestion doesn‟t suffer from any of these problems.81 According to (TRP) 
nothing represents unless it maps according to some rule, and it is this mapping which 
determines what is represented. Quine-type cases are not special in this regard. Hence, for 
every case of representation, there are operations, which govern certain events which are 
entirely internal to the cognitive functioning of the organism, which help to determine 
content. Which of the truths about the relations which the represented can enter into and 
which it can‟t are those truths which are relevant to determining content, is determined by 
which mapping between representation and represented is a Normal condition for the proper 
functioning of the consumer of the representation.  
 
                                                   
80 „Refer‟ is intended as a broad term encompassing both application to individuals and application to objects in 
a term‟s extension. 
81 It should be noted that Millikan (1984) thinks that inferential processes are parasitic on, rather than 
determinative of, content. Hence, she would not approve of inferential processes being construed as potentially 
defining the operation on the set of representations under which this set is isomorphic to the set of representeds. 
However, it doesn‟t seem to me that we need to go along with Millikan on this point so long as „inference‟ is 
explicated in broadly causal terms and the representations are individuated orthographically. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that my proposal of how (TRP) can deal with PIR is not committed to construing the relevant 
operation on the set of representations as inferential: Any operation which can mirror, under an appropriate 
correspondence rule, the relevant operation on the set of representeds will do.  
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Cases in which the same thing is thought about in two different ways are distinguished from 
cases in which two things are thought about as follows. Y is thought about in two different 
ways when there are two representations, X and X*, which map according to distinct 
mapping rules, M and M*, such that both of the following conditions are met:  
(i) the operations on the class of representeds defined by the respective mappings are 
each satisfiable by Y;  
(ii) that X map onto Y according to M is a Normal condition for the proper functioning of 
the consumers of X, {C}, and that X* map onto Y according to M* is a Normal 
condition for the proper functioning of the consumer of X*, {C*}.
82
  
On the other hand, there are representations of two distinct items Y and Z if the following 
condition is met: There are representations X and X*, there are mappings M and M*, such 
that, that X map onto Y according to M is a Normal condition for the proper functioning of 
the consumers of X (whereas that it map onto Z is not), and that X* map onto Z  according to 
M* is a Normal condition for the proper functioning of the consumers of X* (whereas that it 
map onto Y is not).
83
 The above discussion shows how it is possible within a naturalistic 
framework for two mappings to differentiate between two Quine-type properties and how 
there could be a selectional advantage in such differentiation. 
 
Finally, TRP doesn‟t run into the holism problems which Fodor‟s account does, because 
there is an independent constraint which determines which set of transformations of the 
representation are relevant to content, namely the Normal proper function of the 
representation consumer. 
 
This, then, offers an, admittedly potential, but, to my mind, plausible theoretical solution to 
PIR.  
 
                                                   
82 We allow here that {C} may be equivalent to {C*}. 
83 Here it may or may not be the case that Y and Z can each satisfy both M and M*. 
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V 
The Problem of Complex Causal Roles 
 
5. The Problem and Proposed Solutions 
  
5.1. The Problem 
Teleological approaches to mental content, therefore, attempt to resolve the determinacy 
problems of broadly causal accounts by appealing in some way to the proper function of traits 
(either of the representation producer or the representation consumer). However, Neander 
(1995) and Griffiths and Goode (1995) urge that the functioning of a given structure or trait 
need not (indeed cannot) be determinate in the requisite way. This is because an effect‟s 
causal contribution to the selection of the trait which is responsible for it is realized by a 
number of intermediary mechanisms (see Griffiths & Goode, 1995). In the classic case of the 
frog, for example, predatory mechanisms (tongue reflexes) are engaged by any projections of 
small, dark moving things onto the frog‟s retina (Neander, 1995; Sterelny, 1990). Since most 
small, dark, moving things in the frog‟s natural habitat are edible flies, the production of the 
internal state in a suitable relation to the presence of certain retinal projections: (i) contributes 
to the selection of the trait responsible for it, by (ii) contributing to the fitness of the species, 
by (iii) occurring in response to food, by (iv) occurring in response to flies, by (v) occurring 
in response to small, dark, moving things, by (vi) occurring in response to certain retinal 
stimulations (Griffiths & Goode, 1995; Neander, 1995).
84
 This concertina (Neander, 1995) of 
functions, therefore, renders it indeterminate as to what the state represents on teleological 
accounts. This is the sixth determinacy problem with which we will be concerned (hereafter, 
PCR).  
 
                                                   
84 See figure 8, below, for a diagrammatic illustration of PCR in the case of the frog. The diagram is based on 
that given in Griffiths and Goode (1995), with minor amendments. 
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5.2. Proposed Solutions to the Problem 
A number of different responses to PCR have been given in the literature; so much so that 
reasons have been given for taking the content of the frog‟s perceptual state to be fixed as 
small, dark, moving thing (Neander, 1995), fly (Sterelny, 1990), food (Millikan 1991; 
Papineau, 1997) and small, dark, fast-moving food (Agar, 1993; see Griffiths & Goode, 
1995). I will consider four types of approach that have been taken to the problem. Although 
none of them are ultimately correct each highlights an important aspect for a more 
satisfactory solution. 
 
5.2.1. Appeals to the selection for/selection of distinction 
Griffiths and Goode (1995) identify (and reject) one argumentative strategy (which they refer 
to as the „target of selection argument‟) for discriminating the content of the frog‟s perceptual 
state. These authors suggest that each level of functional description in the teleological 
concertina of effects can be seen as corresponding to distinct levels of theoretical description. 
The argumentative strategy attempts to apply Sober‟s selection of/selection for distinction 
across theoretical levels so as to privilege one effect/function in the concertina over others. 
Let {pi,…,pn} denote the n levels of a concertina of functions of the kind described above. 
The argument proceeds by asking us, for some pi (iε(1,n]), to consider the counterfactual 
scenarios in which: (a) the pj (j below i) is/are held constant but pi is absent; (b) pj is absent 
but pi is held constant. The result of this counterfactual version of Mill‟s methods is that in 
(b) but not (a) the mechanism producing the perceptual state is selected; from this it is 
concluded that the proper function of the mechanism is that described at the level pi.  
 
This argument is flawed for two reasons. The first is that the argument overlooks the possible 
interaction between two causally relevant factors. One way in which causally relevant factors, 
c and d, can interact is in the case where one factor, c, can only make its contribution given 
that the other, d, makes its contribution. This sort of case is sometimes referred to in the 
literature on experimental design and analysis as a catalytic interaction between two 
variables/factors, and, indeed the case of a chemical catalyst provides a nice illustration of it. 
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Suppose that two chemicals, p and q, react to form the chemical r. It may be possible that 
there exists a fourth chemical s such that the addition of s to the mixture of p and q can 
increase the rate of reaction from that which would occur if s were not added to the chemical 
mix. However, s may be such that on its own (i.e. in the absence of p) it will not react with q 
to form r. Suppose that not knowing any of these details, on an occasion in which p, q and s 
are all mixed together, we wonder whether it is p or s which is causally responsible for the 
production of r that is observed. Dutifully applying a counterfactual version of Mill‟s 
methods as used in the target of selection argument would yield the result that it was p rather 
than s which is causally responsible for the production of r. However, clearly this would be 
incorrect: s does make a causal contribution to the particular production of r which is 
observed; however, it can only do so in the presence of p.  
 
In any such case, therefore, considering counterfactuals of the above form will lead us 
incorrectly to conclude that c makes no causal contribution. In the specific sort of 
evolutionary types of cases with which we are presently concerned, the contribution to 
selection of each lower level mechanism/function depends on the successful performance of 
the function at the level immediately above it. Hence, when we consider any successive pair 
of functions in isolation, the target of selection argument can be used to privilege any of the 
higher level functions over those at lower levels (see Griffiths & Goode, 1995).  
 
The second flaw in the target of selection argument is that, for similar reasons, if the above 
argument shows anything then it shows that it is possible for a lower level function/effect not 
to make a causal contribution to the selection of the trait responsible for it, rather than that 
such a function/effect did not actually make such a contribution. This is so since the 
counterfactuals which the target of selection argument employs require us to consider what 
would have happened were the function described at the i-th level of the concertina still to 
have been realised, without the function described at the j-th level having not been. In such a 
scenario, presumably one would have to imagine an alternate function described at the level j 
in the place of that function which actually occupies this position. If the trait responsible for 
the i-th level function in the counterfactual scenario imagined were to be selected, then it 
follows that the actual j-th level phenotypic expression of this trait needn’t have been 
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selected. The higher level function could have still been selected without it. However, it does 
not follow that given that the actual j-th level function/phenotypic expression was selected, 
the fact that the trait responsible for it was responsible for it made no causal contribution to 
the selection of this trait. There may be many intermediary functions described at the j-th 
level which could realize the function described at level i, compatible with all of these 
functions having causally contributed to the selection of the trait responsible for them in the 
world in which they appear on the j-th level.
85
  
 
Ultimately, therefore, even when we consider matters in terms of selection for, all of the 
effects on the concertina are selected for.    
 
Griffiths and Goode (1995) attribute versions of this argument to both Sterelny (1990) and 
Agar (1993). I think that Agar is guilty of a version of it; I think Sterelny uses it but 
irrelevantly; my focus will, therefore, be on Agar.  
 
5.2.1.1.  Agar 
Agar (1993) proposes that in determining those environmental properties which are causally 
efficacious in the selection of a representational state
86
, S, we need to consider not only those 
properties which are relevant to the existence of the state, but also those environmental 
properties which are relevant to the state having the particular structure which it does have: 
“…we should work out which properties we cannot change without modifying the exact 
structure of [S]” (p.10).  
 
The fly being small, dark and fast moving is causally relevant to the selectional history of the 
structure of S, since if the fly were not such, then S would not have certain of the causal 
                                                   
85 This is related to the stressed importance of considering historical contingencies in evolutionary explanations; 
see Fodor (2008), Sober (2010), Griffiths & Goode (1995). 
86 Notice here that Agar shifts the emphasis from the question of what property of an item is selected for to the 
question of which environmental feature does the selecting (is the force of selection (Agar, 1993)) of the trait. 
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propensities which it does have (its relation to external stimuli on the one hand and to 
perceptual faculties on the other), and it is partly in virtue of these propensities that it makes 
its contribution to the fitness of the organism. The property of being food is causally relevant 
to the existence of S if not to its structure. However, fly does not qualify for inclusion in the 
representational content, since slight, but significant, alterations in the essential property of 
the fly, its genetic makeup, if everything else was kept constant, would make no difference to 
the existence or structure of S.  
 
Agar‟s proposal is valuable in three respects. (i) It highlights the idea that the proper way in 
which to account teleologically for one of the proper functions of the S-producing mechanism 
being to produce Ss in response to more proximal stimuli is in terms of the selectional history 
of (certain aspects) of the structure of S; (ii) It highlights the idea that, owing to the frog‟s 
cognitive simplicity, relatively undifferentiated contents are often appropriately attributed; 
(iii) it grounds what I take to be the right sort of account of how the semantic properties of a 
contentful state can be relevant to causal explanation of the state‟s effects (see Nicholson, 
2009); (iv) it gives a useful way of identifying the aspect of the environmental which should 
feature in the content of the state, namely searching for those features which exerted 
selectional pressure on the state‟s structure and existence.      
 
Nevertheless, Agar errs in the way in which he attempts to apply his proposal, for much the 
same reasons as those given in section 5.2.1. In this particular case, Agar errs in overlooking 
the phenomenon of co-evolution between frogs and flies (Griffiths & Goode, 1995), and 
hence in eliminating fly from the content of S. Agar also errs in delimiting which section of 
the concertina is content relevant. Since food will not contribute to selection under certain 
conditions (e.g. if the food is poisoned), a description of these conditions should feature in the 
content of S (Papineau, 1997). On the other hand, since S will not occur unless small, dark, 
moving things cast suitable projections on the retina, a description of these projections should 
be included in the content of S.  
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On reflection, one can see that the application of the selection for/selection of distinction to 
the simultaneous determination of the environmental features which are selectionally relevant 
to the structure of a state and those features which are selectionally relevant to the existence 
of a state cannot be satisfactory in principle. For, it will always yield a conjunction of the 
most proximal and the most distal environmental features which are mentioned in the 
descriptions on the concertina of proper functions, whilst excluding those features which are 
mentioned in the descriptions on the levels in-between. Given that the structure of a 
representational state, S, as intimately connected to the relation of S to sensory stimuli on the 
one hand and perceptual/cognitive/behavioural systems on the other, changes in the proximal 
stimuli associated with an object with which interaction is biologically beneficial to the 
subject of S, will alter the structure of S. On the other hand since it is the biological benefit 
itself which is relevant to the existence of S (with or without the exact structure which it 
actually has), changes to the contribution which S makes to the selection of the organism will 
alter the fact of S‟s existence. Since, this contribution is reflected in the top-most level of 
description, however, it seems that as long as we hold these two features constant, on Agar‟s 
proposal, we can change the environmental features which are described at any intermediate 
level of the concertina as much as we like without affecting either the structure or the 
existence of S. Hence, the fundamental difficulty with Agar‟s proposal is that it does not 
show how representation of the items which feature at these intermediate levels of description 
is possible. 
 
5.3. Appeals to the notion of malfunction 
Neander (1995) holds that: 
(i) All of the effects of some trait, T, in a concertina of the above form constitute 
functions of T; 
(ii) However, we can still identify the proper function of T as that function which is 
specific to it.  
(iii) It is in terms of this specific function that representation and misrepresentation can be 
explicated.   
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Neander (1995, p.114-120) begins with Robert Cummins‟ notion of a functional analysis, in 
which a complex system is decomposed into smaller functional units, the operation and the 
contribution to the whole of which can then be successfully described. This process continues 
recursively on each subsystem. For each smaller subsystem, that subsystem will have a 
correct functional description at the level of analysis where it appears explicitly and as an 
unanalysed component. It will also have a correct functional description at the level where it 
appears implicitly as a component of the larger system. However, each subsystem will only 
be considered to be malfunctioning when it fails to produce its biologically normal 
contribution to the functioning of its immediate supersystem. Hence, a subsystem will be 
considered to be malfunctioning when it fails to produce its biologically normal effect at the 
lowest level of description/analysis at which it appears explicitly and as an unanalysed 
component (Neander, 1995, p.129). Let‟s call this proposal about malfunctioning NPF. 
 
In the case of the frog, Neander (1995) takes state S to be “whatever state the frog‟s optic 
fibres and associated neural processors are in when they cause tongue snapping” (p.130), and, 
by an application of the above principle, renders the proper function of the detection device 
of which S forms part as detecting small, dark, moving things. S, therefore, has the content 
„small, dark moving thing‟. Hence, Ss correctly represent when caused by a small, dark, 
moving thing; Ss misrepresent when caused by something else. We can frame this proposal 
about misrepresentation as follows: 
(NPM) For any system, Q, responsible for producing a representational state, S, 
Q‟s tokening of S is a misrepresentation if and only if Q malfunctions (according 
to NPF) in producing S.
87
 
 
It seems to me that Neander has identified one genuine type of misrepresentation. However, 
there are two central problems with the proposal, both of which Neander notes (1995, p.130-
136), neither of which she adequately resolves. First the account is too restrictive: On its own 
it always yields proximal contents. This is because, given a concertina of proper functions, 
                                                   
87 That is, the production of S may partly constitute the malfunction of Q, or it may just be the result of the 
malfunction of Q. 
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{pi}iε[1,n], of the detection device of which S forms part, for every pk, kε(1,n] there is a proper 
function, pj, jε[1,n) such that the device does pk by doing pj. However, as the example of the 
frog illustrates, the successful performance of pk depends upon more than the device 
successfully performing pj; systems external to that of which the device forms part must also 
„co-operate‟. For example, successfully detecting flies depends upon more than successfully 
detecting small, dark moving things, since when a bee-bee pellet is flung across the visual 
field of the frog, the frog successfully detects a small, dark, moving thing which is not a fly 
(cf. Fodor, 1990a). Similar cases can be constructed for the substitutions of „small, dark, 
moving thing‟ for „fly‟ and „retinal pattern of kind A‟ for „small, dark, moving thing‟. Hence, 
a failure of the device to successfully perform pk does not necessarily imply a failure to 
successfully perform pj; hence, pj is a more specific function of the device than is pk. Iterating 
for kε(1,n], yields the result that p1 is the most specific function of the device and, hence, the 
item mentioned in the description at this level is the correct content for S. 
 
The question consequently arises, how is distality then possible? This question divides into 
two. The first is the question of how any distality is possible. For example, once we take NPF 
and NPM seriously, it seems that the correct content for state S in the case of the frog is 
retinal pattern of kind A, rather than small, dark moving. The second is how the right amount 
of distality is possible. For example, in the case of the frog how is it possible to get contents 
like fly or food. The first of these questions will be addressed here; the second will be 
implicitly addressed in the discussion of the possibility of misrepresentation without 
malfunction, below.  
 
In response to the first question, Neander (1995, p.135-136) claims that whilst her proposal 
doesn‟t give a principled answer to the problem of distality it doesn‟t preclude one either (p. 
136) and that whilst her proposal seems to imply that the (proximal) items appearing at the 
lowest level of a concertina are always the contents of representational states it does not 
compel us to give this verdict (p.136). Her motivation for these claims is the idea that, in 
addressing the problem of distality, we can appeal to further principles compatible with that 
proposed, which would delimit a class of more distal features on which her principle of 
malfunctioning could be applied. 
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However, it is a little difficult to see how any further principle could be compatible with that 
proposed and still delimit a subsection of the concertina of functions {pi}iε[1,n] which excludes 
p1. For the original proposal was to take the proper function which is specific to a subsystem 
(in this case a representation generating device) to be that biologically normal function which 
corresponds to the lowest level of description/analysis at which the subsystem appears 
explicitly and as an unanalysed component. However, since, by the argument three 
paragraphs back, for any concertina of proper functions, {pi}iε[1,n], this function is always p1, 
clearly any further principles which demarcate a class of functions in the concertina which 
does not include p1 will not be compatible with Neander‟s proposal as stated. 
 
Hence, Neander‟s suggestion must be that the combination of her proposal with certain 
further principles would yield the result that a subsystem is malfunctioning if it fails to 
successfully perform the lowest of its biologically normal functions within some class, ED. 
Here, ED is: (i) a subset of the concertina of functions generated by the description of the 
subsystem when it appears explicitly and as an unanalysed component; (ii) determined by the 
further principles to which Neander appeals. Call this proposal about malfunctioning NPF*. 
Hence, the bare proposal about misrepresentation in her (1995) must be understood not as she 
presents it but rather as follows: 
(NPM*) For any system, Q, responsible for producing a representational state, S, 
Q‟s tokening of S is a misrepresentation if and only if Q malfunctions (according 
to NPF*) in producing S.
88
 
 
                                                   
88 See figure 8 for a diagrammatic illustration of the proposal in the case of the frog. The nature of ED and 
NPM* illustrated in the diagram are as Neander intends them to be. Whether this intention can be realized, 
however, will be discussed below. 
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Figure 8 
 
There are two problems with this move. The first is that Neander‟s proposal of prioritising the 
lowest level of functional description now becomes far less well motivated. I take Neander‟s 
central motivation for this prioritisation to be that it is intuitively plausible that a supersystem 
can malfunction without each one of its subsystems malfunctioning. This phenomenon 
occurs, moreover, in just those cases in which the possible causes of the non-performance of 
the supersystem‟s function are greater than one. In such cases all but one of the subsystems 
may be functioning in that way which normally
89
 contributes to the supersystem successfully 
performing its proper function. Hence, the non-performance of a supersystem function will 
entail the malfunction of a subsystem if and only if it is that subsystem which is the causal 
source of the non-performance.
90
 Neander‟s proposal, in turn, yields this result.  
 
                                                   
89 Where this notion is not statistical but rather something like Millikan‟s notion of Normal. 
90 We can generalize this idea to the case in which two or more subsystems are causally responsible for the non-
performance of the supersystem‟s proper function. 
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However, it is clear that this line of justification will only support NPF and, hence, NPM. For 
it supports the idea that there is a sense of malfunctioning such that a subsystem malfunctions 
only when the cause of the non-performance of a biologically normal supersystem function 
lies entirely within that subsystem. Clearly NPM* entails that it is possible for a 
representational subsystem to malfunction even if the causal source of the non-performance 
of the relevant biologically normal supersystem function lies outside of that subsystem. For it 
is only because of this entailment that NPM* has any chance of yielding distal contents.
91
  
 
A similar theme permeates the three further subsidiary reasons which Neander gives for 
adopting NPM. First she suggests that a full account of representation and misrepresentation 
will need to depend upon: (i) the existence of inferential processes in perception; (ii) a two-
factor theory which includes both sense and reference. NPM and its entailments about the 
content of mental representations make more plausible content attributions in the case of 
simpler organisms, allow for misrepresentation without malfunction via (i) in higher 
organisms, and inform (ii) by giving the “criteria by which a cognitive system identifies that 
which it represents, and how it represents it” (1995, p.134). However, it is apparent that these 
reasons for adopting NPM carry over to NPM*only if the further principles appealed to in 
NPM* always delimit the class of proper functions such that the lowest level of description 
in the class is that level at which a description of the proximate environmental parameters 
                                                   
91 Couldn‟t Neander claim that NPM* only entails that it is possible for a representational subsystem to 
malfunction even if the causal source of the non-performance of the relevant biologically normal supersystem 
function extends outside of (though still lies partially within) that subsystem? Alternatively, couldn‟t she claim 
that it doesn‟t even entail this, instead requiring that only those cases in which the representational subsystem 
fails to perform its lowest level function in ED because it fails to produce its absolute lowest level function (i.e. 
that function described at level p1) are relevant? Not if she wishes to still maintain: (i) the equivalence between 
malfunctioning and misrepresenting; (ii) that her proposal addresses PCR. For on either of these two 
suggestions, it is a necessary condition for subsystem malfunction, and, hence, for misrepresentation, that the 
subsystem does not perform its absolute lowest function. Hence, if the subsystem does perform this function, 
then it doesn’t malfunction and there is no misrepresentation. But how should the content of state S be construed 
to ensure this result? It could only be by construing this content as disjunctive, where the disjuncts are the items 
mentioned in the description of the p1-level function and the lowest function in ED, respectively, e.g. in the case 
of the frog, retinal pattern A or small, dark, fast  moving. For, it is only in this case that misrepresentation 
requires that S be tokened in response to something that isn‟t mentioned in the description of the p1-level 
function. Hence, this proposal would be of no help in solving PCR, insofar as this problem arises within the 
field of naturalistic semantics. It would also be of no help in accounting for, what I take to be, the standard case 
of misrepresentation. In this case an item which is not in the extension of the content of the representational 
state causes this state‟s tokening by causing the occurrence of the same proximal stimuli that are normally 
caused by items which are in that extension. 
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occurs. This is a substantive assumption which Neander gives us no reason to believe and 
which, prima facie, needn‟t be true. 
 
Finally, Neander suggests that NPM brings the account of mental content into line with 
Cummins‟ suggestion that “psychology should aim to provide an interpreted cognitive 
analysis” (Neander, 1995, p.135) which consists of a recursive decomposition of the 
cognitive system into parts according to the specific tasks which they perform. However, this 
reason can only support NPM, and not NPM*, since it is only the former proposal which 
yields functions which are specific to subsystems.     
  
In general, without a specification of the further principles which delimit the class ED, there 
is no guarantee that Neander‟s notion will do any substantive work in the final account of 
content and misrepresentation. Once we appeal to further principles to address the distality 
problem, there is no guarantee that the only satisfactory principles are such that they will not, 
on their own, yield determinate function ascriptions without appeal to Neander‟s sort of 
analysis. Hence, in order for her proposal to be accepted she would have to give us, not the 
further principles themselves, but rather what sort of work we have good reason to expect that 
these principles will do and what their limitations will be.  
  
The second central problem with Neander‟s overall proposal is that a purported solution to 
PCR is bought at the expense of an adequate account of misrepresentation, since 
misrepresentation can occur without malfunction. In response to this Neander (1995, p.132) 
appeals to levels of cognitive complexity and the introduction of inference in perception 
formation. Neander‟s suggestion is that her account of misrepresentation applies directly only 
to the initial representations of environmental physical parameters; further instances of 
misrepresentation are due to errors in the process of inference on the basis of these initial 
representations.  
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It seems to me that this idea is a good one and introduces a further junction where error can 
occur. However, we can show that the success of this appeal depends upon a prior solution to 
PCR having been given, and, hence, cannot be appealed to in defending Neander‟s own 
solution to this problem.  
 
In a naturalistic framework, the most plausible way to construe Neander‟s appeal to inference 
is as follows. The initial representations are taken as input values and a certain 
representational state is generated on their basis as the output value. Since the input values do 
not uniquely determine the output value, mistakes can occur.  
 
Suppose, then, that the appeal to inferential processes in perception is intended as a way of 
accounting for the fixation of distal content. Arguably, on a naturalistic account of content 
inferential relations are most plausibly explicated in causal/functional terms, amended, 
perhaps, with an appeal to teleology in order to separate the constitutive functional relations 
from those that are not. Hence, state S occurs in response to a set of representations, {Ri}iε[1,n] 
of proximal stimuli, and the subsystem which produces S in such circumstances has the 
implementation of the operation describing this process as its proper function.  
 
We want to say that S represents some distal item, O, because occurring in response to Os 
discharges part of the proper function of the subsystem of which S forms part. We also want 
to say that S misrepresents when it is produced in response to {Ri}iε[1,n] but in the absence of 
O. However, this does not constitute a malfunction of the representational system, since 
under certain conditions some non-Os produce {Ri}iε[1,n]. But, it will readily be noted that the 
problem of PCR has just been introduced at one level higher: Since, S occurs in response to 
Os by occurring in response to {Ri}iε[1,n], in virtue of what does S represent Os rather than a 
disjunction of the elements of {Ri}iε[1,n]? If we once again appeal to Neander‟s principle, then 
the content of S will be a disjunction of the Ri rather than O. If there is some alternative 
principle to which we can appeal, then what reason do we have to believe that it will not 
displace NPM/NPM*?  
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Hence, Neander‟s appeal to inferential processes in perception must assume the prior 
existence of states, within a cognitive system capable of such inference, which have 
appropriate distal contents. Under these conditions, I agree that if human perceptual processes 
are inferential, then this would explain how misrepresentation without malfunction is 
possible. However, what account can be given for the fixation of this prior content? If it is a 
teleological account, then it too will face, and must solve, PCR. On the other hand, if there is 
some non-teleological account of content on which a teleological account amended with 
NPM/NPM* must depend in order to account for misrepresentation without malfunctioning, 
then it would seem that we would have adequate reason to abandon the teleological account 
so amended in pursuit of this alternative theory of mental content. For, the fact that the 
amended teleological account leaves explanatory gaps which an alternative account of 
content must fill, suggests that there are not really two adequate accounts of content here, but 
rather that the teleological account isn‟t really accounting for mental content.  
 
5.4. Appeals to Representation Consumers 
Millikan (1991, pp.162-163) argues that the content of the frog‟s representational state is 
food, since it is only when the state mapped suitably onto food that the way it has historically 
been used by its consumers allowed for the performance of their proper functions (Papineau, 
1997). Hence, a mapping between the state and food would appear in the Normal explanation 
of the proper function of the consumer in responding to the state.  
 
There are two problems with this solution. First, as Neander (1995) and Papineau (1997) both 
note Millikan‟s argument compels us to go further up the concertina: Just as historically it 
was only when the representation mapped onto food that the tongue reflex and digestive 
systems contributed to fitness, just so, it was only when the ingested food enhanced the health 
of the frog that the circulatory and cellular molecular processing mechanisms correctly 
performed their proper functions and contributed to frog fitness; and the argument recurs. We 
can see that this result readily generalises. Hence, Millikan‟s solution either: (i) cannot 
explain how it is possible for there to be representation of any item described on any level 
other than the top-most level of a concertina of proper functions, or (ii) must render 
disjunctive contents (where the disjuncts in the case of the frog would be „food‟ and the 
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relevant items mentioned on the levels of description above food in the concertina). Since, 
very often the items mentioned at the top-most level are not the intuitively plausible contents 
of representational states, and since it is surely possible for items appearing at lower levels of 
description to be represented, (i) would be unpalatable. However, (ii) would not resolve PCR 
as it appears in the field of naturalistic semantics. Hence, on either (i) or (ii), Millikan‟s 
solution is inadequate.  
 
Second, Millikan motivates her approach to teleosemantics by emphasising that it is the 
effects of the representation producers on consumers‟ functioning which are relevant to 
natural selection, and not the causes of the production of such states. But divorcing contents 
from their causes, and fixing them in relation to consumer proper functions often yields 
intuitively implausible contents. For example Pietroski (1992) has argued that dimming light 
at nightfall may in some species trigger an internal representational state, S, which causally 
contributes to falling asleep. This effect causally contributes to the fitness of the species, 
partly, by protecting the organism from predators. Since one of the representation consumers 
is the system which brings about the falling asleep of the animal, and since this system has 
contributed to the survival and proliferation of the species, when it has, partly in virtue of 
protecting the organism from predators, it seems plausible that the mapping between S and 
predator is a Normal condition for the performance of the Normal proper functions of the 
representation consumer.  Hence, on Millikan‟s account it would seem that S represents 
predator rather than nightfall, or darkness, etc., contra intuition.  
      
5.5. Appeals to More Sophisticated Cognitive Abilities 
Papineau (1997) attempts to utilize elements of both Neander 's solution and Millikan‟s 
solution within his (1993) teleosemantic account. Papineau (1997) takes the relevant states of 
selection to be whole propositional attitudes, and suspects that in the case of cognitively 
simple organisms, like the frog, there is no fact of the matter about which of the concertina 
levels provides the correct content. He holds that it is the effect of desires which are content 
determining. On his (1993) theory a “desire's real satisfaction condition [is] that effect which 
it is the desire's biological purpose to produce” (p. 58-59). Similarly “the real truth condition 
of a belief [is] that condition which it is the biological purpose of the belief to be co-present 
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with” (p.59). For Papineau, belief content derives from desire content. Thus, Papineau‟s 
(1997) solution to PCR is to argue that the content of desires is determined by their specific 
effects (in Neander‟s sense) and the content of beliefs is determined derivatively from this 
specific desire content. The specific effect of a desire, in turn, is that effect which is: (i) 
relatively independent of the particular beliefs with which the desire combines; (ii) 
independent of the functioning of other nonrepresentational systems. Hence, it seems that this 
two stage algorithm is intended to define, in every particular case, two sets of effects, the 
intersection of which yields a singleton, which is the specific effect of the desire.  
 
This solution is attractive for (i) the emphasis it places on the selection for effects, (ii) one 
type of possibility of combining Neander‟s analysis with other principles; (iii) the emphasis 
on differential levels of cognitive complexity in fixing content. However, ultimately 
Papineau‟s proposal is unsatisfactory. First, it does not adequately demarcate the two sets of 
effects, the intersection of which is supposed to yield a single determinate content. Second, 
the particular kind of cognitive complexity which it requires for determinate content is 
ultimately untenable within an evolutionary perspective which appeals to natural selection.  
 
It is important to note that although Papineau seems to intend his proposed solution as a 
general one, he gives no reason to think that in general the two sets identified by application 
of his algorithm will have a singleton as their intersection, rather than a set consisting of more 
than one element, or no elements at all. In fact, we can show that there is good reason to think 
that in general Papineau‟s algorithm will not yield a singleton as the intersection between the 
two sets, and in particular that it does not do so in the specific case described by him.  
 
First, it seems to me that the first stage of the algorithm can, in principle, yield a determinate 
set of effects in a way that is acceptable within a naturalistic theory of content. I take the best 
formulation of his basic idea to be that under conditions of proper functioning of the belief 
and desire systems, there either is or can be a wide variation in the particular beliefs 
(specified non-intentionally) with which the desire can combine such that a certain class of 
effects (call it EP) remains invariant under these variations. Hence, the notion of 
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independence of desire effects from particular beliefs, is underpinned by the idea that under 
conditions of proper functioning of the belief and desire systems (or, perhaps, better, the 
belief and desire types themselves) there will be a counterfactual dependence between the 
desire (specified non-intentionally) and a particular class of effects, such that were that desire 
to obtain then that class of effects would obtain. 
 
The crucial question for Papineau‟s account, however, is whether it is possible for any 
element in EP to be such that if it were not to obtain then this would entail a malfunction of 
the desire which caused it. That is whether there is any member of EP which is independent 
of the functioning of other non-representational systems. I think that it is clear that the answer 
to this question in the particular case which Papineau describes has to be „no‟.92 If we 
eliminate the set of distal effects through Neander‟s analysis, then we should also eliminate 
the effect of one‟s stomach receiving food: This effect also depends on other systems, namely 
the system responsible for the peristaltic movements of the oesophagus; this dependence, 
moreover, implies that should food not get into one‟s stomach this doesn‟t necessarily mean 
that the desire is malfunctioning. 
 
Given the above discussion of Neander‟s proposal, we can, of course generalise this result. 
For Papineau‟s account is an example of an attempt to combine NPM with the additional 
principle that the desire must be independent of any particular belief. Applying the arguments 
presented against Neander to the present case, we see that, in general, we can expect the 
occurrence of any distal effect of a desire to depend on the contribution of factors lying 
outside of the immediate desire producing system. Even when beliefs and desires are 
functioning properly and the environment is similar enough to the one in which the most 
recent episode of selection of these cognitive structures took place, distal effects of a desire 
(i.e. the elements in EP) may fail to occur.  
 
                                                   
92 In this example, he applies his algorithm to a system with a belief desire psychology in the attempt to show 
that the subject‟s stomach receiving food is the specific effect of a desire for food. 
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This is, in fact a feature which is readily recognisable from our belief-desire folk psychology. 
Different beliefs combine with a desire to cause different behaviours so as to facilitate the 
desire causing its proper effects despite changing circumstances (cf. Papineau, 1997). Though 
beliefs may inform the agent about aspects of the world relevant to the satisfaction of its 
desires, there are features of the world beyond the agent‟s ken which may thwart this 
satisfaction. These features moreover may be internal or external to the agent, but will 
concern either larger systems of which the agent forms a part or smaller systems which form 
part of the agent. Applying this to a biological context implies that the failure of occurrence 
of a distal effect of a desire does not intuitively entail that either the beliefs/desires on which 
the agent acted or the environment is abnormal. 
    
However, this is not a satisfactory result as far as Papineau‟s analysis is concerned, because it 
entails that there is no member of EP which is such that the failing to obtain of that member 
entails the malfunctioning of the desire. Hence, it seems, we must conclude that the set 
generated by the intersection of the two sets identified by Papineau‟s algorithm will, in 
general, be empty. If PCR generated too many contents, then Papineau‟s solution to it 
generates too few.
93
      
 
What Papineau needs, in fact, to make his proposal successful is not just the notion of 
conditions of proper functioning, but rather the notion of conditions of optimal functioning, 
such that in optimal conditions the non-occurrence of a certain member of EP entails the 
malfunction of the desire. However, by hypothesis all of the effects in EP are effects for the 
production of which the desire type was selected. Hence, there is no one member of EP 
relative to which we can fix the optimal conditions sought. Rather, we can define conditions, 
Ce(i) for each member of EP, e(i), such that under Ce(i), the non-occurrence of e(i) entails the 
malfunction of the desire. Which of these conditions will qualify as optimal for the 
                                                   
93 Why can‟t Papineau adapt his proposal so that it comes out as an instance of NPM*? Because, then we would 
need principled grounds for taking the specific effect of the desire to be the lowest element in EP, and neither 
Papineau nor Neander gives us such grounds. Of course the lowest element in EP will be more specific to the 
desire than any other element in this set. But that is no guarantee that it will be very specific to the desire at all. 
So why should this relative specificity be what is required for determinate content? We would need a good deal 
of cogent argument from Papineau here, and it‟s not clear that such argument is possible in this case.     
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functioning of the desire type will depend upon the content of the desire (cf. Fodor, 1987, 
pp.105-106). Hence, the algorithm which Papineau provides for solving PCR either yields no 
content for representational states, or yields such content only by violating the non-circularity 
requirement on a naturalistic theory of content.    
 
The second reason for the unsatisfactory nature of Papineau‟s account is that on this account 
the proper items of selection are entire propositional attitudes (or the ability to form such). 
But there seem to be good reasons for thinking that many such existing attitudes do not have 
or cannot have had a selectional history. In response to this Papineau seems to appeal to some 
form of (perhaps limited) compositionality (Godfrey-Smith, 1996; Papineau, 1993). 
However, that a complex structure has a selectional explanation does not imply that each part 
of it has such an explanation to call its own: Certain features of a complex structure may be 
necessary by-products of the collection and ordering of other features which are selected for 
and/or which are essential to the selectional explanation of the whole (e.g. the human chin 
seems to be a necessary by-product of the selection of jaw structures) (Gould & Lewontin, 
1979). We need a principled reason for thinking that even though the proper object of 
selection is an entire complex structure, a desire, the relevant individual parts of it to which 
Papineau wishes to appeal have appropriate proper functions, and, therefore, content (see also 
Godfrey-Smith, 1996).  
 
This suggests to me that a better strategy is to apply our teleological account to simpler 
semantic parts and to compositional rules. This, of course, makes it more likely that 
cognitively more simple organisms share certain representational capacities with cognitively 
more complex organisms (see also Godfrey-Smith, 2002). As has been suggested in section I 
above, this strategy is also supported on independent grounds.         
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VI 
RESULTS AND AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
 
The above discussion displays a strong and revealing pattern. The biggest points of success 
(or at least strong promise of such success) for TRP lies in the resolution of PNC, PIR and 
PER. Importantly, this success derives squarely from (i) the teleological nature of the 
account, (ii) its consumer-based nature, and (iii) the natural accommodation of an 
isomorphism requirement. Hence, we cannot derive the same benefits by removing the 
determinative role of the consumer. However, this focus on the consumer generates, in 
certain cases, highly unintuitive contents.  
 
These contents are not generated by information-based accounts. Moreover, such accounts, 
particularly when amended with a teleological graft, look appealing (despite their problems) 
in solving HP and VP. However, indication-based teleological accounts are not viable and it 
seems to be a consequence of consumer based accounts that the particular causal history of 
the representation is irrelevant to its content. Hence it would seem that consumer based 
teleology is incompatible with information based semantics.  
 
Moreover, even if it were possible to blend these two approaches, the particular blend would 
still be left with the problems of multiple consumers and PCR. With respect to this latter 
problem, though each attempted solution reviewed above has value, none adequately resolves 
the problem. 
 
The purpose of this final section is to attempt to do two things. First, to show that an 
information-based semantics is not incompatible with a consumer-based teleological one. 
Second, to sketch how an account blended from these two perspectives can: (a) address the 
problems of HP and VP whilst mitigating the problem of multiple consumers, and (b) 
address PCR in a way which utilises the insights of, whilst avoiding the difficulties 
associated with, each of the attempted solutions reviewed above.  
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6.1. Information and Informational and Consumer-Based Semantics Revisited 
We have seen in sections III and IV, above that accounts which are based on a notion of 
information requiring a suitably high conditional probability of the instancing of the property 
expressed by a representation on the tokening of that representation face deep and severe 
difficulties. Indeed, on quite independent grounds, I think that it can be shown that an account 
of information such as DI1, in order to satisfy the motivating conditions for its adoption, must 
be amended with a broadly causal condition, in part of the form embodied in FI. Moreover, it 
can be shown that there is no sustainable weaker notion of information of the form embodied 
in DI2 which is amenable to inclusion in a satisfactory theory of mental content.
94
 
  
Nevertheless, the attraction of an information-based semantics is undeniable. Consider, then, 
the following formalised notion of information, drawing on the accounts of both Dretske and 
Fodor: 
(ICN) For all X, for all Y, Xs carry the information that Y if and only if: 
(i) Ys qua Ys cause Xs qua Xs; 
(ii) Ys have actually caused Xs; 
(iii) 0<P(Y,X).  
Let us say that Xs are apt for carrying the information that Y if and only if (i) and (iii) hold. It 
is questionable whether there is any theoretical work left for clause (iii) to do in a theory of 
information per se. However, if our interest lies in the construction of an information-related 
notion tailored to a naturalistic semantics then I think that (iii) earns its keep. 
 
 
                                                   
94 The abandonment of DI1 and DI2 is partly motivated by the consideration, defended in sections III and IV 
above, that they are untenable as far as a naturalistic semantics is concerned. However, for details of the 
„independent grounds‟ mentioned in the text, and for discussion of how these grounds can be seen to motivate 
the account of information adopted here, see Nicholson (2012).  
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Consider, then the following account of representation:  
(TRPINF) An inner state X is a representation of some condition Y iff: 
(a) Xs are apt for carrying the information that Y; 
(b) that X is related by a certain correspondence rule, R, to Y is a necessary condition 
on the performance of the Normal proper function of the consumers of X;  
(c) Y admits of variations, within the class of representeds into which it falls, which 
accord, one-to-one, with a set of rule-governed transformations of the class of 
representations into which X falls;  
(d) the rule-governed transformations of X have as a Normal condition of their proper 
function the corresponding variation of Y. 
As before, to say that X Normally maps, according to mapping, M, onto Y, encapsulates (b), 
(c) and (d).  
 
In (TRPINF) the mapping relation, M, is partially constituted by a conditional probability 
requirement stipulating that P(Y,X) = p>0. However, the exact value of p is determined by 
the needs of the consumer; that is p will depend upon the degree of probabilistic dependence 
between X and Y which is (part of) a Normal condition on the proper functioning of the 
consumers of X.  
 
We should take a moment to pause over this point. Taking a leaf out of Millikan‟s (2004) 
book, we can say that the reference class for X is the set of all Xs individuated by their 
proximal genetic origin;
95
 the reference class for Y is simply the set of all Ys.
96
 The 
conditional probability must be underwritten by some condition which explains its 
                                                   
95 That is Xs form a higher order reproductively established family (Millikan, 1984). 
96 This is one reason why it might be better to impose a homomorphism requirement rather than an isomorphism 
requirement: This weakening would allow for the correspondence function between representation and 
represented to be non-surjective. Nevertheless it doesn‟t necessitate the adoption of the weaker requirement so 
long as we can restrict the range of the correspondence function in a suitable way. 
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persistence, in line with Dretske (1988) and Millikan (2004). This is unproblematic, because 
the causal condition will help us to avoid the unwanted consequences that this interpretation 
of the correlation between Xs and Ys has (as noted above).  
 
Hence, the representation consumers determine p, since it is relative to their needs that certain 
states are selected (in part) for correlating in accordance with this conditional probability. It 
is, at least partly, by this mechanism that the conditional probability persists (cf. Millikan, 
2004). Nevertheless, the class of possible representational states on which the proper 
functioning of the representation consumers „acts‟ so as to determine the value of p, is 
delimited by the restriction that Xs qua Xs must be caused by Ys qua Ys.
97
 Hence, the above 
account makes representation harder to achieve. This is because, on this account, 
representational content is a „two-way‟ relation between organism and world. Not every 
physical system will be able to support this relation. 
 
We are now in a position to see why a consumer-based teleological semantics is not 
incompatible with an informational semantics (properly construed). As Millikan (2007) notes 
since proper functions are effects which are selected for, it cannot be a proper function of a 
representation producing system to be caused in a certain way (see also Godfrey-Smith 
(1992)). Nevertheless, the fact that representation tokens have certain effects on their 
consumers, which effects are biologically advantageous from an evolutionary point of view 
because the representation relates to some external condition (i.e. because the effects occur in 
a certain relation to this external condition), can cause the representation type to be selected 
(Millikan, 2004; cf. Millikan‟s (1984) notion of a relational proper function).  
 
Hence, consumer-based teleological accounts concern the organism-world direction of 
dependence, and only concern the world-organism direction of dependence insofar as it 
affects this first dependence (this is made clear in TRP‟s requirement that the representation 
map onto the world). Hence, they do not preclude a further requirement (in this case a causal 
                                                   
97 Consistent with this they may also be caused by Zs qua Zs. 
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requirement) being imposed to characterise the world-organism direction of dependence, 
unless this precludes any role for the representation consumer in determining the character of 
the organism-world dependence. Clearly (ICN) doesn‟t do this. 
 
The addition of the extra condition to (TRP) does not undermine its virtues in addressing 
PNC, PIR and PER. Let‟s then look at the prospects of (TRPINF) being able to offer us a 
satisfactory resolution of the remaining difficulties. The following diagrams will facilitate the 
discussion which follows. 
 
6.1.1. HP 
Informational semantic theories which attempt to deal with HP by identifying the item on the 
horizontal axis which bears the appropriate counterfactual supporting relation to the relevant 
representational state type face the problem of disjunctive proximal contents. We have noted 
above that TRP promises to avoid this problem. On the other hand, an informational 
requirement like that embodied in TRPINF, clause (i), promises to avoid the problem that the 
contents generated by TRP may not fall on the horizontal axis at all.  
 
It was noted above that this is a problem for TRP if this feature of the account allows 
unintuitive contents to be attributed. The „predator‟ example of Pietroski (1992), cited above, 
shows that this is indeed the case (as does the Kimu/Snorf example in Pietroski (1992)). What 
has gone wrong in each of these examples is that the state type which is tokened does not 
bear an appropriate „sensitivity‟ to the condition which TRP attributes to it as its content.  
 
On the other hand, TRPINF yields the intuitively correct contents in these cases. For example, 
even if there is a counterfactual supporting relation which obtains between predator and the 
property of causing some internal state of the organism, this is not the state type which is 
tokened in response to dimming light at nightfall. Rather, the counterfactual supporting 
relation which obtains there is between nightfall or dimming light and the internal state. 
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Hence, if the creature represents anything it represents these two features of the world. 
Similar comments apply to the Kimu/Snorf case in Pietroski (1992). 
 
Now, we have already noted that Millikan thinks that it is a drawback of associating the 
contents of a state with items which either do or can bear a certain causal relation to the state 
that this association will not allow one to get past these causal properties. Hence, she thinks 
that such an account cannot render distal contents like food, whereas an account like (TRP) 
can. Hence, the thought is „so the much better for TRP‟. However, it seems to me that on 
reflection we can equally well respond „so the much worse for accounts such as TRP‟. It is, 
of course, a virtue of an account if it can explain how an organism can acquire concepts such 
as that of food. However, it is a vice of an account if it renders this sort of content 
indiscriminately to simple and complex cognitive systems alike. The point is that the concept 
of food seems to be a reasonably sophisticated one. Hence, it seems implausible to think that 
a very simple organism (which is how the frogs or tortoises have been portrayed in the 
literature) actually has the ability to think about food qua food (cf. Neander, 2004). However, 
there is no principled reason on (TRP) not to attribute this content to simple creatures; and 
the same goes for any other sophisticated concepts, in particular abstract, theoretical concepts 
which refer to properties which make a difference to an animal‟s biological success. 
 
In contrast, it seems to me that an account such as (TRPINF) can do a much better job here. 
My suggestion is that the possession of these sorts of concepts is dependent on reasonably 
sophisticated existing representational and/or non-representational features of the organism. 
For present purposes, let‟s assume that food is a functional kind, so that food is anything 
which has the disposition to maintain life and growth on ingestion. As the above definition 
indicates, functional kinds, like food are defined by certain of their characteristic effects. The 
concern, I take it, is that it is not the properties in virtue of which something (e.g. a fly) 
satisfies this functional description which are causally relevant in producing a 
representational state in an organism (e.g. a frog).  
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However, though the sorts of examples with which the literature has been concerned seem to 
bear this out they do not show that it is not possible for a representational system to have 
states which are causally sensitive to such properties. In general, my suggestion is that as 
long as the representational system is complex enough to have states which are causally 
sensitive to those properties, the characteristic effects of which qualify them for membership 
in some functional kind, it is not precluded, on a broadly causal account, from representing 
such properties.  
 
And, undoubtedly there are such systems. For example, there is clear evidence that the pig 
regulates its control of food (both within a meal and over the course of meals) according to 
the nutritional content of the items ingested (Houpt, 1984).
98
 One of the negative feedback 
mechanisms which is present in the pig to control dietary intake might be a glucostatic 
control (i.e. one based on the monitoring of metabolisable glucose in the digestive system) 
(Houpt, 1984). Supposing this sort of complexity to also exist in the frog, the situation is 
modelled in figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9 
                                                   
98 For, example when the pig ingests items which have been mixed with indigestible material, food intake in 
subsequent meals is seen to increase (Houpt, 1984, p.1346). 
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Clearly, these sorts of controls are causally sensitive to exactly those properties in virtue of 
which an item qualifies as food (qua those properties). Moreover, supposing that state S4 in 
the diagram is an input into a device which modulates the effects of S3 on the behavioural 
system responsible for acquiring food, this device will only perform its Normal proper 
function when S4 maps onto food. Hence, by (TRPINF) S4 has the content food. 
 
This example is intended to demonstrate the possibility of some internal state being such that 
it is causally sensitive to the more distal concertina effects the mapping onto which is 
Normal. However, the general point is that as long as the properties with which we are 
concerned have certain (characteristic) effects, to which the system can be sensitive (in the 
appropriate sense) there is nothing in principle which precludes that system from representing 
those properties on an account of content which includes a (broadly) causal condition.  
 
Similar points carry over to the case of having the concept of theoretical entities. However, in 
this case, since we are dealing with natural kinds, the effects must also be „captured‟ in an 
intension. In general it seems that it is possible to have states which are sensitive to these 
characteristic effects, since it is most plausibly by such effects that we know about these 
properties, and we do take ourselves to have such knowledge. Even in the case of functional 
kinds, intensions may often play a significant role in the development of a state which is 
causally sensitive in the requisite way. 
 
The simple cases with which the literature has often been preoccupied (e.g. frogs, toads, 
tortoises) have explored the causal production of a state such as S3 in isolation and 
consequently concluded that the more distal concertina effects play no role in the causal 
production of the state. The present proposal doesn‟t fall into that trap. However, the 
example, above, it seems doesn‟t give us quite what we want, since by (TRPINF), S3 does not 
have the content food. Yet the effects of S3 and S4 on the behavioural system seem to „make 
sense‟ only if S3 has the same content as S4. Is this a problem?  
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I don‟t think so. We might say that (TRP) gives conditions on a content-like state (say 
„proto-content‟, borrowing the term from Papineau (1993)), which helps to „explain‟ events 
in the sense of showing historically how a certain subsystem/device/arrangement contributed 
toward fitness and was selected. However, over time, an organism may develop states which 
are causally sensitive to certain features of the environment which it proto-represents in 
proto-content. In our example, this would allow such states to have the content food. Such a 
state may come to be associated with the proto-content state (intuitively, in our example, by 
learning that the flies are food), and even to replace the latter state in terms of its effects on its 
consumers. This would be biologically advantageous, since it would allow the advantageous 
effects of producing certain behavioural responses in the presence of food to generalise 
beyond the organism‟s original environment. 
 
The important point is that, given enough complexity (including complex movement patterns 
that require the organism to generalise across contexts), it is plausible to think that the 
processes appealed to in (TRPINF) could yield the genuine content food for S3. However, the 
fact that S3 needn‟t have this content shouldn‟t worry us excessively, since it is arguably only 
in such suitably complex systems that the possibility of rational explanation of behaviour 
becomes a requirement. Moreover, (TRPINF) seems to do a better job of such rational 
explanation. Indeed that (TRP) is insufficient in this regard is one of the points of Pietroski‟s 
(1992) cases; that (TRPINF) can accommodate them, therefore, counts in its favour.     
 
Notice finally that on (TRPINF) representational structures would be selected in part for their 
ability to produce certain effects in the context of items to which they are causally sensitive. 
This is a structural feature of the state, whilst the effects produced determine the state‟s 
existence over time. Hence, the account accommodates Agar‟s points rather nicely.    
 
 
 
118 
 
6.1.2. VP 
In the discussion of (TRP), the central problem raised for the account‟s response to VP was 
claimed to be the problem generated by the possibility of multiple consumers. Does (TRPINF) 
fare any better? For my own part I think that it does; however, it is difficult to give a decisive 
demonstration that this is the case. To see the central virtue of (TRPINF) with respect to this 
problem suppose that there are numerous representation consumers such that their Normal 
proper functioning does not render a unique item onto which the representation is to map. 
Still, it may be the case that not all of these items will fall under a type which bears an 
appropriate counterfactual supporting relation to the property of being a cause of 
representations of the type in question. Hence, (TRPINF) gives greater discriminative 
machinery and makes it far less likely that there will be genuine indeterminacy of content 
arising from the existence of multiple consumers. 
 
Will there always be this singularity of content? Well arguably if there were, that would show 
that there is something wrong with the theory which generates the contents: For there are 
surely mental representations which are genuinely ambiguous, and, perhaps, disjunctive. 
What is required of a good theory of content is to show how it is possible for there to be 
univocal non-disjunctive contents, disjunctive contents and ambiguous contents (cf. Fodor, 
1990b) and, I think, to allow or support the idea that the first set of contents is much larger 
than the second two. (TRPINF) does this quite nicely. A representational state will have a 
univocal determinate content if the mappings between the representation and the world which 
are Normal conditions for the proper functioning of each of the representation consumers 
converge onto one item mapped, and this item is such that the representational state is apt to 
carry information about it. A representation, X, will have a disjunctive content if there exists 
a representation consumer, C, there exist mappings, M and M*, between X and Y, and 
between X and Y*, respectively (Y≠Y*), such that X is apt to carry information about Y and 
about Y*, and each of M and M* historically facilitated the successful performance of the 
proper functions of C as it responded to X.
99
 Here the correspondence rules which partly 
                                                   
99 Alternatively, though not equivalently, a representation, X, will have a disjunctive content if the mapping 
between the representation and the property picked out by a disjunctive predicate in English is a Normal 
condition for the performance of the proper function/s of the consumer of X. 
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constitute M and M* may be the same. A representation, X, will have an ambiguous content 
if there exist representation consumers of X, C and C*, there exist mappings M and M*, 
between X and Y, and between X and Y*, respectively (Y≠Y*), such that X is apt to carry 
information about Y and about Y*, and M historically facilitated the successful performance 
of C‟s proper functions as C responded to X, and similarly with respect to M* in the case of 
C*.
100
 
101
  
 
Figure 10 
 
Since it seems plausible that in the case of paradigmatic representational systems, which will 
be complex, there are a number of representation consumers, and since (TRP) cannot give us 
principled reasons to suspect that the Normal mappings of such consumers will converge in 
the way required for definite content, (TRP) suffers from a theoretical disadvantage when 
compared to (TRPINF). Of course, this latter account also cannot guarantee that there will 
always be univocality of content; and nor should it. However, it does give principled grounds 
                                                   
100 We can generalize this definition of ambiguous content to the case in which there are more than two 
consumers. In this generalization, we require that the Normal mappings required by non-empty, disjoint subsets 
of the set of consumers converge onto different distinct items. Note, also that the definitions can interact with 
one another giving, e.g., ambiguous contents where the ambiguity is between two (or more) disjunctive 
contents. 
101 See figure 10 for a diagrammatic representation of these definitions. 
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to expect that univocality of content can be expected in the main; at least it gives us greater 
grounds for thinking this than does (TRP).  
 
More importantly it gives principled grounds for thinking that when there is not this sort of 
univocality, there is genuine ambiguity/disjunction of content, and it does this in a more 
satisfactory way than (TRP). For, in the case where there is a plurality of content, neither the 
causal structure of the world as it pertains to the representational states of the organism, nor 
the needs/functioning of the organism as this pertains to the world can decide in favour of one 
determinate content over another. (TRPINF), therefore, cannot decide between alternative 
contents (or render non-disjunctive contents) unless the world-organism and organism-world 
interactions can decide the matter. As far as a naturalistic theory of content goes, I think that 
this is the best that one can hope for; it is certainly better than relinquishing rights to univocal 
content just in case content cannot be univocally attributed in terms of one of these 
relationships, as (TRP) does.      
 
6.1.3. PCR 
The lesson of the discussion thus far has been to suggest that an appeal to the cognitive 
complexity of a system can yield fruitful results. This is the crucial point which paves the 
way to an adequate resolution of PCR. The two main lessons which I will be taking from our 
discussion of this problem in the previous section are as follows: 
(i)   Neander‟s suggestion is promising, but unsuccessful when applied within a 
producer-based teleosemantic framework; 
(ii)   Papineau‟s focus on the degree of cognitive complexity of the organism is on the 
right track; however, the sort of complexity which is relevant is not the 
sophistication of the type of representational state, but rather the complexity of the 
system of states of which it forms a part; 
The conclusion for which I wish to argue is that Millikan‟s suggestion can render contents 
which feature on both higher and lower levels of a concertina of proper functions when 
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suitably combined with revised versions of the suggestions of Neander (in line with (i)) and 
Papineau (in line with (ii)). 
 
Consider figure 9, above, and figure 11, below.  
 
Figure 11 
 
The digestive system has a concertina of proper functions of its own. However, by 
application of Neander‟s analysis of the notion of a specific function, this system has a 
function which is specific to it, namely the reception and digestion of food. The digestive 
system‟s specific function consequently determines, as the specific proper function of that 
part of the behavioural system which serves the digestive system, the acquisition of food: It is 
only when the behavioural system managed to acquire food that the digestive system 
historically performed its most specific proper function. 
 
The basis for Neander‟s suggestion was the analysis of proper functions in biology; what 
caused the problem was her attempt to apply the same analysis directly to the representation 
producers within an organism. However, on a consumer-based semantics once we have 
applied the analysis to the representation consumer, no further application is necessary in 
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order to make the analysis relevant to representation, since it is the proper functioning of the 
consumer of a representation type which determines the content of that representation type. 
 
Hence, the first criticism which was raised against Millikan‟s response to PCR (namely that 
either it cannot avoid assigning content from the topmost level of the concertina of functions 
or it must assign disjunctive contents) can be avoided. In the case of the frog, the mapping 
between representation, S, and the world which is a Normal condition for the successful 
performance of the most specific function of the representation consumer is the mapping 
between the representation and food. We have noted that the consumer focus of accounts 
such as (TRPINF) entails that the proper function of the representation producing system is to 
produce representations which map, so, onto the world. Hence, we might say that the most 
specific proper function of (that part of) the producing system which is responsible for S is to 
produce representations which map, so, onto the property food. 
 
Now, suppose that the representation producing system is embedded within further 
representation producing systems, so that it is both a representation producer and a 
representation consumer.
102
 The question is what mapping must obtain between S2 and the 
world, and between S1 and the world in order for representational systems 3 and 2 to 
successfully perform their Normal proper functions, respectively. The answer which I wish to 
give is that S2 must map, according to mapping M2, onto fly and S1 must map, according to 
mapping M1, onto small, dark moving thing. For, we have assumed that in the frog‟s Normal 
habitat food is Normally flies and flies are Normally small, dark and moving. Moreover, we 
have assumed that the frog succeeds in mapping onto („detecting‟ in the original presentation) 
food by mapping onto flies, and that it succeeds in mapping onto flies by mapping onto small, 
dark moving things. Without this assumption the problem of PCR simply does not arise.  
 
                                                   
102 The case is modelled in Figure 11, from which the designating terms which follow are taken, with 
„representational system 3‟ corresponding to the producer system which is responsible for S (hence, S will be 
referred to as S3 from here on). 
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But notice that a Normal explanation is an explanation of how a proper function was 
historically performed on those (perhaps few) occasions when it was successfully performed 
(Millikan, 1989). That is which features of the environment were causally responsible for the 
successful performance of the relevant proper function. Hence, the problem of PCR arises 
only on the assumption that a concertina of means can be selected for achieving a concertina 
of (mostly intermediate) ends. However, on this assumption and on the assumption of the 
existence of suitable representational complexity in the relevant organism, it is correct to 
describe the Normal explanations for the performance of the proper functions of 
representational systems 1, 2 and 3, respectively, as including reference to the mappings 
between S1 and the world, S2 and the world and S3 and the world, respectively, which are 
represented in figures 8 and 10.  
 
Notice that the most proximate Normal explanations will include reference only to the 
mapping at the level directly „below‟ the system the proper performance of which the 
explanation explains. And it is only the most proximate explanation which is relevant to 
content determination in each case (cf. Millikan, 1989). Notice also that although each system 
in Figures 8 and 10 will have as proper functions all of the proper functions of the systems 
above it, applying Neander‟s analysis to each consumer respectively delimits only one 
representationally relevant function  for each producer.   
 
Hence, we are able to render determinate content to representational states within a 
teleological framework through the combination of certain central insights which can be 
extracted from the range of unsuccessful approaches to PCR in the literature. However, in 
order for this solution to generate determinate contents, the representational system must 
demonstrate a suitable complexity, in the respects indicated above, which matches that of the 
complexity of the environment as this environmental complexity pertains to the concertina of 
proper functions.
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103 It should also be noted that this model of representation has something in common with (and perhaps gains 
some empirical support from the evidence informing) the computational models which Neander (1995) cites. 
For it conceives of representation of, e.g., medium-sized objects as being generated out of simpler 
representations of certain qualitative features of those objects. However, notice that this model does not depend 
upon inference in representation formation. Hence it avoids all of the difficulties which arose for Neander‟s 
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6.1.4. Counterintuitive Contents Again 
One final issue should be addressed before closing. A further objection in the literature on 
accounts such as (TRP) has been that such accounts yield counterintuitive contents because 
they must render contents that are overly specific (Neander, 2004). Neander (2004) notes, for 
instance, that a variety of specific conditions can prevent a contribution to the fitness of the 
frog even when the frog ingests a fly/some food. For example if the fly is infected with some 
disease, or if a crow eats the frog soon after ingestion. Hence, she notes that it has been 
argued that an account such as (TRP) must render the content of the frog‟s representational 
state as fly that has not been infected, when no crow is standing by..., where the ellipses 
allow, in principle, for an indefinite number of further conditions to be added. 
 
Notice, however, that (TRPINF) can easily avoid this consequence, when it is read as it has 
been suggested it should be in the previous subsection. In this form it has two points of 
recourse in answering the objection. The first is to point out that the most specific proper 
function of the representation consumers in the case of the frog is to acquire, to receive and to 
digest food; the most specific proper function is not to contribute toward fitness. It is only 
that mapping which is a Normal condition for the successful performance of the most specific 
proper function of the representation consumer/s which is determinative of content. Hence, 
even though there are numerous further conditions which must be met in order for the 
consumer to perform its ultimate proper function of contributing to fitness (and even though 
numerous factors external to the consumer will need to „co-operate‟ in order for this to 
occur), this needn‟t affect the content attributions made to the organism. The second point of 
recourse is to claim that it is not true that such overly specific contents (under the description 
which renders them overly specific) cause tokens of internal representations (qua such 
representations). 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
account based on her suggestion that an appeal to inferential processes in perception could (or should) be made. 
Furthermore, the account does not require the simple representations to uniquely „define‟ some medium sized 
object. This too is a good thing, because I doubt that any such definition is possible.   
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Hence, on either line of response, content is not necessarily overly specific. This is a virtue of 
the (TRPINF). 
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VII 
CONCLUSION 
Some have wondered whether we can “[b]ake a mental cake using only physical yeast and 
flour” (Dretske, 1981, p.xi). The above discussion has attempted to show that we can: Mix 
one part information with three parts teleology, throw in a handful of representation 
producers and consumers, add a cupful of isomorphic transformations and a jar of cognitive 
complexity, mix well and bake in a philosophical oven. 
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    GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 CR = The Assumption of Content Realism: That representational properties are 
objective features of a certain class of states (i.e. mental states)  
 CE = The Assumption of Content Externalism: That the content of (at least some) 
representational states is determined, at least in part, by the relations (past or present) 
such states bear to their external environment 
 PN = The Assumption of Psychological Naturalism: That our best account of mental 
states and their representational properties should not posit or make appeal to entities 
or relations which are incompatible with (our most plausible version of) natural 
science 
 CQ = The „central question‟: In virtue of what sort of external, naturalistic relation 
does an internal, physical state come to either have or to realise a representational 
property. 
 ACA = The assumption that there are mental representational states which express 
only properties and that there are such states which refer only to individuals 
 HP = The Horizontal Problem: The problem of picking out that which is represented 
in a mental state from the other elements in the causal chain which eventually leads to 
the occurrence of an internal event. 
 VP = The Vertical Problem: The problem of picking out the set of objects to which a 
mental state refers from, on the one hand, larger sets of which this set is a subset, and, 
on the other hand, smaller sets forming a subset of this set. 
 PIR = The Problem of the Inscrutability of Reference: The problem of picking out the 
property expressed by a contentful state from other distinct yet necessarily co-
instantiated properties. 
 DP = The Problem of Disjunctivism: The problem of deflating the distinction 
between correct representation and misrepresentation by attributing a disjunctive 
content to a state. 
 PNC = The Problem of Necessarily Co-referring Contents: The problem of 
distinguishing between representational contents which are intuitively distinct yet 
necessarily co-refer. 
 PER = The Problem of Empty Representations: The problem of: (i) Accounting for 
the possibility of states which have content and no referent; (ii) accounting for how 
the content of such states could differ from one another. 
 I = The Indication Relation: X indicates Y iff if an X occurs then a Y occurs. 
 DI1 = The account of information found in Dretske (1981). Namely that: X(r) carries 
the information that Y(s) if and only if there exist some strict law of the form 
„□((...&CC)→...)‟ (where „CC‟ is a complete description of the elements of {Ci}iε[1,n], 
under the relevant types) which is true for the substitution of X in the first open 
position and Y in the second, and there exists no law of the form „□(CC→...)‟ which 
is true for the substitution of Y in the second position. 
 DI2 = The account of information found in Dretske (1986, 1988). Namely that X(r) 
carries the information that Y(s) if and only if P(Y,X) is sufficiently close to 1 and 
there is a contextually relevant condition which explains the existence/persistence of 
the correlation between X and Y. 
 FI = Fodor‟s (1990a) account of information. Namely that: Xs carry information 
about Ys (under that description) if and only if there is a nomic connection between 
the property of being a Y and the property of being a cause of Xs. That is, the 
generalization “Ys cause Xs” is a law (1990a, p.57). 
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 IS = X represents Y only if Xs carry information about Ys (or alternatively, 
only if they do so under certain circumstances).  
 SC = Dretske‟s (1981) account of the semantic content of a state type. Namely, for all 
r, s, for all X, Y, X(r) has Y(s) as its semantic content iffdef X(r) carries the 
information that Y(s) in completely digitalized form. 
 MCD1 = Dretske‟s (1981) account of mental content. Namely, for any X, Y, 
X(…)carries the information that Y(…) iffdef during the learning period, L, 
instantiations of X(…) came to have Y(…) as their semantic content.  
 LP = The reconstruction of Dretske‟s (1981) notion of the learning period. Namely: 
A period of time [t1, tn] constitutes a learning period for a mental representation, X(r) 
iff there exists some state of affairs F(s) such that: 
(i) At t1 X(r) codes in analog form the information that F(s), relative to 
channel conditions CC; 
(ii) At tn X(r) codes, for the first time, in completely digitalised form the 
information that F(s), relative to channel conditions CC.  
 L = The learning period in Dretske (1981). 
 AD = Fodor‟s asymmetric dependence account of mental representation. 
Namely, For any representational state type, X, for any property, Y, tokens of X 
express (represent) Y if: 
(iii)There is a nomic dependence between the property of being a Y and the property of 
being a cause of Xs, such that the generalisation „Ys cause Xs‟ is lawlike. 
(iv) For any property Z, if Z≠Y and there is a nomic dependence between the property of 
being a Z and the property of being a cause of Xs then the law that Zs cause Xs is 
asymmetrically dependent on the law that Ys cause Xs. 
 AC = Fodor‟s asymmetric dependence condition. Namely, for any properties X, Y, Z, 
if Z≠Y and „Y→X‟ is a law and „Z→X‟ is a law, then the nomic dependence between 
Z and X asymmetrically depends on the nomic dependence between Y and X if and 
only if: 
(iii)If „Y→X‟ were to be broken, then „Z→X‟ would be broken; 
(iv) If „Z→X‟ were to be broken then „Y→X‟ would still hold. 
 ACP = The interpretation of AC in the language of possible worlds semantics. 
Namely, for any properties X, Y, Z, if Z≠Y and „Y→X‟ is a law and „Z→X‟ is a 
law, then the nomic dependence between Z and X asymmetrically depends on the 
nomic dependence between Y and X if and only if: 
(i) There exists some possible world, W, such that in W „Ys cause Xs‟ is a law but „Zs 
cause Xs‟ is not; 
(ii) For every world, W*, if in W* „Zs cause Xs‟ is a law but „Ys cause Xs‟ is not, then W 
is closer to @ than is W*. 
 TIS = Teleological Indicator Semantics: The thesis that an inner state type X 
represents a type of state of affairs, Y, iff X has the function of indicating Y. 
 TRC = Representation Consumer Focused Teleological Semantics: The thesis that an 
inner state X is a representation and a representation of some condition Y iff: (a) that 
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X correspond by a certain rule with Y is a necessary condition on the performance of 
the proper function, in accordance with a Normal explanation, of the consumers of X; 
(b) the class of representeds, into which Y falls, admits of variations which accord 
with the conjunction of the set of correspondence rules and the rules defining the 
semantics of the system of representations. 
 PCR = The Problem of Complex Causal Roles: The problem that biological proper 
functions are not/cannot be determinate in the way required by teleological theories of 
mental content because an effect‟s causal contribution to the selection of the trait 
which is responsible for it is realized by a number of intermediary mechanisms. 
 NPF = Neander‟s interpretation of the notion of malfunction. Namely, that a 
subsystem will be considered to be malfunctioning when it fails to produce its 
biologically normal effect at the lowest level of description/analysis at which it 
appears explicitly and as an unanalysed component. 
 NPM = For any system, Q, responsible for producing a representational state, S, Q‟s 
tokening of S is a misrepresentation if and only if Q malfunctions (according to NPF) 
in producing S. 
 NPF* = The revision of NPF which attempts to accommodate distal contents. 
Namely: A subsystem is malfunctioning if it fails to successfully perform the lowest 
of its biologically normal functions within some class, ED. Here, ED is: (i) a subset of 
the concertina of functions generated by the description of the subsystem when it 
appears explicitly and as an unanalysed component; (ii) determined by certain further 
principles to which Neander appeals. 
 NPM* = The revision of NPM which attempts to accommodate distal contents. 
Namely: For any system, Q, responsible for producing a representational state, S, Q‟s 
tokening of S is a misrepresentation if and only if Q malfunctions (according to 
NPF*) in producing S. 
 ICN = The account of information adopted in section IV. Namely: For all X, for all Y, 
Xs carry the information that Y if and only if: 
(i) Ys qua Ys cause Xs qua Xs; 
(ii) Ys have actually caused Xs; 
(iii) 0<P(Y,X). 
 TRPINF = The account of mental content/representation adopted in section VI. 
Namely: An inner state X is a representation of some condition Y iff: 
(i) Xs are apt for carrying the information that Y; 
(ii) that X is related by a certain correspondence rule, R, to Y is a necessary 
condition on the performance of the Normal proper function of the consumers 
of X;  
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(iii) Y admits of variations, within the class of representeds into which it falls, 
which accord, one-to-one, with a set of rule-governed transformations of the 
class of representations into which X falls;  
(iv) the rule-governed transformations of X have as a Normal condition of their 
proper function the corresponding variation of Y. 
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